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The Pennsylvania State University
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THE RHETORIC OF DELIBERATION IN HOMER

A Thesis in
Speech Communication

by

Mari Lee Mifsud

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I argue that personal deliberation in Homer's Odyssey is a rhetorical phenomenon, an art of self-persuasion. I attempt to vindicate both the idea that there is deliberation in Homer and the idea of a Homeric rhetoric. These two ideas oppose both the Snellian view of the Homeric person as lacking agency and self-awareness, and the view held by some scholars of rhetorical history and theory to the effect that rhetoric begins in fourth century b.c.e. Athens as an activity of the public sphere. After examining and refuting the rejections of the ideas of Homeric deliberation and of Homeric rhetoric, public and private, I examine the deliberation of Telemachus, Odysseus, and Penelope. In them we see a range of deliberative activity.

In Telemachus, we see how deliberation is an acquired skill. Telemachus' incipient deliberation makes manifest the idea that his ability to deliberate is inextricably linked with his having been exposed to models of deliberation, in the form of public rhetoric, and with his having been habituated in the art. Telemachus shows signs of practicing self-directed rhetoric only after the rhetoric of Athene, Nestor, Peisistratus, and Menelaos teaches him of the necessity to deliberate and the way in which to do so.

In Odysseus, we see a master deliberator, one who has not only acquired the art but also practiced and perfected it. His mastery of the art of

self-persuasion is prominently displayed in his self-control in resisting temptations, and in his cunning intelligence as applied to each adversity that he faces.

In Penelope, we see another master deliberator, but one who must disguise her art or relinquish her freedom to practice it. Because Penelope is a woman acting in a man's world, she has no sanctioned use of deliberation. For this reason, signs of her deliberation are not explicit like Odysseus' but implicit. I argue that her deliberation is presupposed by her deliberate passivity, her self-control in the face of adversity, and her deliberate deceits of the Suitors and Odysseus.

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This project began in January 1993 when Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. and I started meeting once a week to translate various parts of Homer's Odyssey. By the next year, I had decided to write my dissertation on deliberation as self-persuasion in the Odyssey. Dr. Johnstone agreed to direct the dissertation. We continued to meet at least once a week. During our meetings, we would translate Homeric Greek, and sometimes Attic Greek, French scholarship, and German scholarship. My appreciation and understanding of these languages are results of Dr. Johnstone's instruction and partnership in translation. Our meetings also allowed for wide ranging conversations on Homer, rhetoric, philosophy, and in particular the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy revealed in the idea of deliberation as self-persuasion. Our conversations have always sparked my imagination, and continue to do so. Dr. Johnstone is not only my mentor—patient, kind, understanding, intellectually generous, and encouraging—he is my friend.

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And to my parents, Marie Mifsud and William Mifsud, I owe a debt of gratitude.

Chapter 1
HOMERIC DELIBERATION

The Problem of Homeric Deliberation

When Odysseus ventures to explore the island of Aiaia he climbs to a steep observation point and sees smoke coming from the trees in the distance. He deliberates (μερμήριξα δ' ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν) whether to investigate the smoke or return to his comrades, have dinner, and appoint a group of them to investigate the smoke (Od.10.151). As Odysseus ponders, it seems best in his mind (ὥδε δέ μοι φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι) to return to his comrades (10.153).

This is a typical example of a Homeric deliberation scene. Homer tells us that a character faces a particular problem and that his/her mind is divided. He tells us the character deliberates two alternatives. Then he tells us which was chosen. Scenes such as these where characters deliberate can be found throughout the Iliad and the Odyssey. Odysseus deliberates (μερμήριξεν) about whether to kill Melanthaus or endure (Od.17.235). Peisistratus deliberates (συμφράσσατο) about whether to take Telemachus to the ship first or return to Nestor (Od.15.202). Deiphobos deliberates (μερμήριξεν) whether to fight Idomeneus himself or to find another Trojan to do it (Il.13.455). Phemios deliberates (μερμήριξεν) about whether to slip out of the hall or make entreaty to

Odysseus (Od. 22-333-339). In each of these instances, the characters are presented as making choices. Odysseus decides to endure Melantheus' treatment of him. Peisistratus decides to take Telemachus to his ship. Deiphobos decides to find Ainias to do the dirty work. And Phemios decides to grasp Odysseus' knees and beg him for mercy.

Yet to describe these scenes as scenes of decision-making is problematic, particularly because of Homer's relative silence about how his characters deliberate. We are often given no account of the reasons for the character's choice. When Odysseus decides to return to his comrades, he gives no reason for this choice. Likewise, when he decides to spare Melantheus' life, no reason is given. When Peisistratus takes Telemachus to the ship without stopping to see Nestor first, he gives no reasons for his action. When Deiphobos decides to have Ainias fight, he doesn't explain why. And Phemios does not attempt to make it clear why grasping Odysseus' knees is a better solution than slipping out of the hall.

The lack of deliberative calculi[1] in scenes where characters are said to deliberate gives their actions a seemingly arbitrary quality. Their actions might appear arbitrary, not deliberate. Their motivation to act can seem to come not from intention but compulsion. The characters might be aware neither of their own will to choose nor of their individual freedom to act.

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[1]Throughout this dissertation, I refer to the "deliberative calculus" or the lack of a "deliberative calculus" in a given deliberation. By this I mean the posing of alternative solutions to a particular problem and the process of reasoning the feasibility or desirability of these alternatives.

The Traditional Interpretation of Homeric Deliberation

The traditional interpretation of deliberation scenes asserts that Homeric actions are not in fact the result of deliberation and decision-making. They are not actions motivated by an agent but rather reactions caused by an irresistible force acting upon a non-agent. A Homeric character does not act from his/her own motivation, but rather reacts to some external force. Joachim Böhme, the father of this paradigm of interpretation, argues that the emotion of the Homeric person breaks out spontaneously within him with unheard of force and rules him irresistibly. This emotion is not from the person but occurs in the person, in the θυμός, φρένες, or κραδίη.[2] Böhme suggests that the Homeric character has inner parts, the θυμός, φρένες, or κραδίη, which are media of emotion, each acting as a separate agent within the Homeric person. No unifying idea or organizing principle renders these parts coherent. Without this coherence, no idea of a "gesamtgemüt" (by which Böhme seems to mean "the self") can exist in the Homeric person.

Bruno Snell, who draws heavily from Böhme's classic study, argues that because no idea of the self exists in Homer, Homeric characters are unable to make choices in clear self-awareness of what they are doing.[3] As evidence of the absence of the idea of the self, Snell points out that no single, identifiable word

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[2]Joachim Böhme, Die Seele und Das Ich im Homerischen Epos, (Berlin: [Verlag und Druck von] B.G. Teubner, 1929) 89. "Der Affekt bricht spontan in ihm auf mit unerhörter Gewalt und beherrscht ihn unwiderstehlich. Das kommt nicht von ihm, es wirkt etwas "in" ihm: sein θυμός oder seine φρένες oder seine κραδίη." Similar views of the Homeric person can be found in W. Marg, Der Charakter in der Sprache der frühgriechischen Dichtung (1938 New York: Arno Press, 1979) 43-50, 76-79; M. Pohlenz, Der hellenische Mensch (Gottingen: Vandernhoeck & Ruprecht, 1947) 10-16.

[3]Bruno Snell, Gesammelte Schriften (Göttingen: Vandernhoeck, 1966) 61.

for "self" exists in the Homeric epics. Words that might look like equivalents for the "self" such as θυμός, φρένες, κήρ, νόος, κραδίη are not really equivalent at all. Instead, these words denote the inner parts of the Homeric person. The inner parts are analogous to organs with no unifying principle to render them coherent. These words do not denote the "self." From this lexical absence, Snell infers that Homeric people could not be aware of themselves as selves--as unified beings as opposed to a collection of parts.

According to Snell, without an awareness of selfhood and the agency it presupposes, Homeric people have choices made for them rather than by them. Snell explains that in some cases the instigators of action are gods, in other cases they are forces acting internally on the agent, over which s/he has no control. Snell denies that the Homeric individual deliberates or makes decisions. He describes the Homeric individual as unaware of any ability to advance from a situation through his/her own power or will:

> It should be noted especially that Homer does not know genuine personal decisions; even where a hero is shown pondering two alternatives the intervention of the gods plays the key role. This divine meddling is, or course, a necessary complement of Homer's notions regarding the human mind and the soul.[4]

Snell describes the Homeric character as merely a "vehicle" for divine will, or an "empty vessel" waiting to be filled by the impulse of the θυμός or φρένες.[5] For Snell, "Mental and Spiritual [Homeric] acts are due to the impact of external factors, and man is the open target of a great many forces which impinge

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[4]Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York: Harper & Row, 1953) 20.

[5]Snell Discovery, 14.

on him and penetrate his very core."[6] The Homeric initiative according to Snell has no source of its own; whatever is planned and executed is the plan and deed of the gods. For Snell, the Homeric person is bound to the gods since he has not yet roused himself to an awareness of his own freedom.

Hartmut Erbse agrees, arguing that Homeric characters never act from their own motivation. Because they have not yet come to the realization of their agency, Homeric characters are motivated to act from external forces, like divine will or social position, or from the orders barked at them by the θυμός, φρένες, or κραδίη.[7] Erbse states, "Wenn mithin der Mensch Homers unter dem Zwang der Konventionen handelt, entscheidet er sich nicht, sondern er fügt sich der Notwendigkeit (in Snells Terminologie: "er reagiert").[8]

Julian Jaynes characterizes Homeric individuals in a similar way claiming that they have no will of their own and certainly no notion of free will.[9] Once again, the gods take the place of a will:

> The characters of the Iliad do not sit down and think out what to do. They have no conscious minds such as we say we have and certainly no introspections . . . In fact, the gods take the place of consciousness. The beginnings of action are not in conscious plans, reasons, and motives; they are in the actions and speeches of gods.[10]

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[6]Snell Discovery, 20.

[7]Harmut Erbse, "Nachlese Zur Homerischen Psychologie," Hermes 68 (1990): p 8-10. For the idea of the inner parts, particularly the thumos, "barking orders" to a person, see also, André Cheyns, "Considérations sur les Emplois de θυμός dans Homere, Iliade VII. 67-218," L'Antiquité Classique, 50 (1981): 137-147.

[8]Erbse 9.

[9]Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976): 70.

[10]Jaynes 72.

For Jaynes, people of the Iliad do not have subjectivity, or awareness of their awareness of the world, or any internal mind-space within which to introspect. The process of planning and initiating action was wholly left to the intervention of an external force, described as follows:

> Volition, planning, initiative is organized with no consciousness whatever and then 'told' to the individual in his familiar language, sometimes with the visual aura of a familiar friend or authority figure or 'god', or sometimes as a voice alone. The individual obeyed these hallucinated voices because he could not see what to do by himself.[11]

A. W. H. Adkins makes a similar argument. Adkins describes the Homeric person as made up of separate "little people".[12] These "little people" each attempt to command the person as an external force would command. With no unifying perspective, the Homeric person never comes to consciousness of his/her own freedom to reason and make choices as a means of obtaining a desired end.

From the explanations provided by these scholars, we might conclude that deliberative calculi in deliberation scenes are absent because none were ever consulted by the Homeric character in the first place. And none were ever consulted because the Homeric person is unable to reason. In place of reason, Homeric persons rely on divine intervention or some other external force to tell them what to do to resolve their particular problems. Homeric characters really do not deliberate at all; their primitive mentality prevents them from doing so. In establishing this critique of a primitive Homeric mentality, Joachim Böhme

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[11]Jaynes 75.

[12]A. W. H. Adkins, From the Many to the One, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).

devotes a section in his founding work to comparing Homeric ideas of the soul (or the lack thereof) to those of other cultures, such as African, South American, and Australian, which he also labels "primitive."[13]

The Rejection of Traditional Views of Homeric Deliberation

This traditional view of a primitive Homeric mentality has rightly come under attack. Norman Austin points out that modern studies in structural anthropology and in the symbolic nature of language have made the alleged dichotomy between primitive and civilized cultures seem overly simplistic.[14] Austin argues, "There is no culture so primitive that it has not its own, often highly intricate and inclusive, generic categories . . . to treat Homer as merely the primitive on [the] evolutionary ladder is to ignore the intellectual concepts by which Homer organizes sense data into coherent systems."[15] Other scholars, such as David Claus, Shirley Sullivan, Bernard Knox, and Richard Gaskin form

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[13]Böhme 114-126. The section is titled, "Vergleich meit dem Glauben der Primitiven." Another scholar who believes in the "primitive" mindedness of the Homeric Greeks is J. M. Bremmer, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

[14]Norman Austin, Archery at the Dark of the Moon, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975): 84. While Austin does not identify these studies explicitly, he seems to be referring to the work of Ernst Cassirer and Claude Levi-Strauss. He credits them with helping him to understand that "we can comprehend cultures, our own no less than alien ones, only through their symbolic structures, for which words are but a partial revelation (265 f.1)."

[15]The evolutionary ladder that Austin refers to is the one built by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Mind. Austin believes that Snell's work on Homeric consciousness was influenced greatly by Hegel concept of "a dichotomy between the Ignoble Savage, all sense-consciousness, and Civilized Man, all self-conscious spirit (81)." Homer, according to Snell, believes exclusively in sense-consciousness. Austin argues that Homeric peoples are put on the "Primitive" evolutionary rung because they are being measured according to deficiency or proficiency in Western conceptual systems. On this scale, Homeric characters turn up deficient in the area of mindedness. Austin of course disagrees with the use of this evolutionary ladder.

the leading opposition to the traditional interpretation of Homeric deliberation.[16]

David Claus takes Snell to task for his notion that no unified life-force or center for action was recognized by the Homeric person. Whereas Snell argues that words such as θυμός, μένος, ἦτορ, and κήρ are analogous to other physical organs of a person and cannot be considered to reflect a unified "life-force," Claus states that these same terms denote the very "life-force" that Snell argues was non-existent:

> . . . the vocabulary of 'soul' words in the Homeric language is deeply shaped by idiosyncratic speech patterns and underlying cultural beliefs that can be approached only empirically, not through etymological inferences or suppositions about primitive logic. Whether the ideas [of] contextual 'thought' and 'life-force' are entirely adequate is less important . . . than that the existence of such fundamental patterning be recognized.[17]

Shirley Sullivan argues that even though Homeric man is very open to outside influences, he still seems to have some sense of his personal responsibility and freedom of action. Sullivan's challenge to Snell is primarily lexical.[18] She argues that lexical evidence for the self does exist in the Iliad and

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[16]See also Ruth Padel, In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self. (Princeton: princeotn University Press, 1992) and Jacques-Hubert Sautel, "La Genese de L'Acte Volontaire Chez Le Heros Homerique: Les Syntagmes D'Incitation A L'Action," Revue Etudes Grecques, CIV (1992): 263-282. While both Padel and Sautel recognize that many parts are involved in Homer mindedness, both seem to agree that a unity exists among these parts, a unity in multiplicity. Neither uses this multiplicity to argue that Homeric interiority is fragmented and incomplete.

[17]David Claus, Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of ψυχή before Plato (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) 46.

[18]Sullivan's primary work is Psychological Activity in Homer, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988.) But her other works, some published under the name Darcus, also show her preference for a lexical approach. These include the following: Shirley Darcus, "A Person's

the Odyssey. She points to the use of both the first person pronoun and the first singular reflexive pronoun to show that a person distinguished his/her experiences from those of another. Sullivan states, "In being able to speak of 'I' or 'me,' a person clearly perceives himself as a separate individual."[19] She argues that Homeric individuals "possessed their parts" which explains the frequent references to "his" or "her" θυμός or "his" or "her" φρένες. The existence of distinct names also suggests the notion of personal identity. And the common use of the "accusative of part" suggests an Homeric awareness of the "whole soul." She explains, "In this construction something affects a person both as a whole and specifically in one of his parts . . . In such situations a person either acts or is affected both as a whole and as a part and is apparently aware of these two aspects of his involvement."[20]

While Claus and Sullivan argue for the presence of a Homeric self and a level of consciousness that allows for activities such as genuine decision-making, their analyses center around cataloguing patterns in Homeric vocabulary. Claus focuses on ψυχή and Sullivan on φρένες. While both works provide invaluable empirical evidence for the existence of a self in Homer, they are both limited by their method. Understanding the full activity of the self involves something other than cataloguing lexical patterns. Lexical identification of the self is not much different from lexical rejection of the self. The shortcomings of the lexical

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Relation to φρήν in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets," Glotta 57 (1979): 159-173; "A Person's Relation to ψυχή in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets." Glotta 57 (1979): 30-39. Another scholar who uses a primarily lexical approach to study Homeric psychology is Thomas Jahn, Zum Wortfeld "Seele-Geist" in der Sprache Homers, Zetemata (Munchen: Beck, 1987). Jahn is mainly concerned with isolating and categorizing the occurrences of important words in the soul/self wordfield. From his categorizations, he argues that these words are often interchangeable and that their interchangeability demonstrates their oneness. He uses this "oneness" to establish that the psychological makeup of the Homeric individual is indeed a unity.

[19]Shirley Sullivan, Psychological 4.

[20]Sullivan 6.

method, whether used by Snell, Claus, or Sullivan have been exposed by scholars such as Bernard Knox who describe lexical arguments as both a "snare and a delusion."[21]

Knox argues that a name does not need to exist in order for its referent to be conceptualized. As an example, he points to the self-congratulatory glow of satisfaction that we might get when we hear the news of someone else's misfortunes, saying, perhaps, "Better him than me." We do not have a word for this in English. Nor do the French have a word for it. Knox explains, "When we want to describe this emotion we have to fall back on a German word, Schadenfreude. Or we could go to the ancient Greek word epichairekakia, 'rejoicing over calamities.' But no English nor French word exists." Knox then asks, "Are we to conclude that the English and the French are not fully aware of this feeling? Or that we do not experience this emotion?" He concludes that an affirmative answer to these questions would be ridiculous.[22]

Richard Gaskin agrees. He rejects the basic principle that if a culture doesn't have a word for a thing, then it does not recognize that thing's existence. He rejects the assumption behind the lexical method that "a society could never *discover* that it had all along been working, implicitly, with some concept and proceed to baptize it; rather, whenever a society coined a new term, the concept which that term denoted would simultaneously spring into existence as an *invention* of the linguistic advance." He argues that such a turn of events, presupposed by the lexical method, seems implausible.

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[21]Bernard Knox, Dead White European Males and Other Reflections on the Classics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993) 41

[22]Knox 41.

Instead, Gaskin, like Knox, claims that it is quite possible for an individual or culture to have a concept for which it possesses no name.[23] To demonstrate this, he explains how he can call someone "switched off" to describe the state of inattentiveness of that person, and those of us in the machine age will more than likely catch the analogy. Those prior to the machine age most likely would not. However, this does not mean that no one prior to the machine age was ever "switched off." Gaskin explains, "The term 'switched off' denotes--in a new way--a mental state which was around, and known to be around, long before the invention of the relevant kind of machine--namely the state of being inattentive."

Rather than a lexical approach, Gaskin opts for a philosophical approach to self-consciousness and its manifestation in the Homeric epics. Such a method works from first principles by starting with a definition of "the self":

> The self is delimited as just that thing whose defining characteristic it is to organise and unite [mental] activities. In any normal person those activities will be organised and united, and the word 'self' is just a label we attach to the person in his capacity as mentally endowed unitary being. There is accordingly no more to a self than that which is referred to using a personal pronoun or proper name, both of which linguistic devices are of course to be found in Homer. The concept of a self is just the concept of whatever is referred to

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[23]Richard Gaskin, "Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions?" Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 4. Gaksin uses a Fregean framework which distinguishes between name (Eigenname), referent (Bedeutung)--which may be either an object (Gegenstand) or a concept (Begriff)--and the mode of presentation (Art des Gegenstand) of the object or concept. He states, "The point can then be more clearly expressed as follows: it is possible for an individual or community to invent an Eigenname for a Gegnstand or Begriff which was there all along. It is clear that the Art des Gegebenseins must be ranged with what gets invented in this transaction rather than what is already in place in the world."

> using one of these devices. Hence without possessing a word for the schematic concept of the self, Homer nevertheless thinks of his characters--and must so think of them, since he represents them in a coherent, lifelike way--as unitary agents.[24]

To the extent that philosophy is the study of first principles, Gaskin's approach is philosophical. While the lexicist approaches Homer by looking for a word to refer to the self, the philosopher approaches Homer by forming a definition of what the self is and then looking for this concept as made manifest in the text. Whether the specific word for the self is present in these manifestations does not make a difference to the philosopher. For Gaskin, whether a referent exists for the concept of "the self" is irrelevant since the existence of this concept--indeed of any concept--is not dependent on its having been named.

Gaskin moves from his discussion of the self in Homer to his discussion of decision-making in Homer.[25] Because the Homeric person enjoys unity of mind and is indeed self-possessed, he can make his own decisions. Gaskin agrees with those scholars who have already sufficiently refuted Snell's general thesis that the gods dictate human decisions in Homer.[26] Gaskin states that the idea

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[24]Gaskin 2.

[25]Gaskin's term "decision-making" is synonymous with my "deliberation." We are both talking about those moments in the Homeric epics where a character, faced with a problem, must choose how to resolve the problem. Gaskin refers to this process of choice as "decision-making." I refer to it as "deliberation."

[26]The following are recognized, by Gaskin and others, as leaders in the argument against a deterministic relationship between gods and men: A. Lesky, Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akadamie der Wissenschaften, 1961); E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951); E. Wüst, "Von den Anfängen des Problems der Willensfreiheit," Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 101 (1958): 75-91; H. Schwabl, "Zur Selbstständigkeit des Menschen bei Homer," Wiener Studien 67 (1954): 46-64; and A. Schmitt, "Athenes Umgang mit den Menschen bei Homer," Die Alten Sprachen im Unterricht 29 (1982), 6-23.

"that the intervention of a god in a decision-making process does not derogate from the individual's autonomy or responsibility for the action" is now widely accepted.[27] Briefly reviewing the evidence, Gaskin reminds us of Odysseus' choice not to adopt the goddess Leukothea's advice (Od.5.333–364) and Aegisthus' disobedience to the gods despite the warning issued to him by Hermes (Od.1.32-43).

To these examples, we can add the first deliberation scene of the Iliad when Achilles deliberates whether to slay Agamemnon. Scholars have used this scene to prove that human agency is diminished by divine intervention. Take for example Snell's analysis of this passage. He argues that Achilles *immediately obeys* the command of Athena: "She holds him back and warns him not to fall a victim to his wrath; in the end it will be to his advantage to have restrained himself now. Achilles at once obeys the command of the goddess and places his sword back in the scabbard."[28] But a closer look reveals that this is just not the case. Athene comes down from Mount Olympus as a messenger of Hera to persuade Achilles to stay his anger and spare Agamemnon's life. At Il.1.207, she says to Achilles, "αἴ κε πιθήαι (if you will obey me)." This aorist middle subjunctive form of πείθω can be translated in the infinitive as "to be persuaded." For the ancient Greeks, to obey means to be persuaded. Athene then proceeds to give Achilles reasons why he should obey her and stay his anger. His obedience is not an automatic reaction to a divine order, Athena must attempt to secure Achilles' obedience by giving him reasons to obey. Her reason-giving presupposes Achilles' free will.

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[27]Gaskin 6.
[28]Snell, Discovery, 30.

While Achilles is persuaded, he poses a slightly different reason for his choice than what Athene posed to him. He chooses to obey because he wants the gods to serve him in the future since he obeyed them on this occasion. Achilles is persuaded by his *own* reasoning, not by Athena's. Achilles does not obey Athena out of fear of retribution by the gods or from a sense of duty to serve her divine will. Rather, Achilles chooses to obey out of pure self-interest.

Since the gods do not have a deterministic relationship with the Homeric persons, and since the Homeric person is indeed self-possessed, s/he must be capable of making his/her own decisions.[29] And indeed Gaskin's use of the example of Menelaus at Il.17.91-105 demonstrates how a Homeric character can deliberate, reason through a calculus, and make a decision. When Menelaus must decide whether to hold his ground or retreat, first he reasons that only cowards flee in the face of their enemy. Then he checks this reason with another: fighting Hector would be like fighting a god. Since only fools fight gods, he retreats.

While Gaskin's approach affirms that Homeric characters can make real decisions, his account of deliberation is incomplete. Gaskin only addresses those scenes where reasoning calculi are evident in a character's deliberation. He does not account for the majority of deliberation scenes where reasoning calculi are absent. In order to vindicate the idea of deliberation in Homer, an account must be provided. In the following section, I attempt to provide such an account. I

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[29]Others who argue the same position include the following: L. A. Post, "The Moral Pattern in Homer," Transactions of the American Philological Association 70 (1939): 158-190; Lesky, Gottliche; Dodds; W. Schadewaldt, Von Homers Welt und Werk, (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1944); H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); D. Gill, "Two Decisions: Iliad 11.401-422 and Agamemnon 192-230" in Studies Presented to Sterling Dow (Durham: Duke University, 1984) 125-134; R. W. Sharples, "'But Why Has My Spirit Spoken with Me Thus?': Homeric Decision-Making," Greece & Rome 30 (1983): 1-7.

argue that the absence of accounts of deliberation is more than likely a result of Homer's poetic device rather than a sign of the undeveloped intellectual habits of the Homeric characters.

Accounting for the Absence of Deliberative Calculi in Homeric Deliberation

First, let us consider the question of purpose. Homer is a poet of action not of thought. This does not mean that the Homeric people did not think, or were not fully aware of themselves as selves. It only means that to describe thinking and self-awareness in formal terms was not Homer's purpose. The epics would not be epics if Homer had chosen to have the heroic characters reason their every action. An epic poem is about action. Always to be explicit about thought would create a drag on the action of the poem, and would ultimately violate the genre within which Homer worked.[30] Homer must remain relatively silent about the reasons why characters act the way they do.

The key word here is "relatively," since Homer does on occasion tell us how a character deliberates by including the deliberative calculus. In addition to the example used by Gaskin of Menelaus in the Iliad, other explicit scenes of Homeric deliberation, complete with reasoning calculi, exist. When Odysseus decides not to obey Leukothea, he reasons that because Leukothea might be trying to trick him and because land is still too far away, he will not abandon his

[30]That bards (like Homer) were aware of the constraints of their art and that a bard's audience would not be tolerant of noticeable deviations in the form is a central argument in Albert Lord's classic, The Singer of Tales, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

raft in obedience to Leukothea (Od.5.354-364). When Odysseus decides how to approach Nausicaa, he reasons that he should not supplicate by grabbing her by her knees because this might make her angry. Instead he chooses to stand where he is, his nakedness covered by the bushes, and approach her from afar (6.141-148). When Odysseus decides to hit Iros only slightly rather than kill him, he reasons that this is the best way to protect his own true identity from the suitors (18.90-94). When he decides not to kill the unfaithful handmaidens in the heat of his anger, he reasons that it is best to endure and be more cunning about the way and the opportune moment to punish them (Od.20.9-21).[31] Scenes such as these demonstrate that deliberation is not beyond the ability of the Homeric person and support the idea that Homer stays *relatively*, but not *completely* silent about deliberative calculi.

Second, let us consider the question of audience. Because Homer has such economical phrasing in the majority of deliberation scenes, he demands the audience's "vigilance and imaginative cooperation"[32] not only to move the action along, but to bring meaning to the poem Such economical phrasing is an open invitation to the audience to supply the missing meaning. In this way, Homer's narrative functions enthymematically. However, assuming that Homeric silences about calculi are the result of an enthymematic tool of compositions, namely "Economy of Phrase,"[33] we would be left dangling if Homer never gave us any glimpse of fully developed deliberative processes. But as we know, Homer does on occasion provide us with explicit and complete deliberation scenes. Since Odysseus, for example, reasons in some instances, we

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[31]These scenes will be addressed more fully in Chapter Three.

[32]W. B. Stanford, The Odyssey of Homer, 1.4.738 (Edinburgh: MacMillan, 1974): 238.

[33]Stanford gives various examples of Economy of Phrase in the Odyssey: 1.6.132; 1.10.113; 1.11.563; 1.12.350; 2.15.451; 2.22.195.

can give him the benefit of the doubt in the other cases. Homer's silence in these other instances could be telling us not only that action is more interesting to his audience than describing justifications for a given action, but also that his audience can supply information from its own stock of opinion and knowledge not only of the character who is deliberating but of the demands of the plot according to the particular scene in which the character deliberates.

The Homeric narrative of deliberation seems to have an enthymematic function where the absence of one or more premises invites the audience to supply the missing information. This absence functions rhetorically to call the audience to participate in the deliberation, supplying from their stock of opinion and knowledge to fill the missing premise(s). Because Homer's silence about deliberation can be understood as "a glimmer of possibilities, an array of glances—an enthymeme," it invites Homer's audience to "follow some guides along a path of partial knowledge."[34] In this way, the audience becomes identified with the deliberation and the choice that is ultimately made. They come to see themselves in the rhetoric of that deliberation.

The enthymematic patterning of Homer's portrayal of deliberation is most evident in the first scene that engaged our attention: the scene in which Odysseus deliberates whether to investigate the smoke on Aiaia. In this scene, the reason for Odysseus' choice to return to his comrades is left unstated. But considering Odysseus' experience immediately prior to arriving at Aiaia, the reason does not need to be stated because it is most obvious. The audience can readily supply the reasoning from its knowledge of the disaster that preceded

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[34]I have appropriated this phrasing from James J. Murphy's description of an enthymeme found in the foreward to Andrea Lunsford's edited volume, Reclaiming Rhetorica: Women in the Rhetorical Tradition, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995): ix.

Odysseus' arrival on Aiaia. Prior to reaching Aiaia, Odysseus and his men had sailed to Lamos, the land of the Laestrygonians. There, Odysseus climbed to a steep observation point and spotted smoke in the distant trees. Notice that the same introduction is used to introduce both the scenes at Lamos (Od.10.97) and Aiaia (10.148): ἔστην δὲ σκοπιὴν ἐς παιπαλόεσσαν ἀνελθών. The two men who were sent forth to explore the smoke were eaten by the monster Antiphates. Since this disaster took place immediately prior to arriving on Aiaia, where Odysseus has again spotted smoke, the experience must still be fresh in his mind as well as in the mind of the audience. It seems obvious that Odysseus should not investigate the smoke himself because he would risk meeting the same fate as his two comrades on Lamos. And if this scene is still fresh in the mind of Odysseus and the audience, then the scene with the Cyclops must also remain with them as well. There, Odysseus' selfish sense of exploration and his desire for guest-gifts led to the death of his comrades. Faced with another temptation to explore, Odysseus must restrain himself or risk meeting with a vile death like that of his comrades who were eaten by Polyphemos. Because the stories of both disasters are not likely to have been forgotten quickly by Homer's audience, Homer does not need to present reasons for Odysseus' choice against investigating the smoke himself. To state these reasons would be to state the obvious.

Why a Study of Homeric Deliberation in the Odyssey?

I have just attempted to establish that Homeric deliberation scenes are legitimate scenes of human decision-making, even in the absence of deliberative calculi. The purpose of this dissertation is to reconstruct through a close textual analysis the rhetoric of deliberation scenes in Homer's Odyssey, particularly those of the main characters of Odysseus, Telemachus, and Penelope. Before defining what I mean by "the rhetoric of deliberation," a final introductory issue remains: why a study of the Odyssey and its main characters?

First, in comparison to the Iliad, the Odyssey has been under-represented as a source of evidence for claims about deliberation and decision-making in Homer. Take for instance Jaynes who relies heavily on the Iliad in likening Homeric characters to schizophrenes. In almost every instance, Erbse bases his argument against Homeric agency by drawing evidence from the Iliad. Michael Naas[35] chooses to study only the Iliad in his work on in Homeric persuasion. If only for the sake of giving equal voice, a study of the Odyssey seems to be in order.

Second, while characters certainly deliberate in the Iliad, as when Achilles' deliberates whether to slay Agamemnon or Menelaus deliberates whether to fight or flee, the deliberation in the Odyssey is more intimately connected to the story than that found in the Iliad. If the Iliad is as much a poem of speech-making as it is of war, the Odyssey is as much a poem of deliberation as it is of

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[35]Michael Naas, Turning: From Persuasion to Philosophy: A Reading of Homer's Iliad. (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1995). Naas treats Homeric persuasion as lacking reflexive thought.

Odysseus' return home. The intimate relationship between deliberation and the Odyssey is revealed in the unfolding of each main character of the story. The deliberative activity of Telemachus reveals his struggle for manhood and his role in preparing for his father's re-establishment of order in their family home. Penelope's deliberation reveals the source of her cunning ability to stay free from her obligation to marry one of the suitors. And Odysseus' deliberation is his greatest aid in returning home and reestablishing order in his home. Considering this relationship between the plot and the deliberation of its main characters, a study of deliberation in the Odyssey is particularly appealing. The study of deliberation can be told through the poem's various plots. As we learn about Telemachus' journey to adulthood, we learn of his acquisition of deliberative skills. As we learn of Odysseus' schemes in returning home and reestablishing order, we learn of his masterful deliberations. As we learn of Penelope's stratagems to ward off her suitors, protect her son, and remain loyal to her only love, Odysseus, we learn of her cunning, yet secretive deliberations. In the end, we have a picture of the Odyssey as well as a picture of how deliberation is linked inextricably with the unfolding of the poem's various plots.

Since the Odyssey has not been examined as much as the Iliad, and the plot of the Odyssey is intimately connected to the deliberation of its main characters, this dissertation will examine the rhetoric of deliberation only in the Odyssey and particularly in its three main characters: Telemachus, Odysseus, and Penelope. In Telemachus, Homer portrays a young man in the process of coming to consciousness of the necessity to deliberate and proceeding to acquire the necessary skills. Telemachus is just learning the art, and is a foil to his father.

Odysseus' deliberation is archetypal. In Odysseus, Homer portrays a master deliberator, one who has not only acquired the skills, but practiced and perfected them. Penelope's deliberation is uniquely feminine. In Penelope, Homer portrays a master deliberator but one who must hide her art or relinquish her freedom to practice it.

Before I proceed with the textual analysis of Homeric deliberation, more must be said about why a study of Homeric deliberation is a study in rhetoric. In chapter two, I will argue that Homeric deliberation is a rhetorical phenomenon, and I will suggest the importance of studying deliberation as part of studying the history of rhetoric. Chapters three, four and five will demonstrate the rhetoric of Homeric deliberation in Telemachus, Odysseus, and Penelope, respectively. Chapter six will draw conclusions about Homeric deliberation and will identify the contributions this study makes to our understanding of the history and theory of rhetoric.

Chapter 2
DELIBERATION: A HOMERIC RHETORIC

In the previous chapter, I addressed the problem of Homeric deliberation, namely the frequent absence of any account of the deliberation. I argued that to conclude from Homer's silence that Homeric people did not really deliberate at all would be a mistake. Not only does Homer tell us that they did, but occasionally he shows us how. It is Homer's portrayal of how Homeric characters deliberate that invites a study of rhetoric. The conclusion of chapter one is this: Homeric characters do deliberate. The goal of chapter two is to justify and define a study of Homeric deliberation as fundamentally rhetorical. This chapter will argue that Homeric deliberation is an art of self-persuasion, an art we can call rhetoric.

Before I can proceed with this argument, though, one question must first be addressed. How can we talk about Homeric rhetoric of any kind if rhetorical consciousness did not emerge until the fourth century in Greece? I will begin by addressing this question, in an attempt to vindicate the idea of a Homeric rhetoric. Then I will define Homeric deliberation as a particular kind of rhetoric: an art of self-persuasion.

The Objection to the Idea of a Homeric Rhetoric

How can we talk about rhetoric of any kind in Homer when rhetoric, and the consciousness necessary for rhetoric, is said to have emerged not prior to the fourth century? The idea of a Homeric rhetoric is alleged to pose the problem of anachronism, the imposition of fourth century standards on an eighth century text. This is the position of scholars such as Thomas Cole, Edward Schiappa, Christopher Lyle Johnstone, and Michael Naas.[1]

In the Origins of Rhetoric, Thomas Cole asserts that the art of rhetoric begins with Plato and Aristotle who he asserts were the first to combine an understanding of effective speech with the knowledge of one's subject matter.[2] Cole is the first to point out that since the term "rhêtorikê" did not exist prior to Plato, the idea of rhetoric did not exist either. Rhetoric, as a typically fourth century phenomenon, is defined by Cole as a "speaker's or writer's self-conscious manipulation of his medium with a view to ensuring his message as favorable a reception as possible on the part of the particular

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[1]Others hold this position as well. See for example, Carol G. Thomas and Edward Kent Webb, "From Orality to Rhetoric: An Intellectual Transformation," Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action, ed. Ian Worthington (Londong: Routledge, 1994): 3-25. Thomas and Webb essentially agree with Cole's conception of a revolutionary change from pre-rhetorical to rhetorical Greece. But they believe that the shift happened in the fifth century, unlike Cole who believes it happened in the fourth. All authors agree though that anything prior to the emergence of rhetoric should not be considered rhetoric proper, but rather "proto-rhetoric." Also see K. E. Wilkerson, "From Hero to Citizen: Persuasion in Early Greece," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 15 (1982): 104-125. Wilkerson argues that the "primary condition for the development of the art of rhetoric--belief in the efficacy of human decision--missing in Homer was not fully present in ancient Greece until the fifth century (34)." Wilkerson is a Snellian in his regard for the agency of the Homeric character.

[2]Thomas Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). For a work that addresses and undermines Cole's program of distinguishing oral poetry from rhetoric, see Robert Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric. Londong: Routledge, 1996.

audience being addressed."[3] Like Cole, Edward Schiappa argues that the term "rhêtorikê" marks the origin of the idea of rhetoric.[4] Schiappa argues, "Intellectual enterprises change, in part, through the evolution of a specialized vocabulary." Therefore, Schiappa argues, historical claims which presume that rhetoric was clearly recognized as a conceptualized, discrete verbal art with a body of identifiable teachings are suspect.[5] For Schiappa and Cole alike, the idea of a Homeric rhetoric would be a violation of the historical record.

That Cole and Schiappa are being appropriated by scholars in the history of rhetoric is evident in the recent publication of Christopher Lyle Johnstone, "The Origins of the Rhetorical in Archaic Greece."[6] In this essay, Johnstone adopts Cole's and Schiappa's arguments. He writes, "I find compelling the contention of such scholars as Cole and Schiappa that rhetoric as a concept and as a systematic way of thinking about speech is an invention of the Classical Period, indeed of the fourth century."[7] He describes the collection of essays in his volume as examinations of "the precursors of the art" of rhetoric, an art which supposedly emerged for the first time in fourth century Greece.[8] According to Johnstone, the art of rhetoric was "outlined by Plato in the Phaedrus, developed systematically by Aristotle, and practiced

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[3]Thomas Cole ix-x.

[4]Edward Schiappa, "The 'Invention' of Rhetoric," Protagoras and Logos, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991): 39-63. See also, "Did Plato Coin Rhêtorikê?" American Journal of Philology 111 (1990): 460-73; "Rhêtorikê: What's in a Name? Toward a Revised History of Early Greek Rhetorical Theory," Quarterly Journal of Speech 78 (1992): 1-15.

[5]Schiappa, 'Invention', 49.

[6]Christopher Lyle Johnstone, introduction, Theory, Text, and Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory, (Ithaca: SUNY Press, 1996).

[7]C. Johnstone 3.

[8]C. Johnstone 3.

self-consciously by Demosthenes, Aeschines, and others . . . ."[9] With statements such as these, Johnstone implies that orators who spoke in what he calls the "proto-rhetorical age," were not self-conscious practitioners of their art.[10] According to Johnstone, the establishment of the democratic polis, the arrival of writing, and the shift from a mythopoetic world view to a rational world view governed by a philosophical terminology were prerequisites for rhetoric's emergence in fourth century Greece. Such prerequisites make the idea of Homeric rhetoric impossible.

Michael Naas' Turning from Persuasion to Philosophy contains a chapter titled, "The Birth of Rhetoric?" in which he too argues that while elaborate and well-crafted speeches can be found in the Homeric epics, "the mere use of persuasive techniques" should not be termed "rhetoric."[11] He states that it "seems prudent to distinguish rhetoric from persuasion or oratory in order to avoid confusion between the various levels of theory and practice."[12] Rhetoric, according to Naas, appeared in the fourth century as the highest level of theory, namely the scientific codifying and systematizing of persuasive techniques.[13] To demonstrate his distinction between rhetoric and oratory, Naas examines the different kinds of argument employed in Homeric oratory and compares these with Aristotle's description of artistic arguments. What is most interesting to Naas is what seems to him to be the absence of Aristotle's "logical proof" in Homeric oratory.[14] Naas claims,

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[9]C. Johnstone 3.

[10]C. Johnstone 5.

[11]Michael Naas, Turning : From Persuasion to Philosophy: A Reading of Homer's Iliad, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995): 134.

[12]Naas 134.

[13]Naas 134.

[14]Note here that Naas translates Aristotle's "logos" as "logical proof." But

"Such an absence seems to indicate once again that the practice of oratory has not yet come under the dominion of theory, that oratory is a pragmatics that considers the present situation apart from what is logical, probable, apparent, or likely."[15]

From these four scholars there emerges a tripartite rejection of the idea of a Homeric rhetoric. The lexical rejection, as voiced primarily by Cole and Schiappa, and adopted by C. Johnstone, argues *ex silentio* that since the word "rhêtorikê" did not exist prior to the fourth century, the concept did not exist either. The rejection from the point of view of the culture of rationality, primarily argued by C. Johnstone and Naas, argues that rhetoric emerges as a systematic, rational approach to persuasion in the fourth century. This rational approach is enabled only by a theoretical/scientific world view and philosophical terminology. The political rejection, as represented in C. Johnstone's argument, argues that rhetoric did not emerge until the conditions of the Classical Greek polis were established. None of these rejections presents an irrefutable case against the idea of Homeric Rhetoric.

Ethos and Pathos are as logical as Logos. All three provide logical reasons to give assent. Ethos draws its reasons from the character of the speaker. Pathos draws its reasons from the emotions and values of its audience toward its subject. Logos draws its reasons from the facts of the situation.

[15]Naas 137.

A Vindication of the Idea of Homeric Rhetoric

Against the Lexical Rejection

First, the lexical case against the idea of Homeric rhetoric collapses when we realize that it is derived from the same lexical method which prevents scholars such as Böhme, Snell, Jaynes, and Erbse from seeing the "self" in Homer. The argument that self-consciousness did not appear until a single, unified, and consistent referent for the "self" emerged is formally identical to the argument that rhetoric did not exist prior to the coining of the term. The shortcomings of this lexical method have already been sufficiently described by Knox and Gaskin in my earlier quotations from them. In sum, although we discover words for phenomena all the time, this does not mean the phenomena did not exist prior to our naming them. The naming *presupposes* some level of awareness; it does not *create* awareness from scratch. A mind which understands a phenomenon even without the explicit ascription of a name must have a certain level of sophistication. This mind must perceive and understand more subtly and with greater semantic awareness than the mind that depends on the crutch of a name. While the abstraction of the name "rhetoric" may allow us to think differently about persuasion, this does not mean that the coining of the term brought the phenomenon of an art of persuasion into existence for the first time.

Ultimately, the absence of the term rhêtorikê in the epics is irrelevant to the question of whether rhetoric existed in Homeric times. This point of

method seems to be what Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. argues in his recent note, "On Schiappa versus Poulakos."[16] Like Gaskin, who argues that whether the word "self" exists in the Homeric epics is irrelevant to the question of whether the Homeric people were self-conscious, H. Johnstone argues that whether Homeric people used the term rhêtorikê is irrelevant to the question of whether rhetoric existed in Homeric times. H. Johnstone's point seems to be that since *we* are the ones asking the question of whether rhetoric is in Homer, then we are the ones who must define what we mean by rhetoric. And what we mean by rhetoric may not be what Schiappa, Cole, and C. Johnstone mean by rhetoric. Whether rhetoric exists in Homer is a matter of how we define rhetoric. Following H. Johnstone's method, I will not approach rhetoric lexically but rather conceptually, beginning with a definition. To me, rhetoric is the art of persuasion. So if I want to answer the question of whether Homeric people practiced rhetoric, I must see if anything in the poems suggests that in this world persuasion was in fact an art.

What does it mean to define rhetoric as the art of persuasion? The first page of Aristotle's Rhetoric tells us that people can practice persuasion randomly or through an ability acquired by habit. George Kennedy notes, "The former hardly know what they are doing; but the latter, by trial and error, have gained a practical sense of what is effective."[17] As J. H. Freese explains, "The special characteristic of an art then is the discovery [application] of a system or method, as distinguished from mere knack

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[16]Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. "On Schiappa versus Poulakos," Rhetoric Review, Spring 1996, p. 438-439.

[17]George Kennedy, Aristotle: On Rhetoric, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991): 29. ft. 4.

(ἐμπείρια).[18] To say that rhetoric is an art of persuasion is to say that the persuasive practice has been acquired by some kind of method. This method presupposes an awareness of rules of good and bad speaking. This method presupposes a consciousness of persuasion.

We must keep in mind however that the method discovered/applied does not have to be the one called for by Plato in the Gorgias and Phaedrus and provided by Aristotle in the Rhetoric. This was indeed the method of their time, but it wasn't necessarily the method for Homer's time. It is very likely that people in the Dark Ages had their own understanding of a method for acquiring and practicing persuasion, different from Aristotle's. Kennedy suggests that a Homeric awareness of rhetoric was nurtured by the method of listening to older speakers, acquiring formulae, themes, maxims, and stock topics such as myths and historical examples but was also more than likely explicitly taught.[19] Moreover, direct evidence that the art of persuasion was taught can be found in the Iliad at 9.443 when Phoenix describes his responsibilities as tutor to Achilles. Phoenix explains that when Achilles was a child knowing nothing of how men prove themselves either in war or in the assembly, he was sent to "teach him in all these things." Specifically, Phoenix was to teach (διδάσκω) Achilles to be a speaker (ῥητῆρ) of words and a doer of deeds. This evidence seems to suggest that in Homeric culture, speaking effectively in the assembly and fighting bravely in war were thought to be equally teachable.

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[18]J.H. Freese, Aristotle's "Art" of Rhetoric (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Edition, 1982): 3 n. c.

[19]George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963): 36.

While this is just one piece of evidence for the teaching of speech, Homer probably did not need to say anything more on the subject since his audience more than likely already knew that speech, like other arts such as warfare, healing, hunting, horsemanship, housekeeping, and bardic song, was taught. We are told that Skamandrios was taught to hunt (Il.5.51). Eurypylus was taught to heal wounds, as was Achilles (Il.11.832). Euphorbos was taught warfare (Il.116.811). The bard Demodocus was taught by Apollo (Od.8.488), and the bard Phemios taught himself (Od.22.347). Antilochos was taught horsemanship (Il. 23.307), and the handmaidens were taught their craft in housekeeping and caring for their mistress (Od.22.422). Homer tells us only once that each of these arts was taught. Neither does he repeat that they were taught nor does he expand on how they were taught. But this does not negate the fact that arts were taught in Homer. In fact it might very well emphasize the point. Homer's relative silence may imply that his audience already knew that the skills involved in hunting, fighting, speechmaking and the like were taught. To say any more would be to state the obvious.

This likelihood that a method for acquiring and practicing persuasion was part of the acquisition and practice of persuasion in the Dark Ages reveals the inappropriateness of critical approaches that put Homeric persuasive practices to the test of the Aristotelian method only to discover the ways in which these practices fall short of Aristotle's standards.[20] Critics who follow those approaches fail because they come to the poems with a specific demand, namely that the poems should display the systematic Platonic and Aristotelian methods of persuasion, and when they find that the poems do

[20]As I mentioned earlier, this is the critical approach used by Naas to reject the idea of Homeric rhetoric. See Naas 136-137.

not do this, instead of asking whether the poems meet different demands, these critics find a less laborious explanation: Homeric persuasion is a random or arbitrary act since it has not yet come under the dominion of fourth century rhetorical theory.

If by rhetoric we mean an art of persuasion, which is what I mean by rhetoric, then we can indeed see rhetoric everywhere in Homer. Numerous persuasive practices in the Homeric epics show such an awareness of an art of persuasion: the deliberative debates in Books 1 and 2 of the Iliad; the embassy in Book 9; Priam's appeals in Book 24; Antenor's comparison of the persuasive styles of Odysseus and Menelaus in Book 3 of the Iliad; Telemachus' address to the assembly in the Odyssey; Helen's debate over what to say to Telemachus and how to say it when she recognizes him as Odysseus' son in Book 4; and Menelaus' critique of Peisistratus' speech in Book 15. This of course is only a sample of such instances where characters display a rhetorical consciousness, a consciousness about the necessity of persuasion, of inventing potentially persuasive sayables, and of critiquing the appropriateness of persuasive messages based on an awareness of effective and ineffective speech.

These scenes reveal a critical awareness of language and its strategic uses and effects in the Homeric epics.[21] These scenes reveal not only speechmaking, but criticism of speeches, and inventional processes. The speeches even have formal structures that are shared among them, and for this reason some commentators have judged them to be quite deliberately

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[21]For additional commentary on this awareness in the dawn of European literature, see P.E. Easterling and Bernard Knox, eds., The Cambridge History of Classical Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 498.

shaped.[22] Certainly, we cannot comfortably say that this speaking, inventing, and critiquing was done without any awareness of rules or any understanding of good and bad speaking. While Helen may not have been familiar with Aristotle's topical system of invention, she nonetheless regarded the possibilities of what she could say in her speech to Telemachus considering the constraints of the particular situation.

The idea of rhetoric in Homer is not manifested in the word "rhêtorikê" but rather in the different instances of persuasion. As Kennedy suggests, all practice is coupled to some degree with reflection and theorization upon that practice. He states, "It is difficult to believe that there did not exist in all periods certain critical principles, generally, if tacitly, accepted."[23] Kennedy continues to argue, "Techniques of rhetorical theory are already evident in the speeches of the Homeric poems to such a degree that later antiquity found formal rhetoric everywhere in Homer."[24] And in his most recent statement on the matter, Kennedy notes that "Cole's program of denying any real development of rhetoric in Greece before Plato . . . is not consistent with the evidence or the judgment of most scholars."[25]

Kennedy is not the only scholar to recognize rhetoric in Homer. Andrew Karp argues for the systematic awareness of an art of persuasion when he builds his case for an implicit rhetorical theory existing in the

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[22]Many studies have been done on the formal structures of the speeches in the Homeric poems. The following is only a partial list: Peter Toohey, "Epic and Rhetoric," Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action, ed. Ian Worthington, (London: Routledge, 1994): 153-175; Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982): 9-15 and Art of Persuasion, 35-40; M.W. Edwards, The Iliad: A Commentary, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991): p. 55-60; O. Taplin, Homeric Soundings: The Shaping of the Iliad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 175 ff.

[23]Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, 35.

[24]Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, 36.

[25]Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 33.

Homeric poems.[26] Karp argues that not only does Homer employ rhetorical figures in his poetic narrative, but his characters, when speaking, employ rhetorical figures and techniques for the purpose of persuading one another. Moreover, Karp argues, the characters often explicitly talk of persuading one another. Karp argues that these different instances of persuasion and talk about persuasion constitute a consistent set of claims about how effective persuasion functions. And for this reason, persuasion is recognizable as an art in Homer. Karp calls this art "rhetoric." Whether Homer called this art "rhetoric" is irrelevant to whether the art actually exists in the Iliad and the Odyssey.

In sum, because the lexical method is inherently flawed, we should not use it as a means of understanding rhetoric and its history in early Greece. Rather than approaching rhetoric lexically, a conceptual approach seems more fitting. I have attempted to approach rhetoric conceptually by explaining how I understand rhetoric to be an art of persuasion. If we agree that rhetoric is an art of persuasion then we can affirm the existence of rhetoric in Homer. Homeric persuasive practices seem to be the result of familiarity arising from habit. Homeric persuasion seems to be a skill that was taught. And Homeric persuasion seems to be guided by an understanding of good and bad speech.

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[26]Andrew Karp, "Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric," Arethusa, 10 (1977) 237-258.

Against the Rejection from the Point of View of the Culture of Rationality

C. Johnstone suggests that the codification of rhetoric, enabled by a scientific world view and philosophical terminology, provided the practice of persuasion with a rationality that it could not have had prior to this codification. However, C. Johnstone himself argues that this codification did not arise anew in the fourth century, that it was enabled by the work of the Presocratics. His approach builds up to Aristotle, starting with the Presocratics. But, one should ask why we may not start with Homer? C. Johnstone seems to respond to such a question when he says that indeed, even in Homer, in the "speeches in books 2 and 9 of the Iliad" and "the bardic songs of the Odyssey," we see an "infatuation with the sounds and potencies" of speech.[27] C. Johnstone seems to suggest that the Homeric infatuation with the sounds of speech took centuries to evolve into the more sophisticated understanding of language and its persuasive effects that we find in the fourth century. And according to C. Johnstone, the catalyst for this evolution was the work of the Presocratics. Their legacy is the articulation of a scientific world view through a philosophical vocabulary, both of which C. Johnstone establishes as prerequisites of a rhetorical consciousness.

My response to C. Johnstone is twofold: 1) The prerequisite of a philosophical terminology is unnecessary for the existence of rhetoric in the Homeric world but is indeed a prerequisite of the metarhetoric of the fourth

[27]Christopher Lyle Johnstone, introduction, 4.

century; 2) the dichotomy of the mythopoetic world and the rational world is misleading.

If the absence of the word rhêtorikê is irrelevant to the question of whether there was rhetoric in Homer, so is the absence of a philosophical terminology. Awareness of an art of persuasion can exist prior to the abstraction and codification in philosophical language of the principles of this art. While the coming of an abstract philosophical terminology, like the coining of a name, may indeed bring about a change in awareness, this change is not the debut of awareness. While the abstraction of the name "rhetoric" and the coming of a systematic approach in philosophical terminology does allow us to think differently about persuasion, this does not mean that these developments brought the phenomenon of an art of persuasion into existence for the first time. The coining of a term and the coming of a systematic approach expressed in philosophical terminology permit an increased ability to engage in a metadiscourse about the phenomenon. This is particularly evident in the case of rhetoric. With the coining of the term and the coming of a technical vocabulary, Aristotle could write his discourse on rhetoric. Kennedy has suggested that we could even call Aristotle's famous work a "metarhetoric" because it is just that, a discourse on rhetoric.[28]

Metarhetoric presents us with the explicit abstraction of rules, and such abstraction may indeed by one means of bringing about persuasion. But it is not the only means. If it were, we would have to admit that the speeches that came before Aristotle were less likely to be successful than those that came

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[28] George Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 3.

after. This is a ludicrous notion. An art is not dependent on the explicit abstraction and codification of rules and prescriptions. Just as the art of oil painting is more than just painting by numbers, the art of persuasion is more than just applying codified prescriptions. Cicero taught this lesson quite well. He railed against such a rule-dependent conception of an art. He argued that one should treat with derision and contempt those who think an art is captured in rules laid down by rhetoricians.[29] This also seems to be the lesson of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius, in his analysis of Lysias 11, comments on how to attain the indescribable "grace" (χάρις) that Lysias displays in his speeches: "χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ μακρᾷ τριβῇ καὶ ἀλόγῳ πάθει τὴν ἄλογον συνασκεῖν αἴσθησιν (in much time and extended practice and nonlogical felt experiences one can discipline one's nonlogical sense-perception.)"[30] According to Dionysius, Lysias' oratorical grace, neither style nor content, can be learned wholly through logical precepts but preferably by training in non-logical perception, repetition and practice over a long period of time. Just as a person cannot be made good through philosophical principles but only through the repeated practice of ethical decision-making over time, Dionysius seems to suggest that a person cannot be made an effective speaker, in eloquence or argument, through rhetorical principles alone.

Hoyt Hudson's famous essay, "The Field of Rhetoric," addresses this very point. Hudson, frustrated with dichotomies such as "pure science (rhetoric) and the applied science (composition)," states:

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[29]Cicero. De Oratore, III.xiv.52-55.
[30] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Lysia, 11.19.

> But in ancient as in modern times . . . it was found impossible to divorce theory from practice. The rhetorician and the orator were one; and if not in Aristotle himself, at least in the Aristotelian school and tradition, rhetoric is the whole art of persuasion. It does not satisfy itself alone with the finding of means of persuasion; it also includes the persuasive arrangement and presentation of the speaker's material. A product of rhetoric, in this sense, then, is neither an analysis of some speech already made, with a list of figures and tropes, nor an analysis of a subject upon which a speech is to be made, showing what means of persuasion can be employed. Rather it is a speech, or some piece of persuasive discourse, persuasively presented.[31]

Naas' argument for the separation of rhetoric and oratory is a result of what can happen when the difference between rhetoric as an art of persuasion and metarhetoric as a theory of the art of persuasion is collapsed. While Naas might be concerned with what happens when theory and practice are not kept separate in our understanding of the history of rhetoric, I am concerned with what happens when the two are inappropriately wedged apart. When rhetoric is wedged apart from oratory, the result has been a simultaneous privileging of all things theoretical. Naas and C. Johnstone alike build up to Aristotle, dubbing his theoretical approach to persuasion, "Rhetoric Proper." In both Naas' and C. Johnstone's arguments, rhetoric becomes a supreme

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[31]Hoyt H. Hudson, "The Field of Rhetoric," Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation, eds., Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1965): 22-23.

achievement in theory over the mere practice of persuasion, or the mere infatuation of "the sounds and potencies of speech." Homeric speech is then cast as the primordial ooze from which the sophisticated rhetoric of the fourth century eventually evolved.

In rejection of this position, I suggest that while metarhetoric is an example of a kind of consciousness of persuasive techniques and effects, it is not the only consciousness of such techniques. Kennedy notes this when he says that what we find in Aristotle is "merely a theorizing of conventional practice."[32] This use of "merely" implicitly points out that we should not fixate on rhetoric as a purely theoretical phenomenon. This fixation has blinded us to the greater discovery that rhetoric has always existed--even in times prior to theoretical knowledge as we know it. Richard Enos argues along the same line when he states, "Rhetoric did not originate at a single moment in history. Rather, it was an evolving, developing consciousness about the relationship between thought and expression."[33] The artistic means of persuasion were there all along, even prior to the abstraction and naming of their techniques. Walter Donlan argues in a similar fashion:

> The fact that this tradition [speaking persuasively] became a science only in the fifth century has only an incidental bearing on our subject. That event was merely a sign of the times. The economic, social, and political conditions of the polis, especially in Classical Athens, created a market for teachers of public

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[32]George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, 35.

[33]Richard Enos, Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle (Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, Inc., 1993): ix.

argument. And as good professional intellectuals, and in tune with the abstracting mood of the times, they codified the art.[34]

For these reasons, C. Johnstone's prerequisite of a philosophical terminology is unnecessary for belief in the existence of rhetoric as an art of persuasion in the Homeric world. And for these reasons as well, the separation of rhetoric and oratory is inappropriate.

Furthermore, the dichotomy of the mythopoetic world and the rational world is misleading. C. Johnstone himself notes that this transition from mythopoesis to rationality as put forth by Eric Havelock is not without its critics. C. Johnstone states, "it seems possible that his [Havelock's] central theories about the effects of orality and literacy on consciousness are somewhat overstated."[35] But C. Johnstone proceeds to argue that rhetoric can only exist in a world familiar with rationality. I doubt that anyone would take issue with this. However, whether the Homeric world was familiar with rationality is an issue.

Homeric words and deeds have a logic to them. Homeric people do things and say things for reasons. As we saw in Chapter 1, when Achilles obeys Athene in Book 1 of the Iliad, he does so for certain reasons that he himself generates. And when Menelaus decides to flee the scene in Book 17 of the Iliad, he does so for certain reasons. In addition to these scenes, the speeches that I cited earlier in this chapter and many others like them in the Homeric epics seem rational, and by "rational" I mean nothing more than displaying an ability to reason. As Henry Johnstone notes of Homeric-

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[34]Walter Donlan, "The Dark Age of Chiefdoms and the Emergence of Public Argument," Speech Communication Association National Convention, New Orleans, 5 November 1988, 1.

[35]C. Johnstone, introduction, 4-5.

speeches, they are as rational as anyone could want them to be. He states, "They are not the speeches of madmen."[36] H. Johnstone seems to believe, as I do, that Homeric speech is endowed with a rationality.

C. Johnstone's argument runs deeper than this though. He argues that while myth provides an account of the origins and workings of the natural world, "it does so in terms of supernatural beings whose personal wills, not bound by any absolute law, can affect natural and human events."[37] But we have already seen in Chapter 1 that divine will is not always a factor in human events and when it is a factor, it does not necessarily bypass human freedom. Take as an additional example Od.5.408-425. Odysseus is being beaten by the sea, in a storm that Poseidon sends him. When he sees land, he must decide how to approach it. He ponders his dilemma: if he swims straight ahead, he risks being smashed on the rocks by the waves. But if he swims on further in search of a safer entry, he risks being swept back out to sea. At this moment of deliberation, Poseidon sends a wave that carries Odysseus forward, smashing him against the rocks. The violence of Poseidon in this scene is clear. But despite the imposition of Poseidon's will Odysseus has deliberated. He hasn't relinquished his freedom to Poseidon simply because Poseidon has the ability to turn his world upside down at any minute.

C. Johnstone continues to argue that the mythopoetic world is one "where events are to a large extent unpredictable, and in which the observed regularities of experience are liable to be upset by the actions of beings who

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[36]Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. "Response to Walter Donlan, Christopher Lyle Johnstone, and John Poulakos," presented at the, Speech Communication Association National Convention, New Orleans, 5 November 1988, 3.

[37]C. Johnstone, introduction, 9-10.

can keep the sun from rising, keep spring from coming, and cause people to take nonhuman forms."[38] This description makes the Homeric mythic world seem fantastic. And in some ways, it is. All one needs to do is call to mind the image of Polyphemos, or Charybdis, or remember the haunting trip to Hades, to recognize the fantastic quality of the Odyssey. However, if the Homeric world is an unpredictable fantasy world it does not necessarily follow that rhetoric could not have existed in this world. Rhetoric is necessary only when situations are unpredictable. If the mythopoetic world was unpredictable then the conditions for rhetoric seem to be in place. Moreover, as one critic points out, these fantastic scenes in the Homeric epics are a foil to the very human world of Odysseus' home in Ithaca. As Seth Schein notes, the fantastic scenes in the Odyssey, like the Cyclopes' scene, contrast the quintessentially human scenes in the community of Ithaca. Schein states, "In this way [fantasy in contrast with humanity], to put it simply, the Odyssey is about what it means to be human."[39] Such a characterization of the Homeric poems undermines C. Johnstone's attempt to characterize all of the Homeric world as an unpredictable fantasy world.

C. Johnstone continues to argue that some predictable patterns must emerge in order for a world view to be endowed with rationality. As he explains, the rational world is a world that behaves in a relatively regular, consistent way. He uses the example of probability to demonstrate his point:

> In order for a thing to be probable, the world must behave in a relatively regular, consistent way. If natural events are merely

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[38]C. Johnstone, introduction, 10.

[39]Seth L. Schein, introduction, Reading the *Odyssey*, ed. Seth L. Schein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 5.

> manifestations of the actions and preferences of anthropomorphized divinities, and if such beings are capable of acting and preferring in irregular and inconsistent ways (which they clearly were, for the Greeks), then one cannot surmise that the potential occurrence of one thing is more or less probable than that of another on the basis of past regularities. The fact there is no evidence of probabilistic reasoning prior to the sixth century suggests that this form of thinking and of persuading required a world view that only came into being during that century.[40]

C. Johnstone uses Kennedy to support his claim. He notes Kennedy's description of probability: "in all early invention the most important fact is the absence of what was to be the greatest weapon of Attic oratory, argument from probability. The speakers in Homer are not even conscious that the subject of their talk is limited to probable truth."[41] But seeing that Kennedy wrote that nearly thirty three years ago, we can begin to understand why he makes the mistake of denying Homeric awareness of "that which is likely." Furthermore, seeing that one of Kennedy's most recent publications argues for probabilistic, rhetorical patterning in nature, I doubt that he would continue to seriously begrudge the Homeric person these same patterns.[42]

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[40]C. Johnstone, introduction, 12.

[41]Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion, 39.

[42]See Kennedy "A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 25.1 (1992) 1-21. See in particular Kennedy's discussion of the male red deer stags during rutting season (p. 4). He notes that the stags rarely fight. They just display their potential to fight. The stag that can display the greatest potential wins because it appears likely that he would win in an actual fight. The one who loses probably understands this likelihood and backs down. Kennedy seems to suggest that this process patterns the probabilistic reasoning which is so central to the art of rhetoric.

While the Homeric world may be unpredictable some of the time, it does not follow that it is unpredictable all of the time. The most strikingly predictable moments throughout the Odyssey are those moments when Odysseus is faced with a problem and deliberates as a means to solving the problem. Time and again in the Odyssey, Homer tells us that Odysseus deliberates his way out of a jam, even in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties, including supernatural beasts and the wrath of the gods. Odysseus could only partake in this deliberation if he were indeed aware of some predictable patterns in his world. Perhaps the best example of Odysseus' awareness of such predictable patterns can be found in the opening of Book 20 of the Odyssey. Odysseus, dressed as a beggar in his own home, spies his handmaidens flirting with the insolent suitors. He deliberates whether to kill them at once or stay his anger and wait for a more cunning plan and a more opportune time. He reasons that since restraint and cunning worked in the cave of the Cyclops it is likely to work again in this situation. Odysseus' decision to wait is brought about because of a prediction that his current situation could be successful like one of his former situations if he acts in a similar way. This deliberation seems to have a distinctly probabilistic quality to it.

In sum, the alleged dichotomy between mythopoetic and rational world views is misleading. It is not the case that one world is void of reason and rhetoric and the other is endowed with both. Moreover, as we see glimpses of the rational world in Homer so we see glimpses of the mythopoetic world in Plato, for example, whose own rhetorical technique was heavily dependent on myth and supernatural accounts of human events.

Classic examples of the oral quality of Plato's work can be found in the Phaedrus, the most obvious being Plato's Myth of the Soul[43], and a subtler example being the intervention of the Daimon to stop Socrates' offenses to the god of Eros.[44]

Against the Political Rejection

The political rejection of the idea of Homeric rhetoric is as open to argument as the previous two. The notion that rhetoric did not emerge prior to the coming of democracy in fourth century Athens fails to understand antecedent Homeric political conditions.[45] The political conditions in Homeric times were equally conducive to the emergence and sophistication of rhetorical technique.

Most historians seem to agree that the cultural conditions revealed to us in the Iliad and the Odyssey are not merely literary creations but reflect the historically real cultural conditions of the Dark Ages. From the poems, we know that the Homeric community was organized around a political system headed by the basileus (chief, king). The basileus found himself in competition for status and authority with other able warrior-leaders, also called basileis. Walter Donlan states, "The highest ranking basileus, like Odysseus in Ithaca or Agamemnon in Argos, sat uneasily atop an unstable political pyramid, as a first among equals."[46]

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[43]Plato, Phaedrus, 244a-257c.
[44]Plato, Phaedrus, 242c
[45] Donlan 1-12.
[46] Donlan 5.

The political power of the basileus was measured by his personal qualities such as his ability to lead, his strength in battle, his cunning mind as revealed in his speech, and his generosity in gift-giving. Power was bestowed upon a man by a public who recognized him as having good qualities. So if a basileus wanted to be recognized as a first among equals, he had to win over the public. He did this by competing for followers or comrades who were economically independent, free men. Donlan points out that there was stiff competition for comrades and the leader-people arrangement worked by persuasion and argument not by coercion. It was primarily by good deeds and words that a man could win the approval of the public. Donlan explains, "If a man wanted to win the people's approval, he had to convince them by deed and word that his policy was best."[47] This created a need for rhetorical activity.

Furthermore, Donlan adds that "persuasive argument was as necessary for winning one's case in the archaic legal system of the 9th century as in the litigiously sophisticated 5th century."[48] Literally, one of the best pictures of the necessity of speech in the Homeric world is found on the shield of Achilles which includes a scene in which litigants are arguing before judges (Il.18.497-508).

From this, we can see that the underlying political condition of Homeric times was conducive to rhetoric. Granted, the greater social and intellectual complexity of classical Athens refined rhetoric. But, in no way did these cultural conditions create rhetoric. Donlan states, "The need to know how to speak in a polished and persuasive way, and the self-conscious

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[47] Donlan 5.
[48] Donlan 6.

understanding that public speaking was a learnable skill, and the ability of listeners to evaluate and rate a speaker's ability go as far back as we can see."[49] Donlan concludes that "a self-conscious art of oratory was well established in the later Dark Age. Nor is there any reason, social or aesthetic, to believe otherwise."[50]

Summary

Considering the evidence presented in opposition to the lexical, rational, and political objections to Homeric rhetoric, it is difficult not to affirm the idea of rhetoric in Homer. To exclude rhetoric from Homeric culture is to exclude consciousness from persuasive practices. Without this consciousness, persuasion cannot be an acquired skill, nor can it be recognized as a necessary skill, nor can it be practiced with any understanding of good and bad technique. As a result, excluding rhetoric from Homeric culture seems to characterize Homeric speakers as a bunch of dolts, haphazardly working through the various problems they face, and occasionally using speech in an arbitrary way with the unintended result of the resolution of a particular problem.

I have argued that such scholarly requirements of a term "rhêtorikê", or the requirements of a scientific approach to persuasion facilitated by a philosophical terminology, or the requirements of the exact political conditions of the Athenian polis do very little to help us explore rhetoric and its early manifestations. With the rejection of these requirements, I have

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[49]Donlan 1-2.
[50]Donlan 6.

attempted to vindicate the idea of a Homeric rhetoric. With this idea of a Homeric rhetoric as our foundation, we can return to the earlier claim that private deliberation in Homer is a particular kind of rhetoric, namely internal rhetoric.

The Rhetoric of Deliberation

In order to see how rhetoric is involved in Homeric deliberation, we need to analyze the presuppositions of deliberation. The first proposition to examine is that deliberation is an internal discourse that we can call self-persuasion. The second proposition is that deliberation (self-persuasion) is an art analogous to the art of public persuasion.

The relationship between deliberation and rhetoric has historical precedents. Perhaps the first known commentary on the rhetorical dimensions of deliberation can be found in the work of Isocrates:

> ταῖς γὰρ πίστεσιν αἷς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγοντες πείθομεν, ταῖς αὐταῖς ταύταις βουλευόμενοι χρώμεθα, καὶ ῥητορικοὺς μὲν καλοῦμεν τοὺς ἐν τῷ πλήθει δυναμένους λέγειν, εὐβούλους δὲ νομίζομεν οἵτινες ἂν αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἄριστα περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διαλεχθῶσιν. (For the arguments by which we persuade others when we speak to them are the same as those we use when we deliberate in our own thoughts. And we call those able to speak to the multitude rhetorical, and we think of those persons who

most skillfully debate their problems in their own minds as prudent.)[51]

Isocrates suggests a connection between private deliberation and public rhetoric, namely that they use the same proofs (πίστεις). He also establishes a parallel between eloquence, or skill in speaking (ῥητορεία) and the prudence (εὔβουλος) of those who best converse with themselves about their problems (αὑτοὺς ἄριστα περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διαλεχθῶσιν). This description of thought as a debate with oneself presupposes that thought is linguistic. So not only are deliberation and rhetoric linked by the proofs they use but also by their medium--language. In this way, Isocrates links private deliberation with public rhetoric.

Even Plato may not have excluded the private realm from the rhetorical. Plato's definition of rhetoric seems to extend to a private realm:

> Ἆρ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις; Is not rhetoric in its whole an art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the other public assemblies, but also in private (ἰδίοις)?[52] (Phaedrus.261a9-b1).

Traditionally, ἴδιος in this definition of rhetoric has been translated "private companies," which represents, for instance a gathering of Socrates and his interlocutors as opposed to a public assembly.[53] But ἴδιος can be used

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[51]Isocrates Nicocles, 8.

[52]Plato, Phaedrus, 261a9-b1.

[53] For this conventional translation see Harold Fowler, Plato I: Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). For commentary on this definition which maintains the conventional translation of private companies as a face-to-face dialectical encounter, see Brian Vickers, A Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988): 16-17.

to refer to a "private self" as well as a "private company." Initial evidence for this broader understanding of ἴδιος appears in Herodotus' use of this term to refer to "oneself" or being "by oneself," "on one's own account."[54] And the first entry in Liddell, Scott, & Jones for ἴδιος defines the word as "oneself," "one's own." Since Plato's use of the term ἴδιος is ambiguous, we should at least give consideration to the possibility that Plato internalized rhetoric as a means of moving one's own soul.[55]

In more modern writings, Kenneth Burke argues that all thought is situated in language. No thought exists outside of a given language, because the human condition is symbolic. According to Burke, the symbolic nature of the human condition invites us to view individual motives "from the standpoint of Rhetoric, as a parliamentary wrangle which the individual has put together . . ."[56] Burke goes on to explain that internalized rhetoric is addressed in the same way that public rhetoric is addressed: internalized rhetoric has an audience of one, namely the self:

> A man can be his own audience, insofar as he, even in his secret thoughts, cultivates certain ideas or images for the effect he hopes they may have upon him; he is here what Mead would

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[54]This paradigmatic use of ἴδιος in Herodotus occurs throughout The Histories. Some examples can be found at 1.132.7; 2.120.22; 3.71.17; 4.18.11; 5.63.3; 6.9.18; 7.8.51; 8.109.16. Perhaps the most interesting and relevant use of ἴδιος in Herodotus is the use of it in combination with "βουλεύω." The word ἰδιοβουλεύω is used by Herodotus to describe Xerxes self-deliberation where Xerxes persuades himself to invade Greece (7.8.51). Of course Xerxes is aided in his self-persuasion by Mardonius' numerous and well-adapted arguments.

[55]For relevant passages that depict a soul acting rhetorically, see Phaedo 91-95b; Phaedrus 253d-255; and Republic Book III. 390c-441. George Kennedy makes a suggestive reference to this point as well. After presenting Plato's definition of rhetoric, Kennedy notes that while Plato treats rhetoric as a feature of public address, he recognizes that there is a more general phenomenon of rhetoric in all human communication. See, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 42.

[56]Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969): 38.

> call "an 'I' addressing its 'me'"; and in this respect he is being rhetorical quite as though he were using pleasant imagery to influence an outside audience rather than one within.[57]

Burke sees internal rhetoric--as he sees public rhetoric--as involving a socializing and moralizing process.

> The individual person striving to form himself in accordance with the communicative norms that match the cooperative ways of his society, is by the same token concerned with the rhetoric of identification. To act upon himself persuasively, he must variously resort to images and ideas that are formative. Education ("indoctrination") exerts such pressure upon him from without; he completes the process from within. If he does not somehow act to tell himself (as his own audience) what the various brands of rhetorician have told him, his persuasion is not complete. Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within.[58]

Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca also regard deliberation as a kind of rhetoric.[59] They too think Isocrates' opinion (cited above) provides useful insight into the nature of inner thought as rhetorical. Specifically in rejection of the philosophical tradition that defines deliberation as logic[60],

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[57]Burke 38.

[58]Burke 39.

[59]Chaim Pereman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969): 4.

[60]The authors state, "In contradistinction to dialectic--the technique of controversy with another person--and to rhetoric--the technique of speech addressed to a large number of people--logic is identified, both by Schopenhauer and by J.S. Mill with the rules applied in the conduct of one's own thought. And this because when a person is thinking, his mind would not be concerned with pleading or with seeking only those arguments that support a particular point of view, but would strive to assemble all arguments that seem to it to have some value, without suppressing any,

they feel "that it is highly desirable to consider self-deliberation as a particular kind of argumentation." They define argumentation, which belongs to rhetoric not dialectic, as "the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent."[61] "The mind" is that of the audience. Audiences have three forms:

> The first such audience consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal, adult persons; we shall refer to it as the universal audience. The second consists of the single interlocutor whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue. The third is the subject himself when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions.[62]

For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, self-deliberation belongs to the realm of persuasion. A persuasive model of self-deliberation tells us that, "Even in the realm of inward deliberation . . . a person must conceive of himself as divided into at least two interlocutors, two parties engaging in deliberation."[63] The division of the mind is the starting point of deliberation as self-persuasion for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, since this division creates audiences to which theses can be directed in order to induce the mind to assent.

Most recently, two scholars, Don M. Burks and Jean Nienkamp, have addressed the idea of internal rhetoric. Burks proposes "that self-persuasion can be viewed substantially as we view persuasion of others, as a mode of

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and then, after weighing the pros and cons, would decide on what, to the best of its knowledge and belief, appears to be the most satisfactory solution (41)."

[61]Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 4

[62]Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 30.

[63]Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 14.

rhetorical discourse, and that such a view is enlightening."[64] Burks' exploration of self-persuasion begins with Maurice Natanson and Henry Johnstone's work on argument.[65] He finds in their work the recognition that "self-persuasion is not essentially different rhetorically from persuasion of others."[66] Burks explains that even though Natanson and H. Johnstone never mention "self-persuasion" explicitly, the concept is implicit in their work. In "Rhetoric and Philosophical Argumentation" he quotes Natanson's definition of persuasion: a dialectical transformation of the self through indirect argumentation.[67] Burks points out that implicit in this definition is the fusion of dialectic and rhetoric as well as the idea of a "self-persuasion."

This relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, can be understood as a fusion of philosophy and rhetoric in the Socratic tradition. For Burks, and others in this tradition, rhetoric presupposes dialectic. Dialectic, as the investigation or the deriving of a position, becomes rhetoric's inventional tool, for the eventual purpose of advocacy of a position. To the extent that we advocate a dialectically secured position to ourselves or to others or to both at once, we are using rhetoric. Burks approaches dialectic and rhetoric as if they were on a continuum from pure investigation of a position to advocacy. In this way, dialectic and rhetoric are inextricably linked in the persuasive processes, whether this process is directed only to oneself or to others as well. Rhetoric needs dialectic. Rhetoric increases its chances for ethical argument and advocacy--where the self is risked and the mind of both the auditor and

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[64]Don M. Burks, "Persuasion, Self-Persuasion, and Rhetorical Discourse," Philosophy and Rhetoric 3 (Spring 1970): 116.

[65]Natanson and Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation.

[66]Burks 116.

[67]Burks 111.

speaker are opened--when it uses dialectic as a method for discovering claims and testing their validity. And likewise, dialectic needs rhetoric. Dialectic void of rhetoric seems only an exercise in mental gymnastics. If dialectic is an end in itself, it fails to be relevant in the human world of action. Only with rhetoric can dialectic become useful in bringing about a judgment. A judgment represents a closure, and closure presupposes a commitment to a particular claim. This commitment is not a part of the dialectic process; in fact dialectic proceeds as a way of unsettling commitments. Commitment and judgment are rhetorical not dialectical.

Burks suggests that commitment can be something brought about by either a public or personal rhetoric, either self-persuasion or interpersonal persuasion. In particular, Burks is interested in the persuasion of the self. Burks clarifies that the self "is manifest with every one of the significant choices of life." And these choices, for Burks, are facilitated by a private, internal, persuasive process, a dialectically informed process analogous to the process of persuading others. Both self-persuasion and what Burks calls interpersonal persuasion presuppose dialectic, or individual deliberation. They share the same process so that no intrinsic difference exists between the persuasion of another and the persuasion of oneself. The only difference between self-persuasion and interpersonal persuasion for Burks, like others on this subject, is the audience. Self-persuasion has the self as audience; interpersonal persuasion has the other as audience, though the self is not necessarily excluded from this later process.

After defining what he means by self-persuasion, and showing how this process presupposes dialectic and mirrors interpersonal persuasion,

Burks then suggests how this idea of self-persuasion has been manifest in history. He begins with the ancient Greeks. He uses the Greek word peitho to demonstrate his point:

> The Greek word peitho which when in active voice is translated as persuade may when in the middle voice be translated by the English word obey. One wonders if the subtle mind of the Greek was not conveying the idea that selfhood is often involved in rhetorical experience, as when, after interior dialectic and perhaps a struggle with self, we at last arrive at a feeling of certainty, a feeling that we are now doing what we ought to do. We may then say even as the Greek might have said, 'I persuade myself,' or even, 'I obey myself.'

Burks proceeds to remind us of Isocrates' suggestion of self-persuasion, as was cited earlier, and adds to his historical list Richard Whately, I. A. Richards, Kierkegaard, and Charles Stevenson. He reminds us that Richard Whately wrote, "'A man of sense practices rhetoric on himself.'"[68] He tells us that I.A. Richards suggests the idea of self-persuasion when he writes of "'Something Speaking to Itself of what It is speaking for,' and of 'my very Self, addressing itself in me.'"[69] Burks adds that if Richards is not suggesting the experience of self-persuasion, "he is at least pointing to the experience of moral decision, which may be an instance of internal dialectic leading to moral self-persuasion."[70]

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[68]Burks 112-113. Whately's quotation can be found in Elements of Rhetoric, ed. Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963): 183. Burks notes, "The precise phrasing may not be Whately's since the statement is a marginal insert, but it is a succinct expression of the point of his paragraph."

[69]Burks 113-114.

[70]Burks 114.

Like Burks, Jean Nienkamp is interested in the various historical manifestations of the idea of self-persuasion. Her dissertation, "The 'Georgics' of the Mind: Toward a Historical Understanding of Internal Rhetoric," seems to be the first full length study of the historical relationship between deliberation and rhetoric.[71] Nienkamp provides a historical look at internal rhetoric, which she defines as the reflexive use of language by an individual in order to influence his or her own actions or attitudes.[72] While Nienkamp points out that this activity has variously been called "deliberation, soliloquy, or arguing with oneself," she prefers to call the activity internal rhetoric.[73] Nienkamp examines the idea of internal rhetoric in the works of Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Francis Bacon, Shaftesbury, Whately, Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, Mead, and Vygotsky. These works suggest to Nienkamp the necessity of including internal suasory discourse as part of rhetorical history and theory. In Nienkamp's own words, her study "explores what a history of rhetoric reveals if it takes this "internal rhetoric" as its central concept rather than focusing on public rhetoric."[74]

From this review of Plato, Isocrates, Burke, Perelman, Burks, and Nienkamp, as well as Burks' accounts of Natanson and H. Johnstone, Whately, Richards, Kierkegaard, Stevenson, and Nienkamp's additional accounts of Aristotle, Bacon, Shaftesbury, Mead, and Vygotsky, we can see that for some, indeed for many, the scope of rhetoric is not necessarily limited to

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[71]Jean Nienkamp, "The 'Georgics' of the Mind": Toward a Historical Understanding of Internal Rhetoric," diss., The Pennsylvania State University, 1994.

[72]Nienkamp 6.

[73]Nienkamp 6.

[74]Nienkamp iii. Nienkamp also examines the practice of internal rhetoric as made manifest by Homer. I will address her examination of Homeric deliberation below.

public address, but extends into the private sphere as well. This historical precedent identifies thought with speech, and suggests that we can think about thought as internal discourse and deliberation as self-persuasion.

In addition to suggesting through historical precedent that deliberation is self-persuasion, this proposition can be demonstrated, in part, through Henry Johnstone's metaphor of the rhetorical wedge.[75] H. Johnstone takes as his starting point what he sees to be the function of rhetoric: the evocation of consciousness.[76] To the extent rhetoric functions to evoke consciousness, we can say that rhetoric evokes consciousness not only in other people but in oneself.[77] An antecedent condition of both persuasion and deliberation then is the rhetorical wedge. As Henry Johnstone explains, "Public persuasion attempts to drive this wedge between the audience and some fact or thesis of which it has hitherto been unconscious; deliberation (self-persuasion) drives it between a subject no longer unconscious of the choice s/he must make, and him/herself; it brings the choice to consciousness."[78] In H. Johnstone's vision, rhetoric, both public and private, functions to attack unawareness, to evoke consciousness.

Carroll Arnold, writing in tribute to this idea, explains that in Henry Johnstone's vision, not only do public persuasion and self persuasion function in analogous ways, but they presuppose one another. Arnold writes,

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[75]H. Johnstone's idea of the Rhetorical Wedge can be found in several of his works See Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument, (University Park: Dialogue Press of Man and World, 1978.); Address. "Rhetoric as a Wedge: A Reformulation," Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 20.4 (Fall 1990): 333-338. Also see Carroll C. Arnold, "Johnstone's 'Wedge' and Theory of Rhetoric," Philoslophy and Rhetoric, 20.2 (1987): 118-128, and H. Johnstone, Response, Philosophy and Rhetoric, 20.2 (1987): 129-134.

[76]Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca take this to be rhetoric's function as well.

[77]See in particular, The Problem of the Self, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970): 13.

[78]H. Johnstone, unpublished manuscript, 14 September 1994, 2.

"rhetoric that appears to appeal forces me to examine what I know and what I am, as well as the proffered rhetoric. It evokes my self-rhetoric, and that maintains consciousness that I am, but that I could be otherwise."[79] We take up the burden of coping with, what Arnold calls, "this paradoxical pair of awarenesses," by deliberating.[80] The end of deliberation is judgment. Deliberation, like public persuasion, does not stop with the recognition of a problem, and the invention of alternative courses of action, but it moves on toward the end of making a judgment, resolving the burden of the paradox of consciousness. Judgment is the end of both deliberation and public persuasion. The move to judgment can only be brought about by the use of persuasive appeals. The final judgment is based on those appeals that are most persuasive to an individual.

Because deliberation and public persuasion are analogous arts, sharing a function, method, and end, deliberation, like public persuasion, must be an acquired or learned skill. Deliberation, like public persuasion, must either be acquired through modeling or imitative behavior or it must be learned through explicit instruction. Once deliberative skills are acquired/learned they can be practiced and perfected. Deliberation, like public persuasion, is an acquired art, not a natural condition.

One way to demonstrate that deliberation must be an acquired/learned art is through the behaviors of resisting and yielding to temptation. Henry Johnstone notes, "to resist temptation requires a self-directed rhetoric, which is clearly an art, since it does not come naturally."[81] When we resist a

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[79]Arnold, "Johnstone," 121.
[80]Arnold, "Johnstone," 121.
[81]H. Johnstone, unpublished manuscript, 14 March 1996, p 1.

temptation we do something that acts against our impulses. We resist by persuading ourselves not to do that which comes naturally or by impulse. We present reasons that are most likely to be effective against the impulse. Persuasive reasons enable resistance.

Yielding to temptation also requires a self-directed rhetoric. And this self-directed rhetoric, analogous to public persuasion, must also be an acquired/learned art since it does not come naturally. If rhetoric as a public art of persuasion can be deceptive, as our history of rhetoric continually records and to which our theory continually responds, then a private form of deception must also be manifest. This private form of deception can be called self-seduction. To the extent that certain types of public rhetoric can be thought of as a seduction of an audience, as Plato adumbrates in his Phaedrus, then certain types of internal rhetoric can be thought of as a seduction of oneself. Henry Johnstone notes that the rhetoric of deliberation is neatly exemplified in the rhetoric of yielding to temptation. We can indeed seduce ourselves, through self-persuasion, and yield to a given temptation. H. Johnstone uses a playful yet apt example to demonstrate the self-seductive character of a certain kind of deliberation, namely yielding to temptation:

> It is of course the role of the seducer to engage in the rhetoric that makes us yield to temptation, but we can obviously seduce ourselves, as Mrs. Goose did when on her way to deliver a batch of cookies she had made she thought of a 'very good reason' for

> eating each one in turn before reaching her destination. One unacquainted with this art [of self-persuasion] would simply gobble without having to think.[82]

Both resisting temptation and yielding to temptation require a self-directed rhetoric, a rhetoric that must be acquired or learned because both behaviors go against what comes naturally.

This dissertation proceeds from the premise that an art of persuasion can have both a private and public function. If we understand deliberation as an art of self-persuasion, an art which is analogous to public persuasion in its function, method, end, and in its ability to be acquired/learned, practiced, and perfected, then we can see how Homeric deliberation is the earliest example of such self-persuasion in the western tradition.

The Rhetoric of Deliberation in Homer

Since Homer stands at the beginning of what I (and others such as Karp) regard as the rhetorical tradition, Homer seems a good place to start to understand private rhetoric (the art of self-persuasion). By examining the manifestations of deliberation in Homer, we can see early manifestations of an art of self-persuasion, an art that we can call rhetoric.

Jean Nienkamp recognizes the need for such a study of Homer in her dissertation. While the focus of her dissertation is the "idea" of internal rhetoric as talked about by various thinkers throughout history (what we might call metarhetorics on internal rhetoric), she begins her dissertation

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[82]H. Johnstone, unpublished manuscript, December 1996.

with several examples of the "practice" of internal rhetoric as manifest in the Iliad. While I applaud Nienkamp's project in writing a history of internal rhetoric and beginning this history with Homer, and while I find her portrayals of internal rhetoric throughout history both creative and heuristic, I do differ with her project in its portrayal of Homeric internal rhetoric.

Nienkamp appropriates Snell's description of the psychology of the Homeric character as a way to argue her position that internal rhetoric exists in Homer.[83] But this seems to be a contradiction. As was explained in Chapter 1, Snell's account of Homeric psychology is bleak, giving no place to human agency or self-conscious behavior in the Homeric world. Furthermore, Snell's description of the fragmented Homeric interiority, consisting of independent parts each with its own voice fails to provide the single perspective from which internal rhetoric must begin. This perspective is the self. When a problem arises, various poles of a divided mind are created. Only the unifying perspective of the self allows these poles to be brought into view so that deliberation can begin as a means of resolving the division, i.e. making a judgment and alleviating the burden of a divided mind. With no unifying perspective, as in Snell's account, the Homeric character is unable to deliberate because s/he is unable to recognize the division of the mind. No contradiction exists within the individual. Without contradiction, the need for an internal rhetoric never arises.

Another limitation of Nienkamp's examination is her sample. Nienkamp examines only seven instances of internal rhetoric, and all seven deliberators are heroes in the Iliad: Odysseus (Il. 11.403-411), Menelaus (Il.

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[83]Her discussion of the usefulness of Snellian psychology can be found on page 20-21.

17.90-106); Achilles (Il. 18.5-15; 20.343-353; 21.53-63); Agenor (Il. 21.552-570); and Hektor (Il. 22.98-130). These are the deliberations of prominent men in the public realm, leaders in both words and deeds. Homer is very explicit about their deliberation. In each of these scenes, Homer tells the particulars of a hero's problem and the inner debate that the hero initiates as a means of judging the best solution to the problem. Homer gives us details about this inner debate, namely that the hero addresses himself, poses alternative courses of action, and makes a judgment about these alternative courses of action. Each of these deliberation scenes includes an explicit deliberative calculus.

While the deliberation scenes of these heroes are some of the most explicit and complete portrayals of deliberation anywhere in the poems, a problem arises if we look only at heroic deliberation. Such a restricted scope excludes the very strong probability that deliberation is a more general phenomenon in Homer, that it is practiced by people other than heroes and that it is made manifest in ways that are not explicitly and completely portrayed.

It is very likely that people other than heroes deliberate in the poems. In the Odyssey, while Homer tells us that Odysseus deliberates, he also tells us that non-heroic characters deliberate, the two most important being Telemachus and Penelope. Neither fits the traditional criteria for a Homeric hero. Nevertheless, Homer tells us that they too deliberate. Because Homer portrays deliberate thought as persuasion in the heroic characters, we have no reason to believe that deliberation would be anything different for the non-heroic characters. The deliberation of Telemachus and Penelope is as much a

strategic, internal persuasive discourse as is the deliberation of Odysseus, the major hero in the poem.

Furthermore, manifestations of Homeric deliberation may not be limited to the explicit and complete scenes of heroic deliberation. We saw in chapter one that Homer has reasons for minimizing his portrayal of the inner workings of the minds of his characters. Homer is a poet of action, not of thought. For this reason, Homeric portrayals of deliberation may not always be explicit and complete. By restricting one's scope to only those deliberation scenes that are explicit and complete, one risks ignoring a range of deliberative behavior that could enhance our understanding of the nature and scope of Homeric deliberation.

Rather than restricting the scope of deliberation to the explicit and complete heroic scenes, I will expand the scope of this examination to include both the explicit and the implicit scenes of both heroic and non-heroic deliberation. This dissertation proceeds under the assumption that certain content can be implicit and that the critic must account for both implicit and explicit content. I will examine those scenes where Telemachus, Odysseus, and Penelope make choices and act in deliberate ways to foster their particular ends, as well as just those scenes where the three characters are portrayed as deliberating. Deliberation is implicit in choices and deliberate actions. Deliberation is explicit in portrayals of inner workings of these characters' minds. Through Telemachus I hope to show that deliberation in Homer is acquired, that it is not a natural born skill. Through Odysseus, I hope to show that deliberation in Homer has a clear method, one that can be practiced to perfection. Through Penelope, I hope to show that deliberation in Homer is

gendered. Penelope, as a woman in a man's world, must deliberate differently than a man. I will explore the way in which deliberation is manifest in all three characters' thoughts, words, and deeds, and the way in which this deliberation presupposes an art of self-persuasion, an art that we can call rhetoric.

Chapter 3

TELEMACHUS LEARNS TO DELIBERATE

Telemachus' first appearance in the Odyssey is no scene stealer (1.114-117). He is surrounded by his mother's suitors who are ravaging his home and possessions, not to mention undermining his morale. Rather than taking action on his own behalf and deliberating a plan to solve his problems, Telemachus sits dreaming of his father's return and the punishment of the suitors that would inevitably follow.

Though this first scene does not show Telemachus as a deliberator, as the poem advances Telemachus begins to take on the character of one familiar with the art of deliberation. By the end of the poem we will have seen Telemachus deliberate his own courses of action and make decisive choices on his own behalf to achieve his desired ends. A change takes place in Telemachus, and I suggest that this change is his acquisition of the art of deliberation.

This chapter will examine Telemachus' development in the Odyssey from an adolescent unable to deliberate on his own to an adult who recognizes the necessity of deliberating and who begins to demonstrate the skills of one becoming familiar with the art of self-persuasion. Telemachus' odyssey exemplifies the developmental character of deliberation. If deliberation is a persuasive art, it must not be an automatic reaction of a

divided mind. Deliberation as self-persuasion must be a habit of mind that can be developed in an individual. Through Telemachus' odyssey we see him develop as a deliberator. We see him come to consciousness about the necessity to deliberate, and we see him begin to acquire the necessary skills for successful deliberation.

This chapter will follow a tripartite division, according to the stages of Telemachus' growth and development throughout the Odyssey. The first section will cover books 1-4 of the Odyssey and will trace Telemachus' education in deliberation through the models of Athene, Peisistratus, Nestor, Menelaus, and Orestes. The second section will cover books 15-18 where Telemachus' deliberative nature is manifest in his reasoning and decisiveness. The third section will cover books 19-24 where Homer reminds us that despite Telemachus' emerging deliberative character, his father Odysseus must be regarded as the master of deliberation. This reminder helps us to see that Telemachus is indeed still learning deliberation, this time from the master of deliberation himself, Odysseus.[1]

The Telemachy:
Telemachus' Education in Deliberation

Telemachus is an interesting and complex character in the Odyssey. He is the twenty year old son of Odysseus. Because Odysseus has left his son as a new-born to fight in the Trojan war, Telemachus has grown up without his

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[1]See Norman Austin, Telemachos Polymechanos," California Studies in Classical Antiquity 2 (1969), p 57. Austin describes Telemachus' return to Ithaca as his chance for "observation and imitation of il maestro, Odysseus himself." I will contend that Odysseus is "il maestro" of deliberation.

father's model. We meet Telemachus at an important stage in his adolescence. He is no longer a child, yet he is not fully cognizant of the implications of his impending adult status. He is unsure how to act in the space of adulthood, and the space of adulthood is a space of deliberate action. On account of his youthful inexperience, Telemachus is often afflicted by indecision and unable to act in fully autonomous ways. But as Telemachus gains deliberative models and life-experience, his awareness of the necessity to make choices to resolve his various dilemmas increases proportionately. He learns that he must choose, and he acquires a deliberate character. His decisiveness marks the emergence of his self in deliberation.

When we meet Telemachus for the first time, he is not a very happy young man. He is sitting apart from the wooers, all of whom are invading his household, eating his substance, squandering his resources, and waiting for his reluctant mother to choose one of them to wed. With his household in chaos around him, Telemachus sits dreaming of his father's return.

1.114-117 ἥστο γὰρ ἐν μνηστῆρσι φίλον τετιημένος ἦτορ,
ὀσσόμενος πατέρ ἐσθλὸν ἐνὶ φρεσίν, εἴ ποθεν ἐλθὼν
μνηστήρων τῶν μὲν σκέδασιν κατα δώματα θείη,
τιμὴν δ' αὐτὸς ἔχοι καὶ δώμασιν οἷσιν ἀνάσσοι.
(He sat among the wooers grieving in his own heart,
imagining his noble father in his mind, if he would come
from somewhere and make a scattering of the wooers
throughout the divine house, and himself would hold
honor and would rule over his own house.)

As he sits imagining all this, the goddess Athene appears to him. Disguised as Mentes, a guest-friend of Odysseus, she tells Telemachus that his father will not be absent long because, as a man of many resources (πολυμήχανός), he will be thinking (φράσσεται) of a way to come back (1.205).

By describing this behavior of his father, φράσσεται, Athene seems to bring into contrast the intellectual activity of Odysseus and Telemachus. Both face seemingly insurmountable obstacles to their happiness. Telemachus must suffer the destruction of his home and possessions, the indecisiveness of his mother and her inability to bring an end to the situation, and the absence of his father. Odysseus must suffer through his journey home after the fall of Troy. But Athene points out to Telemachus that Odysseus thinks (φράζω) of ways to resolve his strife on his own. In contrast, Telemachus only imagines (ὄσσομαι) the strife being resolved by another. Imagining may help Telemachus to "see" a desired end, but thinking enables Odysseus to construct means to achieve this end. Imagining puts something before the φρένες; thinking is the action taken by the φρένες to create the worlds that are imagined.

Athene proceeds to speak of her own wish that Odysseus would appear in the doorway, armed and ready to make a scattering of the wooers (1.255-266).[2] Now, both Athene and Telemachus have imagined this ending. This similarity does not seem accidental. Rather Athene seems to adopt the imaginative spirit of Telemachus so that Telemachus might see himself in her. Athene, like Telemachus, imagines Odysseus' putting an end to the

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[2] While Athene does not use any form of ὄσσομαι, as Telemachus did, the subjunctive in her expression of her own wish for Odysseus to return and solve the problem of the suitors gives her speech a "wish-like" quality: 1.255 εἰ γὰρ νῦν ἐλθὼν ... (if only now he would come ...)

misery caused by the suitors. However, Athene does more than just imagine. She goes on to propose a course of action. The remainder of this speech (1.267-305) serves to teach through example what one does when one commits to act within a dilemma. Athene seems to recognize that under the conditions of adolescence and extreme strife, Telemachus is unable to make sense out of his situation. Her speech shows Telemachus how to discern the poles of his dilemma properly.

The first part of Athene's lesson defines the alternatives of Telemachus' dilemma.

1.267-269 ἀλλ' ἤ τοι μὲν ταῦτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται,
ἤ κεν νοστήσας ἀποτίσεται, ἦε καὶ οὐκί,
ὅισιν ἐνί μεγάροισι; σὲ δὲ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα
ὅππως κε μῆνστῆρας ἀπώσεαι ἐκ μεγάροιο.
(But these things lie at the knees of the gods,
either he shall return to his palace and exact
punishment or either he shall not. But I urge
you to ponder how to drive back the wooers
from your palace).

Notice how Athene defines the alternatives: either Odysseus will return or not. But she also states that the outcome of this dilemma is in the hands of the gods. In other words, if Telemachus fails to see further than these two alternatives, he has little hope of resolving the dilemma, and his problem will continue. If Telemachus wants to resolve his problem, he must discern the proper poles of the dilemma: he must ponder (φράζεσθαι) his own course of action in either case, whether Odysseus is alive or dead. Athene tells

Telemachus to seek out information from others who may be likely to know of the fate of Odysseus. She tells him to go to Pylos to question Nestor and from there to Sparta to question Menelaus (1.280-286).

1.287-296 εἰ μέν κεν πατρὸς βίοτον καὶ νοστον ἀκούσῃς,
ἦ τ' ἂν τρυχόμενος περ ἔτι τλαίης ἐνιαυτόν:
εἰ δέ κε τεθνηῶτος ἀκούσῃς μηδ' ἔτ' ἐόντος,
νοστήσας δὴ ἔπειτα φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν
σῆμά τέ οἱ χεῦαι καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερεΐξαι
πολλὰ μάλ', ὅσσα ἔοικε, καὶ ἀνέρι μητέρα δοῦναι.
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ ταῦτα τελευτήσῃς τε καὶ ἔρξῃς,
φράζεσθαι δὴ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν
ὅππως κε μνηστῆρας ἐνὶ μεγάροισι τεοῖσι
κτείνῃς ἠὲ δόλῳ ἢ ἀμφαδόν: (And if you hear
that he has died and is no longer alive then
indeed return to your dear fatherland and
heap up a marker and upon it pay funeral
rites as many as is appropriate and give your
mother to a man. Then when you have done
all this and brought it to an end, then take
thought in mind and heart how you may slay
the wooers in the halls whether by guile or openly.)

With this statement, Athene provides the major premise of the dilemma. In effect she says, "If your father is alive, endure for one more year. If he is dead marry off your mother, and plot your own revenge." This is the dilemma that Telemachus faces. While he can imagine Odysseus returning, he will

not resolve his problem this way. He must <u>think</u> about his own course of action that will follow upon verification of his father's fate. Only by properly discerning the poles of his divided mind and by deliberating about things within his power to change (namely his own behavior) can Telemachus hope to resolve the problem he currently faces. Athene's role, as his teacher of deliberation, is to encourage Telemachus to recognize the necessity of committing himself to choose a course of action in order to resolve his problems.

Athene's speech seems to be an attempt to teach Telemachus how to think differently, to use his φρένες to discover means to resolve his problem rather than to dream about its resolution. And this way of thinking seems to be portrayed as a movement into adulthood. Athene tells Telemachus that he must consider how to resolve his problem since he is no longer of an age where he can cling to his childish ways (1.296-297--οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ νηπιάας ὀχέειν, ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι τηλίκος ἐσσί). Telemachus must realize the full implications of his adult status. He must recognize the necessity of deliberating in the face of his dilemma. Such deliberation will call forth his agency which in turn will allow him to discern ways of securing power from a situation. As with public persuasion, self-persuasion is a way to power.

Athene's speech must have had a significant effect on Telemachus. The poet tells us that Athene left him filled with spirit (μένος) and confidence (θάρσος) (1.320-321). This does not necessarily mean that Athene put these strengths in his mind, as a goddess might cast a spell over a mortal, but rather these strengths were evoked by her speech. She taught Telemachus how to realize him*self* through thinking rather than dreaming. Armed with this

new intellectual tool, φράζεσθαι κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν, Telemachus now has the tools to begin resolving his power.

As any eager student would, Telemachus begins practicing his lesson right away. His actions take on a new and deliberate quality. Upon Athene's exit, at once Telemachus goes over, a godlike man (ὀίσατο γάρ θεὸν εἶναι), to sit with the suitors (1.323). Notice that earlier, he had separated himself from them. His first deliberate act is to sit in their space. Next, he speaks harshly to his mother for trying to persuade the bard Phemios to sing about something other than the Achaians' bitter homecoming from Troy. He tells his mother to go back into the house and to let the men see to the discussion, particularly himself, since he has the power in the household (1.354-359).[3] Most importantly, in response to Athene's speech, Telemachus deliberates all night. Homer tells us of this deliberation in two separate places:

1.427 ἔνθ' ἔιβη εἰς εὐνὴν πολλὰ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζων.
(Then he went to bed deliberating much in his mind.)

1.443-444 ἔνθ' ὅ γε παννύχιος, κεκαλυμμένος οἰὸς ἀώτῳ,
βούλευε φρεσὶν ἦσιν ὁδὸν τὴν πέφραδ' Ἀθήνη.
(So there, all night, wrapped in a fleece of wool, he deliberated in his mind the journey which Athene had shown him.)

This evidence of Telemachus' deliberation presupposes the emergence of his perspective on the poles of his dilemma. Having such a perspective

[3] The poet tells us at 1.360 that Penelope is amazed at her son's words, as would any mother the first time she hears her child speak with such personal authority.

indicates that Telemachus has reached a level of self-consciousness about his situation that he had not reached earlier. This deliberation is a manifestation of Telemachus' commitment to act on his own behalf and commitment to a course of action. Through the model set by Athene, Telemachus has begun his transformation from dreaming to thinking, from unawareness to consciousness, from chaos to order.

While Homer does not fully articulate the calculus that Telemachus' deliberation presupposes, nor any justification of the resulting choice, this should not be taken as a sign of the absence of self-persuasion. As I have argued earlier, Homer is a poet of action not of thought. Because of Homer's poetic preference to highlight action, he tells us Telemachus deliberates all night long, then tells us of his deliberate actions the next morning. To see if Telemachus' deliberation the night before was "true deliberation", we only need to see if Telemachus' actions reveal signs of a deliberate character. And indeed they do.

When he wakes the next day, Telemachus continues to put into practice what he learned from Athene. He calls an assembly of the Achaians, suitors and all, to announce his course of action. Telemachus uses at least four strategies in his address to the suitors: he poses dilemmas, uses practical and moral arguments to build his case, keeps silent about the most strategic information, and attempts to present his speech in a lofty style.

The first strategy, probably learned directly from Athene's model, is to pose a dilemma to the suitors. The suitors can either leave his house at once and feast on their own goods or they can continue their insolent ways and die in the house without atonement. He uses this strategy twice during the

Telemachy, once immediately after Athene's departure and once during the assembly. When he poses the dilemma for the first time (1.374-380), its forcefulness leaves the suitors biting their lips. The suitors marvel at how boldly Telemachus has spoken. In fact, Telemachus' behavior is so unexpected that Antinous responds, "Τηλέμαχ', ἦ μάλα δή σε διδάσκουσιν θεοὶ αὐτοὶ ὑψαγόρην τ' ἔμεναι και θαρσαλέως ἀγορεύειν. (Telemachus, indeed the gods only are teaching you to be both one who talks boldly and courageously 1.384-385.) Antinous' use of διδάσκω is interesting since it supports the interpretation that Telemachus needed someone to teach him how to speak with power.[4] And the use of the dilemma demonstrates that Telemachus has learned his lesson well.

The next day he uses this dilemma for the second time (2.138-145). The language is identical to the first expression of the dilemma. Perhaps this repetition is to be expected since the dilemma hasn't changed. Or perhaps this repetition serves only to ease the creative burden of the bard and so is formulaic. I do not want to rule out either of these accounts, but I would like to introduce another to consider. Telemachus' resources are still not varied enough for him to deviate successfully from a pattern of knowledge already established. Therefore, the second time he poses the dilemma to the suitors, his language is identical. He must repeat word for word the dilemma that he posed earlier, or risk decreasing its effectiveness.

In addition to using dilemma, Telemachus also uses practical and moral arguments to build his case. One of the best examples follows:

2.132-137 . . . κακὸν δέ με πόλλ' ἀποτίνειν

[4]Also διδάσκω suggests that Telemachus' persuasion addressed to the suitors is an art, something he was taught how to practice.

'Ικαρίῳ, αἴ κ' αὐτὸς ἑκὼν ἀπὸ μητέρα πέμψω.
ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς κακὰ πείσομαι, ἄλλα δὲ δαίμων.
δώσει, ἐπεὶ μήτηρ στυγερὰς ἀρήσετ' ἐρινῦς
οἴκου ἀπερχομένη· νέμεσις δέ μοι ἐξ ἀνθρώπων
ἔσσεται· (It would be bad for me to pay a large fine to Icarus, if I were to send my mother away. From her father I will suffer evil and the god will give other evils, since my mother will stir up the dreadful furies when she goes away from the house. Hatred will be to me from men.

In response to Antinous' demand that Telemachus send his mother away to the house of her father so that her marriage and bride gifts can be arranged, Telemachus builds a case around practical and moral considerations. First, he puts forth the practical consideration that it would be a bad thing for him to have to pay a large amount of money to Penelope's father Icarus to take his daughter back. Then he puts forth the moral consideration that the gods would punish his behavior with evils.

Placing the practical, monetary consideration first seems particularly well suited for Telemachus' audience. Antinous and the other suitors would not be likely to identify with the moral argument. On a daily basis they have been behaving immorally and seem to care nothing about any future punishment of the gods. However, the suitors do care about wealth, goods, and substance since these are the things that serve their pleasure. This practical appeal seems to begin Telemachus' argument from a shared value, an agreed upon premise, namely that monetarily costly practices ought to be avoided.

Not only does Telemachus seem to be strategic in what he says, but he seems to be strategic in what he doesn't say. Prior to Athene's lesson, Telemachus' silence was indicative of a mind that dreamt of ends but did not discover means. Now Telemachus' silence is evidence of a mind that strategically chooses what needs to be left silent in order to foster the resolution of his problem. The best example appears at 2.212-223. Eurymachus has just announced that the suitors fear no one, especially not Telemachus. Telemachus responds by telling the suitors to give him a ship and twenty comrades to journey to Sparta and Pylos to seek tidings of his father. Then, adopting the language of Athene, Telemachus repeats the initial dilemma used by Athene in her speech to Telemachus:

2.218-223 εἰ μέν κεν πατρὸς βίοτον καὶ νόστον ἀκούσω,
ἦ τ' ἂν τρυχόμενος περ, ἔτι τλαίην ἐνιαυτόν·
εἰ δέ κε τεθνηῶτος ἀκούσω μηδ' ἔτ' ἐόντος,
νοστήσας δὴ ἔπειτα φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν
σῆμά τέ οἱ χεύω καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερείξω
πολλὰ μάλ', ὅσσα ἔοικε, καὶ ἀνέρι μητέρα δώσω."
(If I hear that my father is alive and returning, I could suffer one year still, although being subjected to impoverishment. But if I hear he has died and lives no longer then I will return to my dear fatherland. I will pile a grave site for him and pay very many funeral rites, as much as seems necessary. And I will give my mother to a man.)

This seems to be a direct quotation of the dilemma that Athene initially posed to Telemachus, with one obvious omission:

1.293-296 αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ ταῦτα τελευτήσῃῃς τε καὶ ἔρξῃς,
φράζεσθαι δὴ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν
ὅππως κε μνῆστηρας ἐνὶ μεγάροισι τεοῖσι
κτείνῃς ηὲ δλόῳ ἢ ἀμφαδόν· (Then when you have done all this and brought it to an end take thought in mind and heart how you may slay the wooers in the halls whether by guile or openly.)

Telemachus does not communicate to the suitors that he will plot their demise. This silence seems to be strategic. Since Eurymachus has just announced that the suitors feel no threat from Telemachus, it is likely that the suitors will continue to underestimate Telemachus and the threat he poses to them. If they underestimate Telemachus then it is likely that they will not prepare against him. These likelihoods are increased by Telemachus' silence about his plan to deliberate their demise. Telemachus' silence is strategic and for this reason can be seen as a sign of his commitment to a course of action in the face of his dilemma.

Telemachus' lofty style of presentation presents us with final evidence of the deliberate quality of his actions. His speeches in the assembly are some of the most difficult speeches to translate in the Telemachy. The lengthy sentences, the tenses of the verbs, the unfamiliar syntax, and the difficult vocabulary all complicate the translation.

This lofty language is not handled flawlessly by Telemachus. After all he is acting on his own not merely being steered by Athene. His mistakes are

understood as the inevitable result of adolescent inexperience. And his first mistake was to choose such lofty syntax. How must Telemachus' speech have sounded to his audience, a group of his elders who had already proven themselves in both word and deed? Telemachus' adolescent attempt at lofty speech must have sounded very odd to his adult audience. In fact, the suitors go so far as to poke fun at Telemachus' attempt at eloquence. At 2.200, Eurymachus declares that the suitors do not fear Telemachus, although he is one of many words (μάλα περ πολύμυθον ἐόντα[5]). And again at 2.303, Antinous calls Telemachus a braggart, unrestrained in spirit (ὑψαγόρη[6], μένος ἄσχετε).

While Telemachus attempts to portray himself as an authority figure, an adult in charge of his household, we can see in his speech a young man who is struggling to make an impressive public showing. This struggle reflects a mind that is aware of the necessity to make choices about what is appropriate to say in a particular situation. Despite Telemachus' speaking deliberately, posing dilemmas, using practical and moral arguments, keeping silent about strategic information, and attempting lofty speech, he is mocked by the suitors. It seems to him that his journey to Pylos and Sparta will be delayed on account of the suitors resistance to his request for a ship, comrades, and supplies. In his moment of loss, Telemachus reverts to his former helplessness. Rather than deliberate about how to resolve the matter,

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[5] "ἐόντα" is a present participle that would mean Antinous' remark governs Telemachus' current words: the suitors do not fear Telemachus despite that fact that he is currently being a man of many words.

[6] "ὑψαγόρη" comes from ὕψι +ἀγορή. "ὕψι" means "on high" or "aloft" while "ἀγορή" refers to the general assembly. This adjective literally describes one who has lofty speech in the assembly.

he prays to Athene. Athene comes to his rescue again, once again disguised as Mentes.

She reminds Telemachus that he is no thoughtless (ἀνοήμων) man; in him is the good spirit (μένος) and cunning (μῆτις) of his father. We could read this as a deterministic statement about how Homeric individuals inherit cunning rather than learn it. However, at least the potential exists to read Athene's statement as an appeal to Telemachus' respect for his father and his familial sense of pride. This appeal works to revitalize Telemachus' confidence after the disappointing results of the assembly. Perhaps Athene realizes that Telemachus' newly learned deliberative skills are not yet reliable. Athene must restore his confidence in his ability to deliberate as a means to resolving his problems. She does this by simply reminding Telemachus that he comes from good stock.

When she finishes speaking her words of encouragement to Telemachus, she becomes very specific in giving directions. She tells Telemachus that after going back to the house and keeping company with the suitors, he should make ready the provisions for his trip. She tells him to get wine in jars and barley in thick hides. Later, the poet tells us that Athene took counsel and disguised as Telemachus, she went to get a ship and to assemble comrades for his journey. Once she accomplished this, she took other counsel and cast a spell over the suitors. Then she disguised herself as Mentor and called Telemachus to embark on the journey.

If Athene is trying to teach Telemachus to think on his own and resolve his strife through deliberating and speaking, why does she do all this work herself? Athene may leave some lessons for Telemachus to learn on

his own, but the difficulty of his current situation often demands a more expert thinker than Telemachus. But, while Athene seems to make all the plans for Telemachus and to think of ways to execute her own will, Telemachus is not wholly uninvolved in the process. We could even say that what Athene did on a grand scale, as a master thinker and goddess, Telemachus did on a minor scale, as a novice thinker and adolescent.

After leaving Athene, Telemachus, with his heart still troubled within him, goes back to the house, but he does not keep company with the suitors as Athene had instructed. Instead he refuses Antinous' offer to eat and drink with him and the group, and he gives two reasons for this choice. First, he tells the suitors that he cannot join company with them because they have devoured his possessions (2.312-313). Second, he tells them that since they wish to prevent his journey, he will not join their company (2.319-320). Rather than join their company, Telemachus tells Antinous that he will try to let loose upon the suitors all evil fates.

This passage portrays Telemachus acting on his own, against the will of Athene. He makes a choice about how to act and provides reasons to support this choice. Unfortunately, Telemachus' decision to refuse the company of the suitors and to announce his plans to pursue evil against them only make the suitors mock and jeer him. One suitor even makes fun of Telemachus' ability to deliberate (μερμήριζει) death for the suitors (2.325-330).

Telemachus, seemingly unaffected by the suitor's comments, leaves the room to gather provisions, as Athene had instructed. Once again, Telemachus acts on his own, only this time, he realizes some level of success. After securing provisions, he tells Eurykleia, his nurse, to remain silent about

his leaving. Especially, Eurykleia is to keep this information from Penelope. To convince her that it is in Penelope's best interest not to know of the journey, he tells Eurykleia that he does not want his mother to grieve and ruin her lovely skin with weeping. Eurykleia swears to tell no one. But Athene did not tell him to attempt to guarantee the secrecy of the journey. Telemachus contributes this strategy himself, of his own accord. And he executes his choice well.

So while Athene is heavily involved in directing the venture and assumes much of the planning herself, Telemachus also contributes his own planning. By not joining company with the suitors, Telemachus prevents himself from seeming inconsistent. It would have seemed strange indeed, after the heated exchange during the assembly between Telemachus and the suitors, for Telemachus to join company with them. By silencing Eurykleia he seems to provide the time needed for the journey to get underway without fear of maternal interruption. Though on a minor scale, these additions to Athene's plan are significant if only because they reflect Telemachus' choices.

Working together, Athene (disguised as Mentor) and Telemachus sail successfully to Pylos to seek information from Nestor about the fate of Odysseus. Upon stepping out of the ship, Athene gives Telemachus another motivational speech. She tells him that it is no longer necessary for him to have shame, not even a little, since he has taken action and sailed across the sea after news of his father. She then urges him to go to Nestor to learn what cunning (μῆτις) he keeps hidden in his breast. And she tells Telemachus to beseech him to tell the truth. Athene adds that Nestor will not tell a lie since he is of sound understanding (πεπνυμένος).

Telemachus panics. Unable to decide how to approach Nestor, he says to Athene, "πῶς τ' ἄρ' ἴω; πῶς τ ἄρ' προσπτύξομαι αὐτόν; (how should I go and how should I greet him? 3.22-23)" Telemachus is aware of what needs to be done, namely he must speak to Nestor to find news of his father, but he is unable to discern the ways in which to speak to him with propriety and expediency. He says, "οὐδέ τί πω μύθοισι πεπείρημαι πυκινοῖσιν (I have not yet attempted cunning speech 3.23). Telemachus seems to be aware that cunning speech is a particular kind of speaking, πυκινός, astute, shrewd.[7] But despite his awareness of this cunning speech, he claims he has not yet tried speaking this way.

This demurer is strange. In Book II we are told of Telemachus' formal address to the suitors. As I suggested, this address hints at Telemachus' attempt at a kind of cunning speech, one that allowed him to dabble with strategies such as posing a dilemma, couching moral arguments in practical ones, omitting strategic information, and using lofty syntax. Telemachus' address to the suitors reflects a kind of cunning speech. So why is it that Telemachus tells Mentor (Athene) that he has never attempted cunning speech? Perhaps Telemachus has a very short memory, or perhaps he is not fully aware that his earlier address to the suitors qualified as cunning speech.

Whatever the reason for this contradiction, we should probably assume that it wasn't a contradiction to Telemachus. Faced with this new experience, Telemachus acts like a scared child. He reverts to his youthful ways and forgets about his emerging adulthood. He fails to remember his

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[7] "πυκινός" can be used as an adjective of the mind or mental faculties, but here Telemachus uses it as an adjective of speech. This seems to be evidence of the link between thinking and speaking: one's speech is a manifestation of the ways of one's mind.

earlier attempt at cunning speech in his address to the suitors. He also seems to forget that he spent an entire night deliberating about his journey (1.443-444). Whatever meager resources, in the form of past experiences, are available to Telemachus, he is unable to draw upon them. He fails to use his newfound deliberative abilities and instead questions Mentor (Athene) about how to address Nestor appropriately. His uncertainty of how to address Nestor and his failure to deliberate reflects his failure to commit himself to choosing a course of action. The self fails to emerge and he must rely on Mentor (Athene) for guidance.

In addition to claiming inexperience in cunning speech, Telemachus reaches for another excuse as to why he can't address Nestor, namely that shame attaches to a young man who must question his elder. In his panic, Telemachus must not have listened well to Mentor's (Athene's) earlier statement that he should not have any shame, not even a little, since he has pulled himself together and sailed across the sea to seek tidings of his father (3.14-16). Apparently, Telemachus fails to appreciate to its fullest the adult nature of his recent actions. As a result, he fails to be persuaded that sailing across the sea in search of news of one's father frees a young man from any shame in questioning his elders. Telemachus knows what he must do, namely address Nestor; however, he does not know how to do this without bringing shame upon himself. Once again, we see that Telemachus is not readily accepting his adult role. The poet seems to be revealing a very human character in Telemachus. Telemachus advances toward adulthood then falters and reverts to the safety of his youthful ways. His youth, after all, had

shielded him from the necessity to deliberate about ways of solving his own problems.

Athene is quick to reassure Telemachus that he will discern (νοήσεις) for himself in his mind (φρεσὶν) the appropriate ways to address Nestor.

3.26 Τηλέμαχ', ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῇσι νοήσεις,
Telemachus, some (ways, ideas) you will discern in your own mind

The verb νοέω has a range of meanings which often blend sight with the action of the mind (in this case the action of the φρένες). The meaning of this verb is similar to our contemporary expression, "to see with the mind's eye". When one νόει, s/he discerns or perceives with the mind. This habit of mind allows for a person to recognize quickly the demands of the situation, including propriety and expediency. To tell Telemachus that he νοήσεις, is to tell him that he will have the wit to say or do what he discerns as appropriate in his mind's eye. He will consider the case at hand, and he will be able to see the proper and expedient action. He will be able to make up his mind about a course of action.

Knowing that Telemachus is not fully confident in this ability of his mind, Athene must say more to reassure Telemachus that he will be able to address Nestor appropriately.

3.27-28 ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται· οὐ γὰρ ὀιω
οὔ σε θεῶν ἀέκητι γενέσθαι τε τραφέμεν τε.
(and others will be put in by the gods for I know you have not been born and reared without the favor of the gods.)

She reassures Telemachus by reminding him of his favor with the gods. Her speech leads Telemachus to believe that the gods will put into his mind means of addressing Nestor. To understand what this implies about the role of the gods in Telemachus' actions, we should examine the verb ὑποθήσεται (third plural future middle of ὑποτίθημι). In Homer, ὑποτίθημι means to put into one's mind, to make a suggestion, or to give advice. To say that one "suggests" something is to presuppose that the receiver of the suggestion has a certain level of freedom to act independently of the suggestion. The suggestion does not act like a drug on the individual. Of course one's freedom in the face of a suggestion can be restricted somewhat if the person giving the suggestion has immortal status, as if a god were to make a suggestion to Telemachus. But this is not to say that the status of the person giving the suggestion guarantees that the suggestion will automatically be adopted by the receiver.[8]

Understanding the role of the gods helps to explain what Athene might have meant when she said that the gods would put some (ideas) into Telemachus. We can understand Athene to mean that the gods would give suggestions to Telemachus. But this is aside from the original point, namely that Athene calls to mind the favor of the gods in order to boost Telemachus' confidence. She understands that Telemachus does not seem to have the necessary confidence in his ability to νοεῖν in his φρένες. So, she must first

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[8]In fact, evidence exists that despite their status, the gods do not presuppose that their suggestions are guaranteed to be adopted by the intended mortal receiver. One of the best examples of this is the exchange between Athena and Achilles in book 1 of the Iliad. Two commentaries on this passage are particularly interesting in the way they read the exchange of Athena and Achilles as a negotiation rather than a command/obey interaction: Gaskins 2-4; Richard Martin, The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the *Iliad* , (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 48-49.

remind him of his ability and then reassure him that he will not be without the favor of the gods.

Surprisingly, Telemachus' necessity to deliberate is eliminated by Peisistratus, the son of Nestor. Upon seeing the strangers, Peisistratus takes action. He takes both Telemachus and Mentor (Athene) by the hands and makes them sit by the feast that he and his family are preparing. He even seats them in privileged seats, on soft fleeces on the sand beside his brother and father. He gives them their due measure of entrails and toasts them with wine from a golden cup. He then chooses to offer the cup to Mentor (Athene) to make a prayer.

3.48-50 πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι.
ἀλλὰ νεώτερός ἐστιν, ὁμηλικίη δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ·
τούνεκα σοὶ[9] προτέρῳ δώσω χρύσειον ἄλεισον.
All men have need of the gods. But he (Telemachus) is younger and my own equal in age. Therefore to you (Mentor/Athene) first I will give the golden cup.

Athene rejoices at the wise and just man because to her first he gave the golden cup. She takes the cup and prays to Poseidon. First, in honor of her hosts, she asks Poseidon to grant glory to Nestor, his sons, and all those people of Pylos for their glorious sacrifice. Then, she asks Poseidon to grant that Telemachus and she complete their journey.

This simple prayer is imitated by Telemachus, to whom Athene passes the cup.

3.63-64 δῶκε δὲ Τηλεμάχῳ καλὸν δέπας ἀμφικύπελλον.

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[9] The "σοι" is not clearly understood to be Athene until several lines later where the poet tells us that Athene prays first and then gives the cup to Telemachus to pray.

ὣς δ' αὔτως ἠρᾶτο 'Οδυσσῆος φίλος υἱός.
(She gave Telemachus the beautiful two-handled
cup and in a same manner as before, the dear son of
Odysseus prayed.)

The intervention of Peisistratus removes Telemachus' opportunity to hone his deliberative skills. But this intervention is not a detriment to Telemachus. Peisistratus is a useful model for him. He is the same age as Telemachus yet he seems to be fully comfortable with his adult status. He even engages in an act of public deliberation without panicking or lacking self-assurance. His successful deliberation in deciding to whom he should pass the cup first allows Telemachus to see how another of his age accepts the necessity to make decisions. First, Peisistratus states his problem, namely that all men are in need of the gods but not all men can speak to the gods at once. Then Peisistratus makes his decision that Mentor (Athene) should pray first since s/he (Athene/Mentor) is older than Telemachus. His choice is both expedient and proper.

Athene's positive reaction to Peisistratus' good judgment is quite understandable. Because of Peisistratus' judicious nature, Athene too is able to serve as a model for Telemachus by praying to Poseidon first. She doesn't want her pupil to undertake an endeavor for which he may not be ready. She wants to provide him with adequate training. Peisistratus' good judgment in passing the cup to the elder gives Athene the chance to continue her lesson and saves Telemachus from having to deliberate about appropriate speech without having adequate training in the art. In the end, Telemachus follows Athene's lead by praying in the same way as she does.

When they have finished praying, the group feasts, and then Nestor asks Telemachus and Mentor who they are. This time, presented with an opportunity to address Nestor, Telemachus jumps at the chance. Without hesitation, he tells Nestor he came to Pylos in search of news of his father, goodly Odysseus of the steadfast heart. The poet gives us insight into Telemachus' mental state:

3.75-77 Τὸν δ' αὖ Τηλέμαχος πεπνυμένος ἀντίον ηὔδα
θαρσήσας; αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θάρσος Ἀθήνη
θῆχ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πατρὸς ἀποιχομένοιο ἔροιτο
(Then wise Telemachus, having courage, spoke to
him face to face. For Athene herself put courage
in his heart so that he might ask about his father
who was gone.)

This passage can be understood in at least two ways. First, Athene puts courage into Telemachus' φρένες as a goddess might cast a spell. Second, she puts courage into his φρένες as a motivational speaker (teacher) might put courage into a listener (student). I prefer the latter possibility. Granted, goddesses do cast spells. Circe goes so far as to change men into pigs. But such strong measures are not needed with Telemachus. He does not need to be drugged in order to learn how to act in the face of a dilemma, unlike Odysseus' men who had to be drugged in order to become pigs. Athene only needs to teach Telemachus, not drug him. In this instance, Athene's role is that of a teacher, not a goddess casting spells.

In response to Telemachus, Nestor gives a fairly lengthy account of the sufferings of the Greeks after the fall of Troy. Although Nestor tells

Telemachus in the end that he returned from Troy with no news of Odysseus (3.184-185), the speech was not a total loss for Telemachus. In his speech, Nestor mentions deliberative action seven times, and he mentions the experiences of Orestes to Telemachus.

Nestor is the first person to speak of deliberation so frequently in the Odyssey. At 3.132, he tells how Zeus planned (μήδετο) in mind (φρεσί) a wretched return for the Argives. At 3.151-152, he tells how the two opposing sides, the Achains and Trojans, spent the night pondering (ὀρμαίνοντες) difficulties in their mind (φρεσίν) against each other. And again at 3.152, Nestor mentions Zeus planning an evil disaster. At 3.166, Nestor states that he knew of the god who was devising (μήδετο) evil. At 3.169, Nestor tells how they were pondering (ὀρμαίνοντας) whether they should sail above rocky Chios toward the island of Pyrias, holding it on their left, or under Chios, alongside Mimantas. At 3.194, Nestor mentions how Aegisthus devised (ἐμήσατο) a wretched destruction for Agamemnon.

These references highlight for Telemachus the various situations in which the mortals and the immortals engage their deliberative capacity. Such references would at least have the potential for helping Telemachus to see the necessity and frequency of deliberation in both the adult and immortal worlds.

One reference in particular goes further than to suggest the necessity of deliberative activity. Nestor's statement at 3.126-129 provides an important model for Telemachus:

3.126-129 ἔνθ' ἤ τοι ἦος μὲν ἐγὼ καὶ δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
οὔτε ποτ' εἰν ἀγορῇ δίχ' ἐβάχομεν οὔτ ἐνὶ Βουλῇ,

ἀλλ' ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε νόῳ καὶ ἐπίφρονι Βουλῇ
φραζόμεθ' Ἀργείοισιν ὅπως ὄχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο.
(There all the while, goodly Odysseus and I did not ever speak divided in assembly nor in counsel, but having one heart with regard to thought and shrewd counsel we advised the Argives how all might be for the best.)[10]

This information, about Nestor's relationship with Odysseus and their ability to think together and share shrewd counsel, has the potential to guide Telemachus in his future attempt to have a similar relationship with his father in order to slay the suitors.[11]

In addition to highlighting the role of deliberation in the return of the Argives from Troy, Nestor aids Telemachus in his emerging adulthood by calling to mind the experiences of Orestes (3.193-200). Nestor briefly states that Aegisthus devised a wretched death for Agamemnon, and that Aegisthus paid for Agamemnon's death in a dismal fashion when Agamemnon's son took vengeance on his father's killer. While the details of this story are saved until Telemachus questions Nestor further (3.247-252), Nestor has said enough for now to warrant Telemachus' interest in understanding the importance of the story of Agamemnon's death.[12]

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[10]Nestor's description of the one heart shared by him and Odysseus with regard to thought and shrewd counsel is good evidence for the unity of heart and mind. This suggests that the Homeric individual did not have a fragmented psychic nature, as Snell and Jaynes would have us believe, but rather there is an underlying awareness of the unity of heart and mind.

[11]As we shall see, this will be especially the case in book 21 when Telemachus must have one mind with Odysseus in their plan to destroy the suitors.

[12]For an interesting commentary on the role of the Oresteia-Story in the Odyssey and its function in Telemachus' development, see Edward F. D'Arms and Karl K. Hulley. "The Oresteia-Story in the Odyssey." Transactions of the American Philological Association, 77 (1946): 207-13.

Telemachus replies to Nestor that he has little faith that his current suffering will be eased, since the gods do not wish it to be so (3.208-9). His doubt runs so deep that he disbelieves that his situation would improve even if the gods so willed it (3.227-8). Mentor (Athene) briefly scolds Telemachus and reminds him that easily a god who wished to do so could save a man, even from afar (3.230-1). But she doesn't dwell on this lesson, rather she follows Nestor's lead and mentions the story of Agamemnon's death (3.232-235).

This is enough for Telemachus. This story mentioned by Nestor and Mentor (Athene) is of such great interest to Telemachus that he forgets his earlier fear of shame in questioning his elder. He asks Nestor for more details, and he questions him about the whereabouts of Menelaus, Agamemnon's brother, during this time (3.247-251). Nestor willingly obliges him with details. He tells of how Aegisthus charmed Clytemnestra, Agamemnon's wife, while Agamemnon was away. Then, Aegisthus worked his evil plans, namely the murder of Agamemnon. For seven years (after the murder) Aegisthus ruled the Mycenaens, but in the eighth, Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, came to avenge the death of his father. Orestes kills Aegisthus and his own mother for plotting against and murdering his father. Menelaus, after being severely delayed by the death of his comrade (284-5) and by his adventures in gathering riches (301-2), had returned on the day of the burial (310-11).[13]

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[13] See W.B. Stanford, The Odyssey of Homer, I (London: MacMillan St Martin's Press, 1973) note 310, p 261. Stanford notes that "Only here does H. refer to Orestes' killing of his mother, perhaps because it did not suit the analogy with Telemachus, and perhaps also because a reference to matricide would be distasteful to his audience."

The story of Agamemnon's death serves a crucial purpose for Telemachus. First, it justifies a sense of urgency about his journey. Second, it provides a model for Telemachus in Orestes. Orestes and Agamemnon were unjustly wronged. Since his dead father can't bring justice, the young man Orestes is obligated to avenge both his own suffering and that of his father. He acts courageously and justly in doing what needs to be done, despite the horror of the deeds. Similarly, both Telemachus and Odysseus are unjustly wronged. Since Telemachus' absent father can't bring justice, Telemachus is obligated to avenge both his own suffering and the injustice brought to his father in the destruction of his kingdom. Telemachus must have the courage of Orestes to do what needs to be done. Also, Telemachus must have a knowledge of Orestes as his model for just revenge.

After completing the story, Nestor urges Telemachus to return home quickly to protect his property, but first to visit Menelaus who may have news of his father. He tells Telemachus that he must ask Menelaus to speak the whole truth.

3.327-8 λίσσεσθαι δέ μιν αὐτός, ἵνα νημερτὲς ἐνίσπῃ.
ψεῦδος δ' οὐκ ἐρέει; μάλα γὰρ πεπνυμένος ἐστίν.
(Beseech him yourself so that he may tell you
the truth. He will not speak a lie for he is very
thoughtful.)

This imperative is similar, almost identical, to Mentor's (Athene's) at 3.19-20 where she tells Telemachus to ask Nestor to speak the whole truth.

3.19-20 λίσσεσθαι δέ μιν αὐτός, ὅπως νημερτὲα εἴπῃ;
ψεῦδος δ' οὐκ ἐρέει; μάλα γὰρ πεπνυμένος ἐστίν.

The repetition of this imperative highlights that Telemachus is getting a second chance. Perhaps after the lessons learned at Pylos from Athene, Peisistratus, Nestor, and Orestes, Telemachus will not panic over the necessity to deliberate about how to approach Menelaus with proper speech.

When Nestor finishes his speech, Mentor (Athene) announces that it is time to sleep. The group prepares for bed by making an offering to Poseidon. Telemachus stays to sleep in the bedding provided by Nestor while Mentor (Athene) leaves to sleep in the ship. Athene changes her appearance to that of a vulture and flies away. This assures all present, including Telemachus, that Athene holds Telemachus in favor. After Athene reveals herself and departs, Telemachus is left apparently to his own resources. He will no longer have the benefit of her model to follow.[14]

He will, however, have the benefit of Peisistratus as a model. Nestor sends his son with Telemachus to aid him in his journey. Peisistratus replaces Athene. The remainder of this book contains the details of the departure of Telemachus and Peisistratus for Sparta.[15] From 3.405-495, Telemachus is exposed to the ways of an orderly society, one that honors the gods and gives freely of its resources to those who have just need. This is a

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[14] After she departs as a vulture, she has no contact with Telemachus until she approaches him as a goddess in the opening of Book 15, where she urges him to go home. This is further evidence that books 1-3 constitute Telemachus' education by Athene. Her departure in book 3 indicates then that the remainder of Telemachus' actions (with the exception of the introductory lines of book 15) will be free from her explicit model.

[15] Henry Johnstone, in an unpublished manuscript, recently pointed out that the details in this section are interesting since they point to what may be uniquely eleventh century practices. The detailed account of this particular way of roasting meat suggests that it might not be familiar to Homer's eighth-century audience. The elaboration of this practice is quite different from the lack of elaboration about rhetorical activity including education. The lack of elaboration about education in speech then is, from this perspective, not a sign that it did not exist but that training in persuasion was such a common practice in both the eleventh century and the eighth century that the audience did not need extensive details.

far cry from Telemachus' homeland where order had been sacrificed to the appetites of the suitors, where the gods had been neither honored nor feared, and where the squandering of resources had shown no concern for any just need. The social order of Pylos heightens the sense of injustice suffered by Telemachus and the necessity for vengeance. Armed with the knowledge from his stay at Pylos and his new models Peisistratus and Orestes, Telemachus is ready for his next stop.

When Telemachus and Peisistratus arrive in Sparta, they find Menelaus, his family, and his people celebrating the double wedding of his son and his daughter. The poet tells of feasting, lyre playing, dancing, and acrobatics all in honor of the occasion (4.15-19). Menelaus commands Eteoneus his servant to welcome the two strangers as guests, and the servant leads them through the house to the baths. Bathed and anointed, the two guests sit at the table of Menelaus, and the wedding feast is extended to honor them as guests. Menelaus tells the guests to eat and drink their fill and afterward to announce who they are (4.61-62).[16] The poet seems to take a special pleasure in relaying the details of the splendor of Menelaus' household and hospitality--the silver basin and gold pitcher used in the hand-washing ritual, the well-polished table, the abundance and variety of bread and meat, and the gold goblets.

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[16] In line 61, Nestor uses a royal "we": αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα δείπνου πασσαμένω εἰρησόμεθ' οἵ τινές ἐστον ἀνδρῶν (But when you have eaten we will ask you who among men you are). This is unusual since Homeric kings usually speak in terms of "I". Perhaps this can be understood to reflect the sense of unity in the kingdom of Menelaus. Menelaus is not acting as an autocrat. He speaks as a member of a collective. This humility and sense of group cohesion is new to Telemachus, since the suitors show no humility, and since he has lived his adolescent life without unity in his household.

This is the best hospitality Telemachus has experienced and the most splendid surroundings. After all, Telemachus met with Nestor on a beach. Even though Peisistratus did obtain soft fleece for Telemachus to sit on, this natural setting cannot possibly compare with the elaborate surroundings in which Telemachus now finds himself. He is so awestruck that when they finish eating, rather than address Menelaus to announce who he is and why he has come, he whispers to Peisistratus, so no others can hear:

4.71-75 Φράζεο, Νεστορίδη, τῷ ἐμῷ κέχαρισμενε θυμῷ
χαλκοῦ τε στεροπὴν κάδ δώματα ἠχήεντα,
χρυσοῦ τ' ἠλέκτρου τε καὶ ἀργύρου ἠδ' ἐλέφαντος.
Ζηνός που τοιήδε γ' Ὀλυμπίου ἔνδοθεν αὐλή,
ὅσσα τάδ' ἄσπετα πολλά· σέβας μ' ἔχει εἰσορώοντα.
(Observe son of Nestor, gratifying to my heart, the gleam of bronze throughout the echoing halls, and gold, electrum, and silver, and ivory. Of such a kind is the court of Olympian Zeus within, so many great things; amazement holds me looking in.)

Menelaus overhears and tells Telemachus that no other mortal could rival his household and riches. But he also tells Telemachus that these riches were not without their price, namely his brother Agamemnon's life. While Menelaus took his time in returning from Troy to gather riches in foreign lands, Aegisthus and Clytemnestra had plotted against Agamemnon and murdered him. Menelaus tells of how Agamemnon suffered for this and how he lost his pleasant household. This information is crucial to Telemachus. Now Telemachus has an example of a great man who moved

from suffering to happiness on his own accord. Menelaus seems to have rebuilt his life out of the ruin left in the wake of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. Perhaps then, Telemachus too might be able to build a life out of the ruin left in the wake of the suitors.

Unfortunately, Telemachus is too busy crying to think about bringing himself up from his misery. When Menelaus spoke of his suffering, he mentioned his grief over Odysseus. At the mention of his father, Telemachus had begun to cry. This is not necessarily a strange sight for the Greeks. Frequently, throughout both the Iliad and the Odyssey the Greeks are said to weep, wail, grieve, and shed big tears. But in this instance, the poet provides details about Telemachus' crying. Such details on weeping are fairly uncommon in the Homeric epics.

4.113-116 τῷ δ' ἄρα πατρὸς ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο,
δάκρυ δ' ἀπὸ βλεφάρων χαμάδις βάλε πατρὸς ἀκούσας,
χλαῖναν πορφυρέην ἄντ' ὀφθαλμοῖιν ἀνασχὼν
ἀμφοτερῃσιν χερσί. [and for him (Telemachus) arose a desire for weeping for his father. Tears from his eyelids fell to the ground upon hearing of his father, and with both hands, he held up his bright cloak before his eyes.)

These details seem to suggest that Telemachus was making a bit of a spectacle of himself, and this is hard to do considering the frequency and acceptability of wailing/weeping in the Homeric epics. In fact, Telemachus' weeping is such a spectacle that Menelaus does not know how to respond. He thinks about the situation (νόησε) and deliberates about whether to stay silent

while Telemachus recollects his father or whether to speak to the young man and question him about everything (4.116-119).

The poet never tells us what Menelaus decides since his deliberation is interrupted by the entrance of his wife Helen. At once, Helen comments to Menelaus about the likeness between Telemachus and Odysseus. Her keen insight is confirmed by Peisistratus who announces that indeed, Telemachus is the son of Odysseus. Menelaus responds in tribute to Telemachus and tells what he remembers of Odysseus. His tale of Odysseus is so touching that now the entire group is in tears, even Peisistratus. But Peisistratus soon persuades Menelaus to change the subject since he no longer wishes to cry at the feast. Menelaus is persuaded and compliments Peisistratus on his speech. He tells Peisistratus that they will return their attention to supper, and his speeches with Telemachus will be saved for tomorrow.

Helen, however, has a different plan (4.219-220). She decides to drug everyone and tell them stories. She puts a good drug in the wine from which everyone is drinking, a drug that will make them forget all their troubles, and she proceeds to tell about the great Odysseus.[17] She tells of how Odysseus disguised himself as a beggar and entered the city of Troy, duping all the Trojans. Only Helen recognized him and questioned him, but in his cunning, he avoided her. When she bathed and anointed him, he made her swear a great oath that she would not tell the Trojans, and he set about to slay them.

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[17] See Stanford 4.220. He comments that this drug may be coffee but was probably opium. For additional commentary, see Ann Bergren, "Helen's 'Good Drug': Odyssey IV 1-305," Contemporary Literary Hermeneutics and Interpretation of Classical Texts, ed., Stephan Kresic (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1981): 200-214.

Menelaus answers her by continuing the story from his perspective, inside the Trojan horse. He describes how Odysseus left Helen and went into the horse. Helen stands outside of the horse and calls all the Achaian men in the voices of their wives. Only Odysseus is able to restrain the men so that they do not run out to answer Helen and ruin the surprise attack.

Despite the drama of the story, Telemachus interrupts and asks to go to bed. So far, Telemachus does not seem to be learning his lesson very well. Upon reaching Sparta, he has only been able to marvel in delight, weep uncontrollably, and then ask to go to bed. He seems to be resistant to the necessity of assuming his adult role of addressing Menelaus. Though he is being trained well through the model of Peisistratus, who has spoken appropriately and persuasively to Menelaus, Telemachus does not seem to have the mental discipline to act accordingly. While Peisistratus, who does weep initially, chooses to restrain himself from weeping further, Telemachus lets himself be consumed by his sorrow. Telemachus knows he must address Menelaus, but he fails to do so. He is unable to speak except in the most insignificant ways, as when he whispers to Peisistratus and when he asked to go to bed.

It is important to note that Telemachus' failure to address Menelaus the first time is different from his failure to address Nestor the first time. With Nestor, Telemachus fails at first because he does not know how to address Nestor or what to say. With Menelaus, Telemachus fails because his mind isn't focused on the task at hand. He is too busy marveling or weeping to address Menelaus. And to top it all off, Helen has given him drugs, which were probably an even bigger source of distraction for Telemachus.

Telemachus' failure to address Menelaus is not because he does not know what to say or how to say it. Telemachus fails because he is so easily distracted by the words and deeds of others. His mind is not steadfast; it is scattered, not focused. How can Telemachus deliberate in this confusion? He can't. He needs to sleep it off and start again tomorrow.

Indeed, on the next day, when, presumably, Telemachus' thoughts are clear, he succeeds in addressing Nestor, without having to ask for instructions. His speech is nearly identical to his address to Nestor. Only one difference exists. In his first address to Nestor, Telemachus explains that he has come for news of his father but he does not mention the destruction of the suitors. However, in his first address to Menelaus, he states that he is seeking news of his father on account of the damage done by the suitors. Telemachus then provides details about the insolent suitors. Perhaps both Telemachus' understanding of his mission and his sense of urgency are deepening on account of the knowledge he has so far amassed. He knows how Agamemnon's absence allowed his home to be ruled by another and his murder to be plotted. He knows how Orestes was faced with the unthinkable task of killing his own mother because of her role in this injustice to his father. If Odysseus is alive, Telemachus does not want him to meet the same fate as Agamemnon. And he does not want to face the same matricidal imperative as Orestes. He must find news of his father and return quickly to protect his home and, if Odysseus is alive, to prepare for his safe homecoming.

Telemachus' speech works. Menelaus is greatly angered at the injustice to both Telemachus and Odysseus. And at 4.331-586, he tells

Telemachus everything. After the fall of Troy, Menelaus was stuck in Egypt, desperately wanting to return. The goddess Eidothea was so moved by his plight that she came to him and directed him to her father, immortal Proteus, the servant of Poseidon, who knew every sea and paths in them. With help from Eidothea's cunning and tremendous physical stamina, Menelaus and his comrades capture Proteus. After some struggle, Menelaus finally asks Proteus not only how to return home but also whether the other sons of the Achaian had returned safely. Proteus then tells Menelaus the fates of Aias, Agamemnon, and Odysseus after the fall of Troy. Aias died. Agamemnon was murdered upon his return. And Odysseus remains weeping on the island of the nymph Kalypso, with no means of returning, neither a ship nor any comrades. Menelaus ends his speech by inviting Telemachus to stay on with him until the eleventh or twelfth day. Then Menelaus says he will send Telemachus on his way with glorious gifts: three horses, a well finished chariot, and a fine goblet to pour libations to the immortals (4.587-592).

So finally Telemachus has heard that his father, the noble Odysseus, is still alive. Now that Telemachus has the answer he needs, he should be on his way home to await the return of his father. But his mind is not focused on this course of action. He becomes distracted by the talk of gifts and by Menelaus' invitation to stay, and so he responds to these distractions rather than the more important news of his father. Quite boldly, Telemachus tells Menelaus that he wants different gifts.[18]Telemachus states he wants κειμήλιον

[18]See Raymond Smith, "Homer's Telemachus: Man and Hero," diss., Ohio State University, 1977, 29. Smith argues that Telemachus' request for different gifts is a sign of his "practicality, self-assurance, and courage." However, I think his request is evidence of how easily distracted his mind can be. His request has the tone of a blundering response to a crucial revelation of information. Telemachus hears, from a reliable source that his father is alive, and all he can say is, "I want different departure gifts."

(things that can be stored up) rather than horses since his homeland is not well-suited to travel by horseback and since Menelaus' plains are better for feeding the horses.

This moment is bittersweet. While Telemachus is indeed speaking boldly and reasoning well, as Menelaus affirms that he is (4.611), he seems to have forgotten his purpose. His purpose is to find out whether his father is alive or dead, not to negotiate his going away prize with Menelaus. His mind is so distracted from his initial dilemma that not only does he focus on his departure gifts, but instead of insisting on an immediate return, Telemachus only asks Menelaus not to keep him for a long time (πολὺν χρόνον). Telemachus adds that he could easily stay listening to Menelaus' stories for up to a year.

4.594-596 'Ατρεΐδη, μὴ δή με πολύν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἔρυκε.
καὶ γάρ κ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἐγὼ παρὰ σοί γ' ἀνεχοίμην
ἥμενος, οὐδέ κε μ' οἶκου ἔλοι πόθος οὐδὲ τοκήων
(Son of Atreus, indeed do not keep me here for a long time. For I would endure sitting beside you for a year, neither would I yearn for my home nor my parents.)

How convenient it is for Telemachus that he might have such splendid surroundings to "endure" for the year, rather than having to return to the chaos of his homeland to wait for the return of his father, as Athene had instructed. Telemachus is slackening in his commitment to resolve his dilemma. Further evidence of this comes from his uncompelling reason for

his speedy return. Telemachus tells Menelaus that he should send him on his way because his comrades in Pylos are restless (4.598-599).

By presenting this reason to Menelaus, Telemachus hopes not to be delayed for a long time. But Telemachus' persuasion is not strong enough. He fails to mention the most obvious reason why Menelaus should not keep him, namely that the suitors are left unchecked to run rampant in his home and possibly plot evil against him or his father, if his father returns. The absence of this reason seems significant. Without it, Telemachus does not have enough ammunition to fight off the temptation of Menelaus' request. And indeed, Telemachus fails to resist Menelaus. Instead of leaving that afternoon, Telemachus stays with Menelaus, at least for the night, if not longer.

The duration of Telemachus' stay in Sparta is the subject of much scholarly controversy. Some argue that Telemachus only spent one additional night with Menelaus after telling him not to keep him long.[19] Others argue that Telemachus spent at least a month with Menelaus.[20] However, the duration of time Telemachus spent in Sparta is less relevant to my case than the fact that he did indeed spend additional, unnecessary time with Menelaus, after asking Menelaus not to keep him long. Telemachus and Menelaus had met at dawn. They had then conversed until dinner. Why hadn't Telemachus left after dinner? The poet does not indicate that the hour is too late for travel. Furthermore, nothing in the guest/host

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[19]Denys Page, The Homeric Odyssey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955); Austin, "Telemachos".

[20] A. Shewan, "Telemachus at Sparta," Classical Journal 22 (1926): 31-7; M.J. Apthorp, "The Obstacles to Telemachus' Return, Classical Quarterly 30.1 (1980) 1-22 ; See also Stanford commentary note 625 p285.

relationship would have required him to spend an additional night. In fact, Menelaus himself later tells us that it is equally bad to keep a guest longer than he wishes as it is to hurry him along (15.72-73).

Menelaus is able to avoid violating this rule of the guest/host relationship in the first place because Telemachus originally told Menelaus not to keep him for a long time (πολὺν χρόνον). Of course "πολὺν χρόνον" is open to interpretation, but I am inclined to think that any additional time would be a long time for Telemachus to stay, if indeed his mind is steadfast on his goals. But, instead, the poet leaves Telemachus in Book 4 conversing with Menelaus and preparing to feast. We hear nothing of his plans for departure nor his sense of urgency to return to his homeland to protect what is rightly his. In fact, we don't hear about the young man again until Book 15 when Athene comes to remind Telemachus of the need to journey home.

So whether Telemachus spent only one additional night or several, he stayed longer than was necessary. His request to Menelaus not to keep him long failed to work. Telemachus failed to use the most compelling reason for his speedy return, and he qualified his request by saying "πολὺν χρόνον". These failures in persuasion allowed Menelaus to keep Telemachus at Sparta without violating either the guest/host relationship or Telemachus' request.

While Telemachus' persuasion could not stand up to that of Menelaus, we should not consider Telemachus to be an utter failure. He did after all persuade Menelaus to give him different gifts, and the boldness of his request reveals a more mature character than when he first arrived at Sparta. Telemachus is making progress in his journey to adulthood and in his

newfound ability to discern appropriate speech, but he is not yet fully committing himself to the resolution of his problem.

Books 15-18:
Telemachus' New Found Deliberation

We return to Telemachus in Book 15. Athene has come to remind him of his journey and to urge him to return.

15.1-3 Ἡ δ' εἰς εὐρύχορον Λακεδαίμονα Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
οἴχετ', Ὀδυσσῆος μεγαθύμου φαίδιμον υἱόν
νόστου ὑπομνήσουσα καὶ ὀτρυνέουσα νέεσθαι.
(And now, Pallas Athene came into the wide-spaced Lakedaimon to remind the shining son of great-hearted Odysseus of his journey, and to urge him to return).

This description of Athene's purpose seems to support the earlier idea that Telemachus has spent too much time with Menelaus. Athene would not need to remind (ὑπομνήσουσα) or urge (ὀτρυνέουσα) Telemachus if he was not procrastinating in the pursuit of his goals. But Telemachus is procrastinating; his mind, once again, is fleeting, not steadfast. Therefore, Athene must bring back before his mind the reason for his journey and simultaneously remind him of the urgency of his return. Athene finds Telemachus kept awake with concern for his father (15.7-8).

While some credit should go to Telemachus for not slumbering sweetly, as Peisistratus does, we should not go too far in granting this credit

since Telemachus seems to be rendered ineffective by his anxieties (μελεδήματα). We still have very little evidence that Telemachus deliberates about ways in which to resolve his problems. Athene must intervene and remind him of the most compelling reason why he should return, namely that he has left his possessions behind for the overbearing suitors to divide them up and devour all his substance. And since some time has elapsed, Athene has even more grave news about the situation that Telemachus had left behind. Athene tells him that Penelope's father and brother are urging her to marry Eurymachus, the suitor who is outdoing others in giving gifts (15.16-17). She also tells him that the best of the suitors lie in wait to kill him as he returns home to Ithaca (15.28-30). She ends her speech with vague instructions to sail with the night, staying away from the islands, and upon reaching land, to go see the swineherd (15.33-39). There, she says, Telemachus should spend the night, and in the morning send the swineherd to Penelope with news of his safe return (15.40-43).

Telemachus jumps to action. He wakes Peisistratus from his sweet sleep and tells him to yoke his horses and prepare to start back. Telemachus seems to have no awareness of proper timing--no one appreciates an abrupt awakening from a sweet sleep. Nor does Telemachus recognize that he has to persuade Peisistratus to start back, not just tell him to do so. Telemachus fails to provide Peisistratus with any reason to believe that starting back, at that particular time, is the best course of action to take. Telemachus is not being deliberate; he is being reactive. Peisistratus finds Telemachus' request easy to deny. He reasons that it is too dark to travel and that propriety would suggest that Telemachus wait to receive the gifts from his host.

Telemachus fails once again to get what he wants. He cannot resist the persuasion of others. His mind is not yet firm; it is still impressionable. This pattern of behavior continues into the next morning when Telemachus addresses Menelaus. He tells Menelaus to send him on his way at once since his heart longs for the journey home. But once again, Telemachus fails to provide Menelaus with a compelling reason to hasten his return. Menelaus replies by agreeing to send him home but only after he gives him gifts, feeds him, and prepares to travel with him so that they can take what would appear to be a leisurely tour through Hellas and Argos to gather treasures. Once again the stakes for Telemachus are high. If he is unable to resist Menelaus' persuasion, he will be delayed even further.

This time however, Telemachus is able to resist the persuasion of Menelaus. He does so by providing the most compelling reason for his return to be hastened:

15.87-91 'Ατρεΐδη Μενέλαε διοτρεφές, ὄρχαμε λαῶν,
βούλομαι ἤδη νεῖσθαι ἐφ' ἡμέτερ'· οὐ γὰρ ὄπισθεν
οὖρον ἰὼν κατέλειπον ἐπὶ κτεάτεσσιν ἐμοῖσιν;
μὴ πατέρ' ἀντίθεον διζήμενος αὐτὸς ὄλωμαι,
ἤ τί μοι ἐκ μεγάρων κειμήλιον ἐσθλὸν ὄληται.
(Menelaus, son of Atreus, born of Zeus, leader of people, I want to go return to our land now; for when I went, I left behind no one to guard my possessions. I must not, going in search of my godlike father, ruin myself, or have some stored-up treasure lost from my palace).

This time Telemachus is successful. By using his most powerful argument, namely that his possessions are left unguarded, he is able to stand firm against Menelaus' persuasion. The poet tells us that upon hearing this reason, Menelaus immediately hastens Telemachus' departure.

Despite the fact that Athene had to remind him of this reason, Telemachus' achievement in persuading Menelaus is significant. The significance of Telemachus' persuasion can only be seen in the details of that morning. The poet tells us that in the morning, Telemachus immediately addresses Menelaus. The scene paints an extremely eager Telemachus: he barely gets himself dressed before going out the door to speak to Menelaus (60-61). In his state of eagerness, Telemachus' first speech to Menelaus, requesting a speedy return to Ithaca, fails. Telemachus in effect says, "Send me home because I want to go." Menelaus' reply has the same effect of someone saying, "Yes, yes, I'll send you off, but let me do a few other things first that I think will be in your best interest." If Telemachus had followed his old pattern, he would have succumbed to Menelaus' persuasion at this point. But instead he calls to mind for himself the urgency of his return and communicates this to Menelaus. If Telemachus had just been mimicking Athene's instructions, he would not have failed the first time. His failure shows that he was acting on his own. When he stands firm against Menelaus' response and persuades Menelaus to hasten his return immediately, his over-eagerness has been replaced by deliberateness. His success is an execution of a deliberate act.

After Telemachus and Peisistratus depart and come close to Pylos, in their chariot, Telemachus makes another bold and persuasive speech. He

persuades Peisistratus to take him to his ship, not to Nestor. He tells Peisistratus that he fears that Nestor, in his affection would keep him longer than he wishes. Rather than go to Nestor, Telemachus must make his way home quickly (15.199-201). Because of a legitimate sense of urgency to return, and the likelihood that Nestor will delay him further, Telemachus persuades Peisistratus to leave him at his ship.

Persuading Peisistratus was surely no simple task. The poet reveals to us that Peisistratus recognizes the impropriety of not bringing Telemachus back to Nestor.

15.211-214 εὖ γὰρ ἐγὼ τόδε οἶδα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν;
οἷος κεινου θυμὸς ὑπέρβιος, οὔ σε μεθήσει,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸς καλέων δεῦρ' εἵσεται, οὐδέ' ἔ φημι
ἄψ ἰέναι κενεόν; μάλα γὰρ κεχολώσεται ἔμπης.
(For I know well in mind and in heart, such is the
headstrong heart of that man, he will not hear of
your going, but he himself calling you will come
here, and I say that man will not go without you;
for certain he will be greatly enraged.)

Persuading Peisistratus to omit the visit to Nestor is quite a feat in light of Peisistratus' expectation of the overbearing anger of his father. Citing Peisistratus' "uneasy expectation of the old man's wrath," scholars have described Telemachus' request as "near to downright rudeness" and a "breach of social convention."[21] But despite its impropriety, Peisistratus obeys

[21]C. M. H. Millar and J. W. S. Carmichael, "The Growth of Telemachus," Greece and Rome, 1.2 (1954): 63.

Telemachus. Peisistratus' obedience in this case is a testament to the new-found force of Telemachus' character.

As Telemachus prepares to sail away with his comrades, he makes yet another bold decision. He is approached by Theoclymenus, a fugitive for murder and prophet who seeks asylum from Telemachus. With neither hesitation nor indecision, Telemachus accepts Theoclymenus and offers him the protection he seeks. This decision is yet another testament to Telemachus' "newly won authority"--he has the power to give protection and show hospitality even to a murderer like Theoclymenus.[22]

Telemachus' deliberate nature is even more evident in his not seeking guidance or instructions from his newest companion Theoclymenus, who is after all, a prophet. In light of the pattern of Telemachus' past experiences, one might easily think that the prophet Theoclymenus appeared in order to replace Peisistratus as Telemachus' guide, as Peisistratus took the place of Athene. But this does not seem to be the case. Once on board, Theoclymenus plays no role whatsoever in Telemachus' escape from the suitors trap. In fact, we don't hear any more about Theoclymenus until the end of book 15 when Telemachus has arrived safely in Ithaca, and, even then, Telemachus gives Theoclymenus instructions, not vice-versa.

Upon Telemachus' arrival in Ithaca, he goes to the swine-herd Eumaios. There, after a heartfelt reunion, Telemachus questions him. He asks if some other man has married his mother or whether she remains unmarried (16.30-35). Seeking this information was not something Athene instructed Telemachus to do, yet it seems necessary for Telemachus to do so.

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[22]Howard Clarke, "Telemachus and the Telemacheia'," American Journal of Philology 84 (1963): 136.

He has been away for some time and needs to be informed of any crucial changes in the social structure of his homeland. Only with adequate information can Telemachus go about protecting his own best interest and the possessions that are rightly his.

After hearing that Penelope still waits for Odysseus in the palace, Telemachus is introduced to his father, who is staying with Eumaios in the guise of a beggar. Telemachus, in the role of a gracious host, tells the beggar (Odysseus) to remain seated, and he himself takes a seat on the ground. He questions Eumaios about the beggar, and Eumaios tells him to keep the beggar as his suppliant. Telemachus resists. He fears the idea of taking the stranger to his home because of the outrageousness of the suitors. Telemachus decides that because the suitors are likely to insult the beggar and pick quarrel with him, Eumaios should keep him.

Upon hearing of the behavior of the suitors, Odysseus questions Telemachus further about the condition of his home. Telemachus provides greater detail, explaining who he is and why the suitors are in his home. He tells of how his mother neither refuses the hateful marriage nor is she able to put an end to the matter. In the meantime, the suitors continue to wait for Penelope's decision and they squander the resources of the household.

Telemachus' deliberateness shows itself again when, after providing the details of the situation in the palace, he gives instructions to Eumaios to take message to Penelope of his safe return. While indeed Athene instructed Telemachus to do just this, Telemachus adds an instruction of his own, not of Athene. He tells Eumaios to give the message to Penelope alone, making

sure no other Achaians hear it since there are many who plot his demise (16.132-134).

When Eumaios leaves, Athene appears to Odysseus and instructs him to reveal himself to his son. She changes his appearance (for the better), and he introduces himself to Telemachus (16.186-189). When Telemachus is finally convinced that Odysseus is who he says he is, and the two enjoy a tearful reunion, Odysseus speaks to Telemachus as an equal in deliberation and as a capable ally. First, he tells Telemachus that he returned so that the two of them could deliberate about how to slaughter their enemies (16.234 ὄφρα κε δυσμενέεσσι φόνου πέρι βουλεύσωμεν.) Next, Odysseus treats him as an ally in the plot to destroy the suitors because Telemachus can give him strategic information about the numbers and abilities of the suitors which will help Odysseus determine whether the two of them alone will be able to face them without any help (16.235-239).

After establishing his feelings and regard for Telemachus and his abilities, Odysseus swears Telemachus to secrecy about his return to the palace. Telemachus is to tell no one, not even Penelope and Laertes, that Odysseus has returned (16.300-304). Telemachus' response is quite significant.

16.308-310 ὦ πάτερ, ἦ τοι ἐμὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἔπειτα γ', οἴω,
γνώσεαι; οὐ μὲν γάρ τι χαλιφροσύναι γέ μ' ἔχουσιν;
(Oh father, I think you will learn what my heart
is like, when the time comes, for my mind shows
no slackening.)[23]

[23]"χαλιφροσύνη" means "lightness or weakness of mind, lack of sense," but I prefer Lattimore's translation "slackening" since it draws into better contrast the former distracted and unfocused mind of Telemachus from his present steadfast commitment. It is almost as if

With this statement, Telemachus seems to affirm to himself as well as to Odysseus that he is finally capable of making a commitment. His days of slackening are over. Telemachus is no longer the uneasy youth we met in the Telemachy, subject to fits of anxiety and insecurity. He is self-possessed. Because Telemachus is now clear about his purpose and has sufficient hope in his power to achieve his purpose (with the help of Odysseus, Athene, and Zeus), he will no longer waver in his resolve.[24]

Telemachus' resolve stays with him as he leaves his father and goes back to the palace. Homer's description itself of Telemachus' exit reveals a young man with a purpose. Homer tells us that Telemachus, preparing to bring evil for the suitors, strode out the door, advancing quickly (17.26-27). Telemachus has a purpose and is deliberately pursuing it. When he reaches the palace he meets with his mother as she comes out of her chamber. She delights in seeing him and questions him at once about his trip. Telemachus rejects both her fondling and her request for information. As he did in book 1, Telemachus abruptly instructs her to return to her chamber (17.46-56). As one scholar notes, "His less than courteous attitude toward Penelope, however, is not a mere egocentric adventure or feeble first attempt to attain manhood as it was in the first book. Telemachus has a definite purpose in mind, and that is to conceal the truth and guard the secret of Odysseus' presence in Ithaca."[25] Telemachus' treatment of Penelope is nearly forgivable

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Telemachus is declaring, not only to Odysseus, but to himself that his commitment is finally firm. His days of slackening are over.

[24]Smith attributes Telemachus' new-found self-possession to the appearance of his father and his feeling of certainty about his lineage. I attribute Telemachus' self-possession to his education thus far and the deliberative models he has had in Athene, Peisistratus, and Orestes.

[25]Smith 37.

considering all that is on the young man's mind. Being sworn to secrecy over the return of Odysseus, Telemachus must evade Penelope's questions or run the risk of ruining the plan. His treatment of Penelope is not an adolescent reaction to the over-protection of a mother but rather a deliberate adult strategy.

And again, Telemachus shows his self-possession when he decides what to do with the gifts that he acquired from Menelaus. He tells his comrade Peiraios that he himself should keep the gifts so that the suitors will not divide them up among themselves. Then Telemachus says that if he causes the destruction of the suitors, Peiraios should bring the gifts to the house (17.82-83). This statement reflects not only Telemachus' ability to make a decision without external influence, but also it reflects his faith in his own potential to bring about (φυτεύω) the demise of the suitors.

Later, when all have bathed and feasted, Penelope approaches Telemachus again about news of Odysseus which he acquired in his travels. This time Telemachus obliges; he can't very well put her off indefinitely or she may grow suspicious. In his response, Telemachus strategically omits damaging information (17.107-149). He tells Penelope what he heard in his travels, that Odysseus remains suffering on the island of Kalypso with no means to return, but he says nothing of the information he acquired upon his return to Ithaca. He also says nothing about his childish behavior during his journey. He omits telling of his insecurity in addressing Nestor, his failure to address Menelaus expediently, and his unnecessarily extended stay in Sparta. This omission is to be expected since Telemachus would not want to undermine his own credibility in front of the others, especially his mother.

Theoclymenus follows Telemachus' news with a prophecy of Odysseus presence in Ithaca. Penelope replies, skeptical of the news. The poet leaves the three of them conversing in this manner, and we don't meet up with Telemachus again until Odysseus and the swineherd enter the palace. Telemachus is the first to see them and summons the swineherd. What follows is yet another revelation of Telemachus' new resolve in the face of his problem. Odysseus begs for food from the suitors who in turn mock and jeer him. Antinous even throws a stool and hits Odysseus. Odysseus stands firm against the blow.

17.463-465 ὁ δ' ἐστάθη ἠΰτε πέτρη
ἔμπεδον, οὐδ' ἄρα μιν σφῆλεν βέλος Ἀντινόοιο,
ἀλλ' ἀκέων κίνησε κάρη, κακὰ βυσσοδομεύων.
(He stood as steady as a rock, even against the stool
thrown at him by Antinuous, but he shook his head
silently, pondering evils.)

That Odysseus endures in the face of adversity comes as no surprise to the audience. As we saw in the previous chapter, Odysseus was steadfast in his resolve to achieve his goals, namely his safe return to Ithaca. And he was a master of restraint. But the audience is left wondering at this moment what Telemachus will do. He is a bit of a wild card since in the past his resolve has not been firm. This time is different however. In fact, the poet describes Telemachus' behavior in much the same way as he does Odysseus'.

17.489-492 Τηλέμαχος δ' ἐν μὲν κραδίῃ μέγα πένθος ἄεξε
βλημένου, οὐδ' ἄρα δάκρυ χαμαὶ βάλεν ἐκ βλεφάροιῖν, ἀλλ'
ἀκέων κίνησε κάρη, κακὰ βυσσοδομεύων. (And Telemachus

held in his heart a great sorrow over the blow, but he did not let fall to the ground any tear from his eyes, but shook his head in silence, deeply pondering evils.)

Telemachus' restraint shows that he is master of himself at this moment. By subduing an emotional reaction, Telemachus, like Odysseus, has demonstrated his deliberate character. The poet confirms this by telling us that Telemachus' only reaction, like that of his father, is to ponder (βυσσοδομεύων) evil in is heart.

Telemachus' next challenge is to calm his mother after she confronts him about his inability to prevent the suitors from mistreating the beggar. His particular difficulty is calming her without revealing the strategy behind his action. He does this by appealing to his former character, affirming his mother's belief that he still acts like a child.[26] He tells her that even though he is no longer an infant, he can still not always see the wise course of action, especially since the suitors distract him and since he has no one to help him (18.230-232). Using his former character, he is able to play victim to the suitors once again, and in the eyes of his mother, absolving himself of personal responsibility for the mistreatment of the beggar. The lie goes unnoticed by Penelope since she has not yet recognized Telemachus as a changed man. At this point, Telemachus is a master of disguise and cunning, calming his mother while safeguarding the plan to destroy the suitors.

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[26]Penelope's reluctance (or failure) to see Telemachus as an acting adult is evident in the way she still calls Telemachus "ηλυκερὸν φάος"(sweet light of my eyes), which is reminiscent of a mother's talk of her only baby, and in the way she avoids Eurynome's characterization of Telemachus as "τηλίκος" (grown up) and "γενειήσαντα" (bearded, attaining manhood) (18.175-176).

Books 19-24:
Telemachus' Continuing Education

Despite all the strides Telemachus is making in his decisiveness, he is still not yet wholly without need for instruction and guidance. This time, his instruction in deliberation comes from this father Odysseus. While indeed we must understand that Telemachus is working within the larger plan that is primarily Odysseus' creation, we cannot let this understanding prevent us from seeing the ways in which Telemachus still acts on his own, and makes decisions to help foster the plan. One scholar explained that "The problem Homer faced was technical: how to show the maturity, individuality, and heroism of Telemachus without detracting from the dominance of Odysseus."[27] After all, the dominance of Odysseus is expected considering the status of his heroic acts. An audience would not believe that equal status is warranted considering the disparate experiences of Odysseus and Telemachus. Homer must portray Telemachus as coming close to but ultimately falling short of being a "Second Odysseus."[28]

This portrayal of Telemachus is evident throughout the remainder of the Odyssey. But in this portrayal, Homer continues to show us how Telemachus comes into his own. Perhaps nowhere is the tension between the heroic status of Odysseus and the emerging status of Telemachus more evident than in the following three scenes: the storage of the armor in the

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[27]Clarke 137.

[28]This phrase is used by both Clarke and Smith as well as by John Scott, "The Journey Made by Telemachus and Its Influence on the Action of the Odyssey," Classical Journal 13 (1917-18): 425.

inner chamber, the contest of the bow, and the unlocked door of the inner chamber.

The first evidence of this new stage in Telemachus' education comes when Odysseus instructs Telemachus to hide all the weapons (19.5-13). He continues telling Telemachus that when the suitors ask about them, he should say that they are being stored to keep them away from the smoke of the fire. To make this story more plausible to the suitors, Odysseus tells Telemachus to mention an added benefit of storing the weapons. Telemachus should tell the suitors that a god suggested that the weapons should be stored to prevent the suitors from using them on each other when the wine overcomes their sensibility and camaraderie.

At least one scholar has suggested that Telemachus' response to his father is just what Odysseus instructed him to do.[29] But this is not necessarily the case. While Telemachus does indeed follow the instructions to store the weapons, he must figure out how to do so without stirring the curiosity of the suitors. Odysseus' instructions prove only partly useful in this regard. Telemachus must act on his own.

19.14-20 ὣς φάτο, Τηλέμαχος δὲ φίλῳ ἐπεπείθετο πατρί.
ἐκ δὲ καλεσσάμενος προσέφη τροφὸν Εὐρύκλειαν:
"μαῖ', ἄγε δή μοι ἔρυξον ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γυναῖκας,
ὄφρα κέν ες θάλαμον καταθείομαι ἔντεα πατρὸς
καλά, τά μοι κατὰ οἶκον ἀκηδέα καπνὸς ἀμέρδει
πατρὸς ἀποιχομένοιο· ἐγὼ δ' ἔτι νήπιος ἦα.
νῦν δ' ἐθέλω καταθέσθαι, ἵν' οὐ πυρὸς ἴξετ' ἀὐτμη."

[29]Smith 44.

> (So he spoke, and Telemachus obeyed his dear father, and calling his nurse Eurykleia he said, "Come, nurse, detain the women inside the palace, so that I can put away in the inner room the beautiful armor of my father. In my father's absence it is carelessly laid in the house, and darkened with smoke. I was a child all this while. Now I want to put it away where smoke from the fire will not reach it.)

Odysseus' instructions did not mention Eurycleia's involvement in detaining the women in the inner chambers. Telemachus thought of this himself, and his action was wise considering that those handmaidens who sleep with the suitors would likely tell them of Telemachus' actions, if they were to find out. Telemachus must prevent their knowing, and he relies on his trustworthy nurse to help him. He tells her to detain the women until he has finished storing the armor. His reasoning reveals his cunning. In effect, he tells her that since he is no longer a child he must start taking care of his father's possessions, starting with the beautiful (καλά) armor. Telemachus' addition of "καλά" is important since it hints to Eurykleia of an aesthetic admiration of the armor as part of his father's possessions rather than an interest in the armor for its practical purposes. There is no hint in Telemachus' explanation to Eurycleia that his interest in the armor stems from a plan to destroy the suitors.

Eurycleia commends him on his interest in caring for his father's possessions and only wishes that he would assume such foresight in caring for *all* the house and possessions (19.22-23). Then she asks a potentially

damaging question. She questions Telemachus about who will hold the light for him as he goes into the inner chamber since the handmaidens will be detained at his request. If he were his former shadow of a self, we might expect Telemachus to hesitate, allowing Odysseus, or some other person or immortal, to step in with an answer. But Telemachus' now deliberate nature allows him to speak without hesitation. Not only does he tell Eurykleia that the stranger (Odysseus) will hold the light for him, but he provides a reason for his choice. He states that he will not tolerate a man who eats from their supplies but does not work (19.27-28). Telemachus succeeds with Eurykleia. The poet tells us that she had no winged words for an answer to Telemachus, but only proceeded to obey his instructions (19.29-30). So while indeed Telemachus' actions were dependent on Odysseus' instructions, Telemachus finds a way to make choices on his own to help foster the plan.

The second instance where Telemachus is instructed by Odysseus is during the contest of the bow. At the beginning of book 21, Penelope announces the contest: the man who can string Odysseus' bow and shoot an arrow through a row of twelve axes can marry her. Telemachus' response is curious indeed.

21.101-106 τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειφ' ἱερὴ ἴς Τηλεμάχοιο;
'ὢ πόποι, ἦ μάλα με Ζεὺς ἄφρονα θῆκε Κρονίων;
μήτηρ μέν μοί φησι φίλη πινυτή περ ἐοῦσα,
ἄλλῳ ἅμ' ἕψεσθαι νοσφισσαμένη τόδε δῶμα;
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ γελόω καὶ τέρπομαι ἄφρονι θυμῷ.
(And then Telemachus spoke his word to them.

> Come now, Zeus the son of Kronos has made me senseless. My own dear mother although being wise, tells me that she will turn her back on this house and leave with another. But I laugh and enjoy it in my senseless heart.)

Woodhouse described this response of Telemachus as "hysterical."[30] He argues that for Telemachus, Penelope's announcement of the contest was a "nerve-shattering" crisis and that he was "tongue-tied."[31] Other scholars deny any such absence of mind on Telemachus' part. Stanford argues that Telemachus betrays himself with a laugh to show his delight at the approach of the crisis. This delight is skillfully covered up as being "inanely connected with the approaching departure of Penelope".[32] I favor the possibilities that Stanford's interpretation offers.

Since we are told at 20.385 that Telemachus sits across from his father, always waiting (δέγμενος αἰεί), we can assume that Telemachus' senses are primed for the arrival of the moment when the destruction of the suitors can begin. With this perspective, it is not hard to believe that Telemachus discerned the contest of the bow as the beginning of the end for the suitors. With this keen perception of the moment, he laughs in joy at its long-awaited arrival, then passes the laugh off as "witless" so as not to awaken the suspicion of the suitors.

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[30]W. J. Woodhouse, The Composition of Homer's "Odyssey" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930) 113. Woodhouse argues that to Telemachus, Penelope's announcement was a "nerve-shattering" crisis.

[31]Woodhouse, p. 113.

[32]Stanford, n. 102.p. 360.

The strongest evidence that helps support this reading comes from the remainder of Telemachus' speech and his actions that follow. In effect, Telemachus seems to disguise himself as a kind of circus-barker, luring the gullible into a trick.[33] He tells the suitors to step right up to attempt claiming their prize, the finest woman in all the Achaian country (21.106-107). He encourages them not to drag things out with delay nor turn their back from the contest (21.111-112). And to make the stakes even more interesting, Telemachus states that he too will attempt to string the bow and if he succeeds, his mother will not have to leave the house to marry another (21.113-115).

After he has promoted the contest, he expertly sets up the game. Telemachus springs up with a grand movement to remove his cloak and take up his sword (21.188-119). He then sets up the axes, digging a long trench for them, drawing it true to a chalk line, and stamping down the earth around them (21.120-122). Homer tells us that wonder seized the onlookers at how skillfully he set them up (21.122-123).

From this, I think we can see that neither Telemachus' words nor his deeds demonstrate a loss of his composure in this moment of crisis. Rather, he seems to be acting with great self-assurance and strategy. He is so confident in fact that when he has finished setting up the game, he proceeds to attempt stringing the bow. And he would have probably succeeded in doing so if Odysseus hadn't stopped him.

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[33]See also Austin, "Telemachos," 61. Austin interprets Telemachus' laugh as his "most masterful disguise." He further describes it as an "ingenious ploy, for it enables him to display his true feelings by disguising them as the motivations of an entirely contrary persona."

According to Woodhouse, Odysseus' interruption signals Telemachus' inappropriate behavior and the senselessness of his actions.[34] But Odysseus' interruption does not necessarily have to signal this. First, we should consider that Telemachus was keen enough to perceive Odysseus' slight nod (21.129-130).[35] This alone is evidence of the young man's composure. He had to have his wits about him to perceive such a subtle sign.

Second, we should see the technical problems faced by Homer if Telemachus were to have succeeded. If Telemachus had succeeded in stringing the bow, he would become an equal to Odysseus, which as I mentioned earlier would violate audience expectations. Odysseus must be the center of the action. Most important, if Telemachus had succeeded, the crisis would have ended. Penelope would have stayed in the house allowing for her continued pursuit by the suitors, the suitors would not have had a chance to prove themselves unworthy with the bow, and the opportune moment for Odysseus to string to bow and begin the slaughter of the suitors would no longer have been possible.

For all these reasons, Telemachus' success needs to be forestalled. Odysseus does so with a nod of his head, which Telemachus keenly perceives as a sign not to string the bow. Odysseus' nod should only indicate that Telemachus is not the one to win the contest. His nod should not indicate the outright failure of Telemachus' actions. After all, Odysseus does not intervene with specific instructions for Telemachus; he stops with a nod of his head. Odysseus' nod becomes Telemachus' sign that the bow must eventually find its way to Odysseus' hands. Odysseus is confident in the

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[34]Woodhouse 114.

[35]For Homer, a nod means "no".

ability of his son to discern this plan from this point and act in ways that will foster its completion. Odysseus would not have been so subtle if he lacked confidence in his son or if his son was being hysterical in the face of the crisis.

To Telemachus' further credit, he seems to catch Odysseus' drift immediately. Just as Nestor had asserted in book 3 that he and Odysseus were of one mind in their counsel during the Trojan war, Telemachus and Odysseus are of one mind at this point. In a speech to the suitors, Telemachus feigns weakness on his fourth attempt to string the bow and he gives the bow over to the suitors (131-135). He does so knowing that he can't just hand the bow to Odysseus, who is still disguised as a beggar, and knowing that none of the suitors are a match for Odysseus.

While these scenes reveals that indeed a choice is prompted by Odysseus, the master deliberator, a specific course of action is not articulated. While Telemachus does not make the overall plan himself, he must at least be perceptive enough to discern the overall plan so that he can discern for himself how he should act[36] It is not unlikely that Telemachus discerned that if the suitors fail, then Odysseus might have the opportunity to ask for a turn. And considering that Antinous himself had announced publicly that there is no man among them who could match Odysseus in stringing the bow (21.91-94), we are fairly safe to assume that Telemachus as well believed that the suitors would fail if given the chance. Thereupon, Odysseus would have his opportunity to ask for his turn. The arrival of this opportunity can be credited in no small way to Telemachus. He is the one who perceived

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[36]Perhaps we can think of Telemachus in this regard as the "agent of actualization" for Odysseus' plan.

Odysseus' nod and gave the suitors their chance. Over and above Odysseus' instructions, Telemachus is able to act on his own to help foster the plan.

Telemachus' choice has positive results. After all the suitors who tried failed, Odysseus asks for a turn (21.275-284). The suitors become indignant and vehemently reject his request (21.285-310). Telemachus is confronted with his next challenge: getting the bow into his father's hands in the face of this opposition. He does this by once again using his mother. Penelope is trying to persuade the suitors to let the beggar have a chance. Telemachus harshly interrupts his mother and once again tells her to go to her room and attend to her own business for only he has the power to give the bow to the beggar if he so wishes (344-353). Telemachus' abrupt orders to Penelope allow him to insist on giving the bow to Odysseus as a show of his power in the household rather than as a show of his true desire to put the bow in his father's hands. Telemachus masks his intentions by speaking harshly to his mother. The plan is once again safeguarded by the mastery of Telemachus' disguise.

Upon hearing Telemachus' wishes, the noble swineherd Eumaios begins to carry the bow to Odysseus. But once again, the suitors become angry and shout at him to put the bow back were it was. Telemachus responds by declaring his authority over the household, demanding that Eumaios obey him and not the suitors (369-75). Once again, Telemachus acts as if the issue at hand is the affront to his power in the household. Telemachus' true desire to get the bow to his father is masked by his act.

The act works. The suitors respond by giving up their anger at Telemachus and they laugh at his feeble attempts to look powerful (376-377).

Eumaios carries the bow to Odysseus, and secretly instructs Eurykleia to lock the doors to the house. The true moment of crisis has emerged.

Odysseus takes the bow and studies it, which makes the suitors mock and jeer him (396-403). Their arrogance only adds to the element of surprise when Odysseus easily strings the bow and shoots through the axes. He tells Telemachus to begin the feasting and entertainment now that the contest is over (424-430). He then looks at his son and nods (431). Once again, Telemachus discerns what this nod means and instead of preparing for a feast, he prepares for the slaughter of the suitors. He puts his sharp sword about him, closes his hand over his spear, and takes his position close beside his father (432-434).

The killing begins. For the first part of the slaughter, Telemachus fights bravely at the side of his father, killing Amphinomos who was rushing against Odysseus. But after this kill, Telemachus panics (as would be expected of any person aghast at the violence of his first kill). He runs away from the body, leaving his spear (22.95-99), and approaches his father. He tells Odysseus that he will go to the inner chamber and bring back shields and spears, stating that it is better for them to be armored (101-105).

While Telemachus' intentions are good, one cannot help but read them with the bias of his fear. Smith says that his trip to the inner chamber is an act of heroism.[37] But this description can hardly account for either Telemachus' fear that the poet announces at 22.95-98 nor his selfishness in being the first of all to put the bronze armor upon himself (22.113). Most of all, Smith's description of Telemachus cannot account for his absent minded

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[37]Smith 54.

mistake in leaving the door to the inner chamber unlocked. This mistake allows Melanthios, the goatherder who is an ally of the suitors, to climb through to the inner chamber and supply the suitors with armor (22.142-146).

Telemachus has clearly made a mistake. His reemerging adolescent fear and absent-mindedness contrast sharply with Odysseus' bravery and steadfast mind. In this scene, Homer introduces the third occasion where Odysseus reigns as the hero of the story. While Telemachus comes close to this heroism, he must ultimately fall short.

Odysseus must now instruct Telemachus to find out who was responsible for what he thinks is an act of treason. Telemachus' response is one of the most interesting in the Odyssey and holds important psychological information. Telemachus announces to his father (who does not suspect Telemachus in the least)[38], that he was responsible for the door being left open.

22.154-156 ὦ πάτερ, αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τόδε γ' ἤμβροτον--οὐδέ τις ἄλλος
αἴτιος--ὃς θαλάμοιο θύρην πυκινῶς ἀραρυῖαν
κάλλιπον ἀγκλίνας. (Oh father, I myself failed at
this duty--no one else is to blame--I left the tight
fitting door to the chamber open at an angle.)

This admission of guilt implies that Telemachus has a conscience. A conscience presupposes the presence of the self. Only through self-consciousness can Telemachus see himself as responsible for his own actions. Throughout Telemachus' development we saw him on various occasions fix blame for his problems on the gods on account of their wrath, or on the

[38]At 22.151-152, Odysseus suggests that maybe one of the women or Melanthios committed this act of treason.

suitors for their wanton acts, or on Penelope for her indecision, or even on Odysseus himself for his absence. On all of these occasions, Telemachus has failed to see himself as having agency. And in the face of his such adversity, his mind was fleeting, and easily distracted. While indeed, Telemachus had been distracted when he left the chamber door open, we can see a significant change in him because of his admission of guilt. His admission of guilt is a mark of his self-awareness. In effect, the disaster of Telemachus' panic and resulting mistake seems less important in understanding his final character than his admission of his guilt which marks his agency and self-awareness.

The Odyssey closes with the utter destruction of the suitors, the reuniting of Odysseus and Penelope, and the forestalling of the vengeance of the suitors' families. In all of this action, while Telemachus assumes the back seat to Odysseus, his choice to do so seems to be the result of his own self-assessment, not a lack of self-awareness. The best example of this can be seen when Odysseus asks his son to think (φράζεσθαι) what to do about the expected vengeance of the suitors' families.[39] Telemachus' response affirms that he recognizes Odysseus as the proper person to think about this problem:

23.124-126 αὐτὸς ταῦτά γε λεῦσσε, πάτερ φίλε; σὴν γὰρ ἀρίστην
μῆτιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους φάσ' ἔμμεναι, οὐδέ κέ τίς τοι
ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐρίσειε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. (You must look to this yourself, dear father, for they say that you

[39]Odysseus doesn't realize that Telemachus, albeit unknowingly, has already done a great deal to avert the reprisals of the suitor's relatives. See Georges M. Calhoun, "Telemaque et le Plan de l'Odyssée," Revue des Etudes Grècques civ (1931): 154-155 for an extended commentary on the way in which Telemachus has already helped their cause against the relatives. Calhoun argues that Telemachus' formal demand for justice in the assembly of book 2 establishes the legitimacy of vengeance on the suitors if they fail to change their ways. In this regard, Telemachus' speech has helped to avert the reprisals of the relatives and is a master stroke according to Calhoun.

> have the best cunning among men, and there is no other man among the mortal men who can contend with you).

Telemachus' statement does not indicate that he does not know how to think (φράζεσθαι) about a plan to resolve the problem of the relatives, he only says that Odysseus is the more capable person for the job. This statement can be seen as Telemachus' own self-assessment of his development.[40] Telemachus seems sensible enough to understand that his development in deliberation is not complete in comparison with his father's. Odysseus is the real master of deliberation. Now that his father's rule has been reestablished, Telemachus discerns the propriety in yielding to him.

Conclusion

By attempting to trace the odyssey of Telemachus, I hope to have suggested the importance of his education in deliberation/self-persuasion. It is my hope to have shown the stages of his development. What I have suggested can be essentialized by comparing Telemachus' first scenes with his last.

I suggested that Telemachus' opening scene painted a bleak picture of his mental acumen at that time. He was completely the victim of the actions of the suitors. He was able only to dream about his father's return to resolve

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[40]For additional commentary on this statement see Smith 56-57. Our views are similar in this instance.

the situation. He was easily moved to distraction, and he initially showed few, if any, signs of self-awareness or self-possession. In his last scene, Telemachus is still capable of being moved to distraction (leaving the door open), but signs of his self-awareness were present both in his admission of guilt, and the earlier signs of self-awareness described in books 15-18.

The coming of this self-awareness marks a significant change in Telemachus. This chapter has been an attempt to understand this change by examining the ways in which his self-awareness has emerged. I suggested that the self emerges in division and is maintained by deliberation. Decisiveness as a result of deliberation is a manifestation of self-persuasion. Telemachus' division was caused by the unruly behavior of the suitors, as well as by several other problems that have emerged throughout his experiences. In the beginning of the poem, his self-consciousness had not emerged in the face of his problem. By the end of the poem, it clearly has. I have suggested that this change was a direct result of Telemachus' acquisition of deliberative skills. He began to acquire these skills through the instruction and the examples of Athene, Peisistratus, Nestor, Menelaus, and Orestes. And he attempted to refine his deliberative skills by continuing his education through Odysseus' deliberative model.

While Telemachus does not yet have his degree in deliberation, his advancement through his education points to the fact that someday he will. Deliberation/self-persuasion must be acquired. My analysis of books 19-24 has attempted to show that the completion of Telemachus' acquisition of deliberative skills goes beyond the technical requirements of Homer's Odyssey. The poet gives us enough of the picture to see that Telemachus is

developing his deliberative skills, but for the poet to tell of his mastery of these skills stands outside the scope of the poem.

Chapter 4

ODYSSEUS: MASTER OF DELIBERATION

The Odyssey opens as a story of the ἀνήρ πολύτροπος--the resourceful man, Odysseus himself (1.1). While the opening line of the Odyssey does not reveal the name of its hero, it does give us a clue into his nature with his epithet πολύτροπος. The word appears only twice in the Homeric epics, both times in the Odyssey: at 1.1 as Homer's epithet for Odysseus and at 10.330 as Circe's epithet for him. This word, literally meaning "of many turns", is highly ambiguous, alluding to both the many turns of Odysseus' wanderings and the many turns of Odysseus' mind, the hero's "mental dexterity".[1] Though the ambiguity is interesting in its own right, the reading of πολύτροπος as a quality of mind is particularly interesting with regard to the study of Odyssean deliberation.

This quality of mind should not be defined so much in terms of wisdom or intelligence but in terms of what the Greeks called μῆτις.[2] Not only is Odysseus πολύτροπος but also πολύμητις. Odysseus' most frequent epithet is πολύμητις , and among mortals, the epithet is exclusively his. Sheila Murnagham describes Odysseus' μῆτις as "that capacity for thinking

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[1]See Jenny Strauss Clay, The Wrath of Athena, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 29. Strauss uses the phrase "mental dexterity" as a way of communicating the potential meaning of πολύτροπος.

[2]See M. Detienne and J.P. Vernant, Les Ruses de l'Intelligence: la Metis des Grecs (Paris: Flammarion et Cie, 1974); A useful guide to the French work is Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, trans. Janet Lloyd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.)

one thing and saying another" all for the purpose of versatility and cunning in achieving one's own goals and charting one's own course of action.[3] Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant explain that μῆτις, or cunning intelligence, allows Odysseus to adapt "to the most baffling of situations, of assuming as many faces as there are social categories and types of men in the city, of inventing the thousand ploys which will make his actions effective in the most varied of circumstances."[4] Because of Odysseus' μῆτις, he is described by Detienne and Vernant as "always master of himself."[5]

Odysseus' mastery of himself is never as evident as when he deliberates. He demonstrates μῆτις when his polytropic nature allows him to see the various possible turns or paths available to him during any particular situation and then to choose one among them. Odysseus' μῆτις can be understood as his faculty of deliberation, his ability to weigh alternatives in his mind for the purpose of making a judgment (κρίσις). He uses his μῆτις to change the course of his fate and to resist the many temptations he faces.[6] Rather than succumbing to fate or temptation, Odysseus fights with his μῆτις. He turns away from fate and temptation and toward alternative paths. He deliberates and makes judgments about his best alternative. His μῆτις is his deliberation.

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[3]Sheila Murnagham, Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 10.

[4]Detienne and Vernant 39-40.

[5]Detienne and Vernant 40. The authors point out that the πολύτροπος can be contrasted with the εφήμερος, who represents the extreme susceptibility to fate and change. The εφήμερος can not be an agent of change, only a victim of it. The πολύμητις/πολύτροπος is always an agent of change.

[6]For an interesting examination of Odysseus' many temptations his resistance to temptation, see James C. Hogan, "The Temptation of Odysseus," Transactions of the American Philological Association, 106 (1976): 187-210.

Odysseus' μῆτις reveals his awareness of his freedom: he is not a slave to fate, or to the gods, or to his emotions. Furthermore, he is free from the trappings of the typical hero. A typical hero, making a conditioned response, can do nothing other than act with reckless bravery.[7] Odysseus, at least in this regard, is anti-heroic in the way he resists the impulse to act and instead deliberates his particular course of action. Odysseus' μῆτις enables him to resist his heroic impulse and affirms his freedom from impulse.[8] We must realize, though, that this freedom does not come without a fight. With every new situation, Odysseus must fight his temptation to respond on impulse.[9]

In this chapter, I will examine the moments when we see Odysseus demonstrate his μῆτις in deliberation. First, I will examine the explicit scenes of Odysseus' deliberation. These scenes are earmarked by a verb of

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[7]I do not mean to suggest that this is the only trait of a "hero" in the Iliad and the Odyssey. As M. I. Finley points out, "a staggering diversity of substance" exists in Homeric heroes that the label "Hero" tends to conceal. See, The World of Odysseus, (n.p.: The Viking Press, 1954) 27. Also see pages 28-29 for Finley's description of other qualities of the Homeric hero, and Gregory Nagy, The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

[8]For a commentary on the rejection of heroic impulse in the Odyssey, and particularly in Odysseus' behavior, see Charles Brooks, "The Heroic Impulse in the Odyssey," The Classical World, 70.7 (April-May 1977): 455-456.

[9]Odysseus' cunning habits of mind have attracted the attention of many scholars. The following is just a sampling of interesting commentary: John Alvis, Divine Purpose and Heroic Response in Homer and Virgil: The Political Plan of Zeus, (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995) 85-136; Agathe Thornton, People and Themes in Homer's Odyssey, (London: University of Otago Press, 1970) 78-92; Laura M. Slatkin, "Μῆτις and Composition by Theme," Reading the Odyssey, ed. Seth Schein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) 236-237; Charles Segal, "Kleos and Its Ironies in the Odyssey," Reading the Odyssey, ed. Seth Schein, 205-206; Charles Taylor, "The Obstacles to Odysseus' Return," Essays on the Odyssey, Selected Modern Criticism, ed. Charles H. Taylor, Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966): 87-99; Norman Austin, Archery at the Dark of the Moon, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975): 39, 75-76; Sheila Murnaghan, Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987): 9-10. See also John Peradotto, Man in the Middle Voice: Name and Narration in the Odyssey, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Norman Austin, "Odysseus Polytropos: Man of Many Minds," Arche, 6 91981): 40-52; and Pietro Pucci, Odysseus Polutropos: Intertextual Readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, xlvi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

deliberation--either μερμήριζω, ὁρμαίνω, βουλεύω, or φρονέω. Following the verb of deliberation, a process of self-persuasion follows wherein Odysseus must make a choice among alternative courses of action. Sometimes these explicit scenes of deliberation are complete and sometimes incomplete. In a complete scene, Odysseus recognizes his problem, poses alternatives to himself , and announces a *reasoned* judgment. The "reason" for the judgment comes from a deliberative calculus where Odysseus presents reasons to himself for either undertaking or abstaining from each alternative course of action. The reason that seems most persuasive to Odysseus determines his judgment.

In an incomplete scene, a verb of deliberation will still signal an explicit moment of deliberation, and part of the process of self-persuasion is present, but some part(s) will be unstated. Perhaps one alternative is left unstated. Or more commonly the reasoning behind Odysseus' choice will not be explicit. These incomplete scenes function rhetorically in two ways. First, since the audience can often infer whatever part is missing they are in this way called upon to participate in the meaning of the poem. Second, with incomplete scenes Odysseus' action is highlighted as opposed to his thought. This after all is to be expected since Homer is a poet of action not of thought.

In addition to examining the explicit scenes of Odysseus' deliberation, I will examine the implicit scenes. These scenes are not announced with verbs of deliberation nor do they contain any textual evidence of deliberation. Rather, Odysseus' deliberation is revealed in his deliberate deceits, his lies to Athene, to Eumaeus, to Antinous, and to Penelope. To the extent that these

lies are deliberate acts of deceit, they presuppose deliberate thought. This deliberate deceit is yet another manifestation of Odysseus' self-persuasion.

In examining the nature and scope of Odysseus' deliberation, I will be concerned always with discerning its rhetoricity. I will argue that when Odysseus uses his μῆτις to resist the temptation of impulse, or to thwart the course of his fate, or deny the will of the gods, he is being quite rhetorical. My concern with the rhetoricity of Odysseus' deliberation leads me to examine further the way in which deliberation is a form of self-persuasion. This self-persuasion brings about not only Odysseus' resistance to temptation but also his judgment of alternative courses of action. In analyzing Odysseus' deliberation, we will see that Odysseus has mastered this art of persuasion. His mastery of the art is displayed in his deliberate self-control and cunning intelligence. He is in every way πολύμητις.

Odysseus' Many Ponderings:
Explicit Deliberation

Complete Deliberation

The first complete deliberation scene (5.354-364) sets the standard for Odyssean deliberation.[10] Not only is it complete but it shows more than any other scene Odysseus' freedom from the gods. When Odysseus finally starts his journey home after being detained by Calypso for seven years, he approaches Scheria, the land of the Phaecians, on a meager raft that he

[10]The typicality of this scene is noted by Alfred Heubeck, Stephanie West, and J.B. Hainsworth, A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 283.

himself had constructed with the axe that Calypso provided. Poseidon, who hates Odysseus for having blinded his son the Cyclops Polyphemos, sends storm winds to the sea, and Odysseus is tossed from his raft. Waves hold him under water for a time, but despite near drowning, Odysseus stays mindful of his raft, springs after it, and takes hold of it. But Poseidon keeps on, and Odysseus remains in danger of falling off again and drowning. Then the sea goddess Leukothea takes pity on Odysseus and gives him a chance for safe passage. She appears before him and tells him to throw off his clothes, fasten a magic veil under his chest, dive off his raft, and swim to shore.

At 5.354 Homer tells us, "αὐτὰρ ὁ μερήμριξε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς, (But the much-enduring, noble Odysseus deliberated.)" Rather than simply accepting divine magic to escape his dire situation, Odysseus uses his human power to deliberate:

5.355-364 εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν·
Ὤ μοι ἐγώ, μή τίς μοι ὑφαίνῃσιν δόλον αὖτε
ἀθάνατων, ὅ τέ με σχεδίης ἀποβῆναι ἀνώγει.
ἀλλα μάλ' οὔ πω πείσομ', ἐπεὶ ἑκὰς ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
γαῖαν ἐγὼν ἰδόμην, ὅθι μοι φάτο φύξιμον εἶναι.
ἀλλα μάλ' ὧδ' ἔρξω, δοκέει δέ μοι εἶναι ἄριστον·
ὅφρ' ἂν μέν κεν δούρατ' ἐν ἁρμονίῃσιν ἀρήρῃ,
τόφρ' αὐτοῦ μενέω καὶ τλήσομαι ἄλγεα πάσχων·
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δή μοι σχεδίην διὰ κῦμα τινάξῃ,
νήξομ', ἐπεὶ οὐ μέν τι πάρα προνοῆσαι ἄμεινον.
(He spoke to his own mighty heart, "Oh my soul!,
do not let this be one of the immortals contriving

> a trick for me again, to order me off my raft.
> But I will not yet be persuaded, since I saw with my eyes that the land was far away, where she said I would find refuge. But this I will do, and it seems to me to be the best: as long as the timbers hold firm in their fastenings, so long I will stay and endure to suffer hardships. But when the wave blows my raft hither and thither, I will swim, since I can think of nothing better).

He decides not to follow Leukothea's divine plan. Instead he chooses to remain on his raft until the time when a wave might shatter it. Then and only then will he choose to abandon his raft, fasten the veil, and swim for shore. He reasons that his plan is the best one for him because land is still too far away to abandon his vessel and because Leukothea might be trying to trick him off his raft.

So Odysseus does not blindly accept Leukothea's plan for him. Instead he sets up a condition under which he will be persuaded to adopt it, and only when this condition is met will he accept her divine suggestion. As when earlier he had told Calypso that he would not leave Ogygia on a raft until she swore a great oath not to do any harm to him through divine trickery (5.173-179), he tells himself now that he will not adopt Leukothea's plan until his raft is shattered and no other option exists for him. In both scenes, he distrusts the intentions of a divinity. In both scenes he sets up his own conditions under which he will choose to obey divine persuasion. But in the scene with Leukothea (unlike the scene with Calypso), Homer provides an explicit and complete account of the internal deliberation that informs

Odysseus' choice. We understand his dilemma: how should he escape from drowning? Shoud he obey Leukothea or make a plan of his own? We have knowledge of his calculus: if he abandons his raft he may become the object of divine trickery, and he may be too far away from shore to swim to it safely; if he stays on his raft he will have a better chance at reaching the shore safely and avoiding the undesirable fate of being tricked by a divinity. We know his judgment: he will remain on his raft until it is shattered, and then, and only then, will he adopt Leukothea's plan. If Odysseus were unaware of his freedom from the gods, he would not have been motivated to deliberate. The motive to deliberate, to persuade oneself how to act in a particular situation, does not arise in a person who fails to recognize him/herself as fundamentally free.

Not only does this scene of deliberation reveal Odysseus' awareness of his freedom, but it also shows his awareness of his own character. Odysseus knows himself, and this knowledge of himself will not allow him to take a path that would betray his character as πολύμητις. The path of betrayal would be the one Leukothea shows him. Yet, Leukothea's path is a tempting offer, one that Odysseus must resist if he is to stay true to his character. Therefore, he has a problem. He must deliberate. But this deliberation is not just a means of inventing himself anew. It is not so much a process of self-discovery as it is a process of self-affirmation. His deliberation is a means of presenting additional reasons to stay true to his character. His self-persuasion serves to pull him away from temptation by affirming his polytropic character. Rhetorically, this deliberation functions as a way for Odysseus to determine how he as πολύμητις should act considering the particulars of his

situation. The πολύμητις one cannot yield to temptation offered by divine will, but rather must discern other paths to take, paths that allow him to use his μῆτις and stay true to his own character.

In addition to revealing his awareness of his freedom and his knowledge of his own character, this first scene of deliberation reveals Odysseus' knowledge of the process of deliberation. This process involves weighing alternatives as a means of making a reasoned judgment in order to resolve a particular problem facing an individual and chart a future course of action. We see this process quite completely in this first scene of deliberation, but Homer also provides us with three more complete accounts of Odyssean deliberation. Taken together, these four scenes help to show that Odysseus' deliberation is not accidental, but rather part of his art. These accounts serve as additional evidence, not only of Odysseus' freedom and knowledge of himself, but of his skill at deliberating and thus his mastery of the art of deliberation.

When Odysseus faces the lovely maiden Nausicaa, he deliberates about how to approach her (6.141-148). Naked and covered with brine from the sea, Odysseus ponders whether he should clasp her knees and beseech her to take him in, give him clothing, and lead him to the city, or whether he should stand where he is, partially hidden in the brush, and persuade her with gentle words. As he deliberates, it seems best to him to persuade her from where he is so that he won't make her angry by clasping her knees:

6.141-148 ὁ δὲ μερμήριξεν Ὀδυσσεύς,
ἢ γούνων λίσσοιτο λαβὼν εὐώπιδα κούρην,
ἦ ἄυτως ἐπέεσσιν ἀποστὰς μειλιχίοισι

λίσσοιτ', εἰ δείξειε πόλιν καὶ εἵματα δοίη.
ὡς ἄρα οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι,
λίσσεσθαι ἐπέεσσιν ἀποσταδὰ μειλιχίοισι,
μή οἱ γοῦνα λαβόντι χολώσαιτο φρένα κούρη.
αὐτί κα μειλίχιον καὶ κερδαλέον φάτο μῦθον. (and
Odysseus pondered whether he should clasp the knees of
the fair faced maiden, and beseech her, or whether,
standing apart as he was, he should beseech her with
gentle words, so that she might show him the city and
give him clothing. And, as he pondered, it seemed better
to him to stand apart and beseech her with gentle words,
so that the maiden's heart would not be angry with him if
he clasped her knees; so at once, he spoke a gentle and
crafty speech).

When Odysseus, disguised as a beggar in his own home, must fight another beggar, Iros, for the right to beg among the suitors, he deliberates about how to approach the fight (18.90-94). Should he kill Iros with one swift blow or merely stretch him out a bit by hitting him lightly? In the division of his mind, Odysseus decides that it is best to only hit him lightly so that the suitors will not grow suspicious of him.

18.90-94 δὴ τότε μερμήριξε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
ἢ ἐλάσει ὥς μιν ψυχὴ λίποι αὖθι πεσόντα,
ἦέ μιν ἦκ' ἐλάσειε τανύσσειέν τ' ἐπὶ γαίῃ.
ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι,
ἦκ' ἐλάσαι, ἵνα μή μιν ἐπιφρασσαίατ' Ἀχαιοί.
(Then indeed, much-enduring goodly Odysseus

deliberated whether to hit him so that the life would go out of him, as he went down, or only to stretch him out by hitting him lightly. And in the division of his heart this way seemed best to him, to hit him lightly, so the Achaians would not be suspicious of him.)

When Odysseus, still disguised as a beggar, sees his handmaidens flirting with the suitors, he deliberates about how to punish their unfaithfulness (20.9-21). He debates whether he should spring on them and kill each one or rather let them sleep with the suitors one last time. He tells himself it is best to endure their behavior a bit longer until his μῆτις finds the best way and the opportune moment to punish them. He reasons from past experience that since this combination of endurance and μῆτις allowed him to escape successfully the cave of the Cyclops, this combination is likely to work again in his present situation.[11]

20.9-21 τοῦ δ' ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στηθεσσί φίλοισι·
πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,
ἦε μεταΐξας θάνατον τεύξειεν ἑκάστῃ,
ἦ ἔτ' ἐῷ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι
ὕστατα καὶ πύματα, κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει.
ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῇσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα
ἄνδρ' ἀγνοιήσασ' ὑλάει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι,

[11]This reasoning strongly resembles reasoning from probability. Odysseus is arguing that what worked well on one occasion is probably a sign of what might work well on another occasion where the particulars of the situation are similar. In the scene with the Cyclops, Odysseus at one point wanted to rush upon him and kill him but thought differently once he realized that if the Cyclops were killed, no one could remove the boulder from the cave door. In the scene with the handmaidens, he once again wants to rush upon them and kill them but thinks differently since he realizes that this might compromise a successful outcome. The sophistication of this reasoning from probability should not be overlooked.

ὣς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα·
στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
"Τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης,
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἤσθιε Κύκλωψ
ἰφθίμους ἑτάρους· σὺ δ' ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μῆτις
ἐξάγαγ' ἐξ ἄντροιο ὀϊόμενον θανέεσθαι.
(But Odysseus' heart was deeply stirred and he deliberated much in mind and heart whether to spring on them and kill each one, or rather to let them lie this one more time with the insolent suitors; but his heart was growling within and as a bitch, facing an unknown man, stands over her new-born pups, growling ready to fight, so Odysseus' heart was growling inside him as he looked on these evil deeds. He struck himself on the chest and spoke to his heart and scolded it: 'Endure heart since you have endured worse than this before when the Cyclopes ate my strong comrades, but you endured until cunning got you out of the cave, though you expected to perish.')

In all four of these scenes, the process of Odysseus' deliberation is the same. In each scene, his problem is apparent. How should he escape from drowning? How should he approach Nausicaa? How should he fight Iros? How should he punish the unfaithful handmaidens? In each scene, alternatives are posed. Should he obey Leukothea or remain on his raft? Should he approach Nausicaa by clasping her knees, as was the standard practice in the times that Homer describes, or beseeching her from where he

stands? Should he fight to kill Iros or only wound him slightly? Should he kill the handmaidens in the heat of the moment or wait for a more strategic moment and a more cunning plan? In each scene he announces a reason for his particular judgment. He will remain on his raft because Leukothea may be trying to trick him and since land is too far away. He will persuade Nausicaa from behind the brush so that he won't anger her by clasping her knees. He will only wound Iros because he doesn't want to raise suspicions about his own identity. He will endure the behavior of his handmaidens to wait for a more opportune moment and a more strategic plan because this is what worked best for him when he was in a jam with the Cyclops.

These four scenes show us that Odysseus knows how to deliberate; he has full knowledge of this intellectual process. The identical pattern of Odysseus' deliberation in all four of these scenes shows us that the process of self-persuasion is part of Odysseus' mental habitude. And like all mental habits, the habit of deliberating had to be acquired. Odysseus himself tells us as much when he announces his identity to the Phaecians. He says, "εἶμι' Ὀδυσεὺς Λαερτιάδης, ὅς πᾶσι δόλοισιν ἀνθρώποισι μέλω, καί μευ κλέος οὐρανον ἵκει (I am Odysseus, son of Laertes, known before all men for my knowledge of cunning plans and my fame goes up to the heavens.) (9.19-20)." Odysseus' knowledge is not divinely instilled nor accidental. Rather, Odysseus had to acquire this knowledge; he had to study its production and use.[12] Acquisition of this knowledge of cunning designs could come only after habituating himself in the process of self-persuasion: recognizing the

[12]For an interesting commentary on the teaching of such knowledge in ancient Greek culture, see P. Walcot, "Odysseus and the Art of Lying," Ancient Society, 8 (1977): 1-19. Walcot argues that cunning wiles, such as deliberate lying, or disguise, were a necessary part of all ancient Greek culture and were taught as a life skill.

particulars of a given situation, generating and weighing alternative courses of action, and making a final reasoned judgment about which course of action to adopt. This process of self-persuasion is so fundamental to Odysseus that he identifies himself with neither his physical prowess nor his heroic nature (e.g. his pride, or courage, or honor), nor his many wanderings, but with his knowledge of crafty designs and strategic ways. Odysseus, in both his deeds and words, knows himself as "The Deliberator."

Incomplete Deliberation

In addition to these 4 complete scenes of explicit deliberation, Homer also presents us with 9 incomplete scenes. Predominantly, these scenes are incomplete because no reasons are presented for Odysseus' choices. Other scenes are incomplete because in addition to the absent reasons, the deliberative calculus is missing (altogether or in part).

In the first incomplete scene, Odysseus has just landed on the shore of Scheria after being tossed in the sea on a lone timber for days. Once ashore, he must decide how he will spend the night. His speech to himself begins with a statement of his new dilemma.

5.465-473 Ὤ μοι ἐγώ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται;
εἰ μέν κ' ἐν ποταμῷ δυσκηδέα νύκτα φυλάσσω,
μή μ' ἄμυδις στίβη τε κακὴ καὶ θῆλυς ἔέρση
ἐξ ὀλιγηπελίης δαμάσῃ κεκαφηότα θυμόν·
αὔρη δ' ἐκ ποταμοῦ ψυχρὴ πνέει ἠῶθι πρό.
εἰ δέ κεν ες κλιτὺν ἀναβὰς καὶ δάσκιον ὕλην

θάμνοις ἐν πυκινοῖσι καταδράθω, εἴ με μεθείη
ῥῖγος καὶ κάματος, γλυκερὸς δέ μοι ὕπνος ἐπέλθῃ,
δείδω, μὴ θήρεσσιν ἕλωρ καὶ κύρμα γένωμαι.
(Oh my soul! What will I suffer? What will happen to me at last? If here by the river I keep watch throughout the weary night, I fear that the bitter frost and the fresh dew will overcome me, for from my weakness I have breathed forth my spirit, and the breeze from the river blows cold in the early morning. But if I climb up the slope to the shady wood and lie down to rest in the thick brush, in the hope that the cold and weariness might leave me, and if sweet sleep comes over me, I fear I will become prey and spoil to the wild beasts.)

Homer tells us in the following narration what Odysseus decides to do:

5.474-487 Ὣς ἄρα οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι·
βῆ ῥ' ἴμεν εἰς ὕλην· τὴν δὲ σχεδὸν ὕδατος εὗρεν
ἐν περιφαινομένῳ· δοιοὺς δ' ἄρ υπήλυθε θάμνους,
ἐξ ὁμόθεν πεφυῶτας· ὁ μὲν φυλίης, ὁ δ' ἐλαίης.
τοὺς μὲν ἄρ οὔτ ἀνέμων διάη μένος ὑγρὸν ἀέντων,
οὔτε ποτ' ἠέλιος φαέθων ἀκτῖσιν ἔβαλλεν,
οὔτ' ὄμβρος περάσκε διαμπερές· ὣς ἄρα πυκνοὶ
αλλῆλοισιν ἔφυν ἐπαμοιβαδίς· οὓς ὑπ Οδυσσεὺς
δύσετ'· ἄφαρ δ' εὐνήν επαμήσατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν
εὐρεῖαν· φύλλων γὰρ ἔην χύσις ἤλιθα πολλή,
ὅσσον τ' ἠὲ δύω ἠὲ τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔρυσθαι
ὥρῃ χειμερίῃ, εἰ καὶ μάλα περ χαλεπαίνοι.

τὴν μὲν ἰδὼν γήθησε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς
ἐν δ' ἄρα μέσσῃ λέκτο, χύσιν δ' ἐπεχεύατο φύλλων.
(Then, as he deliberated, this thing seemed best to him: he went to the wood and found it near the water in a clear space; and crept beneath two bushes that grew from the same spot, one of thorn and one of olive. Through these the strength of the wet winds could never blow, nor the rays of the bright sun beat, nor could the rain pierce through them, so closely did they grow, intertwining one with the other. Beneath these Odysseus crept and straightway gathered with his hands a broad bed, for there were plenty of fallen leaves, enough to shelter two men or three in winter time, however bitter the weather. And the much-enduring goodly Odysseus saw it, and was glad, and he lay down in the midst, and heaped over him the fallen leaves.

The combination of Odysseus' speech to himself and Homer's narration provides explicit details of Odysseus' deliberation, except for the reason behind his final judgment. We know Odysseus' particular problem: how should he spend the night? We know his two alternatives: he can either spend it by the river keeping watch and risk the elements or spend it in the woods sleeping and risk the wild animals. And we know Odysseus' final action: he spends it in the woods inside a dense grove of thorny bushes and covers himself with a blanket of leaves. But we do not have explicit knowledge of the reasoning behind this action.

Because a reason is not explicit in the deliberation, are we to understand that Odysseus climbs into a grove of dense, thorny bushes and olive trees (which are also quite thorny) for no other reason than mere impulse? That he covers himself completely in a blanket of leaves for no deliberate reason? Certainly not. Odysseus' choice to do these things is obviously based on certain reasons. That these reasons are left unstated in his actual speech to himself means very little. In the end, the audience can supply the missing information. In this scene, we have the help of some important details supplied by Homer's narration.

First, Homer tells us that Odysseus chooses to sleep in a grove of thorns, covered by a mound of leaves because, after deliberating, he thinks this is his best alternative (5.474: Ὣς ἄρα οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι·). We can infer that this is the alternative that offers the most protection and the greatest potential for his much needed rest. Second, Homer tells us that Odysseus did not just pick any old spot to lie down, but rather the spot that was so densely protected that through these the strength of the wet winds could never blow, nor the rays of bright sun beat, nor could the rain pierce through them, so closely did they grew, intertwining one with the other (5.478-481). As final evidence of the deliberate quality of Odysseus' actions, we have Homer's comparison of Odysseus hiding under a blanket of leaves to a man hiding a brand beneath the dark embers in an outlying farm, a man who has no neighbors, and so saves a seed of fire, that he may not have to kindle it from some other source (5.488-490). Such hiding, of either oneself in a blanket of leaves, or a brand beneath the embers, takes forethought. Odysseus must use his μῆτις to discern current and future needs and make choices

about how to meet these needs. This process of making choices is the very act of deliberation. Despite the absence of Odysseus' reasoning we can safely infer that his action is a result of his deliberation: that climbing into this shelter seemed likely to be his best alternative for protection and rest, both of which he must have if he is going to successfully accomplish his goal of returning home.

A second incomplete scene presents Odysseus deliberating whether to investigate the smoke on Aiaia. He and his comrades have just arrived on this new island, after surviving the disasters of Polyphemos, the opening of the bag of winds, and the Laestregonians. Odysseus leaves his men at the ship and sets off to explore the island. He climbs to a point of observation and sees smoke. There he deliberates about how to proceed:

10.151-155 μερμήριξα δ' ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν
ἐλθεῖν ἠδὲ πυθέσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἴδον αἴθοπα καπνόν.
ὣδε δέ μοι φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι,
πρῶτ' ἐλθόντ' ἐπὶ νῆα θοὴν καὶ θῖνα θαλάσσης
δεῖπνον ἑταίροισιν δόμεναι προέμεν τε πυθέσθαι
(Then I pondered deeply in my heart andé my mind,whether I should go and make search, since I had seen the flaming smoke. And as I pondered, this seemed to me to be the better way, to go first to the swift ship and the shore of the sea, and give my comrades their meal, and send them forth to make search.)

Once again in this scene, the reason for Odysseus' choice is left unstated. But considering Odysseus' experience prior to arriving at Aiaia, the

reason does not need to be stated because it is very obvious. Prior to reaching Aiaia, Odysseus and his men had sailed to Lamos, the land of the Laestrygonians. There, Odysseus had climbed to an observation point and spotted smoke. The two men who explored the smoke had then been eaten by the monster Antiphates. Since this disaster took place prior to arriving on Aiaia, where Odysseus has again spotted smoke, the experience must still be fresh in his mind as well as in the mind of the audience. It seems obvious that Odysseus should not explore the smoke himself because he would risk meeting a fate similar to that of his two erstwhile comrades.

In this scene as in the earlier scene, Odysseus' reasoning is implicit in the details of the story itself. For Homer to make the reasoning explicit would be to state the obvious. In addition, this scene like the earlier scene shows that Odysseus' choice is once again the result of self-persuasion. One incompetent in using such a process would have dashed off to investigate the smoke at the first impulse to do so. In this scene, Odysseus resists this temptation to act on an impulse. This resistance is brought about by self-persuasion.

In the next two incomplete scenes, Odysseus' reasoning though unstated is equally obvious since it can be inferred from his character. In the first of these scenes, Odysseus has been betrayed by his comrades and must decide how to proceed. He and his comrades have just left the Aeolian isle where King Aeolus gave Odysseus a bag of the blustering winds so that only the West wind would be free to blow. With the West wind at their back, Odysseus and his comrades have optimum sailing conditions for their return home. They sail for nine days and on the tenth they see their native land.

They are so near that Odysseus, in utter exhaustion, hands over the ship to his comrades and goes to sleep. But his comrades face temptation. They speak among one another and convince one another that Odysseus has been hiding from them a stash of treasure in the bag that Aeolus gave him. The comrades decide to open the bag and distribute the loot evenly, but when they open the bag, the blustering winds escape. A storm seizes them, sweeping them back out to sea and far away from their native land.

Odysseus wakes up and deliberates:

10.49-54 αὐτὰρ ἐγώ γε
ἐγρόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμύμονα μερμήριξα,
ἠὲ πεσὼν ἐκ νηὸς ἀποφθίμην ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
ἦ ἀκέων τλαίην καὶ ἔτι ζωοῖσι μετείην.
ἀλλ' ἔτλην καὶ ἔμεινα, καλυψάμενος δ' ἐνὶ νηὶ
κείμην (I awoke and deliberated in my goodly heart whether I should fling myself from the ship and perish in the sea, or endure in silence and still remain among the living. And I endured and abode, and covering my head lay down in the ship.)

In this deliberation, we see the structural similarities with the earlier scene. Odysseus faces a problem: how should he respond to the disaster of his comrades' betrayal? He poses two alternatives to himself: should he fling himself overboard or endure? He makes a choice without specifying an explicit reason: he chooses to endure. But as with the earlier scene, we must ask whether it is necessary for Odysseus to have announced an explicit reason or if the audience can supply this information? It is not unreasonable to

think that the audience can do this. Whereas in the earlier scene, the audience is aided in making an inference by the additional details provided by Homer, in this scene the audience is aided by an acquired knowledge of Odysseus' character. Not only is he "The Deliberator" he is "The Endurer." So far the audience has learned of numerous scenes of Odysseus' endurance in the face of strife. We know that up until this point in the story, Odysseus has endured the torment of being stranded on Ogygia, the near deadly force of the storms of Poseidon and Zeus, the revenge of the Cicones, the spell of the Lotus, the deadly horrors of Polyphemos, and the taunting of the Phaecians.

Not only do we know Odysseus' character through these many experiences of endurance, but we know it through his epithet "πολύτλας Οδυσσεύς" or "much-enduring Odysseus".[13] Up until this scene in the poem, this epithet has been used 13 times, more than any other epithet of Odysseus. Furthermore, this epithet is used only for Odysseus; no other character in the Odyssey is "πολύτλας."

With the knowledge of Odysseus' character as one who endures in the face of adversity, as revealed in both his experience and his epithet, the audience is bound to find reasonable his choice to endure the storm resulting from his comrades' betrayal. If Odysseus were to choose some other path than endurance, i.e. suicide, then an explicit explanation would certainly be necessary. But in this scene, Odysseus acts according to his character and for this we need no further explanation. Furthermore, Odysseus' resistance of the impulse to end his life is very similar to his resistance of the impulse to investigate the smoke on Aiaia in that this resistance is an affirmation of

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[13]For additional commentary on Odysseus' endurance see Strauss-Clay 31; Peradotto 52, 87, 119, 163-168; and Murnagham 5.

Odysseus' emergent self. In both scenes he had to resist temptation and to do so he deliberates. Through deliberation he persuades himself to resist impulsive action. This deliberation is self-persuasion, and this self-persuasion allows Odysseus to affirm his character

When Odysseus deliberates about how to approach his father, we once again have an incomplete scene that is made complete by the audience's knowledge of Odysseus' character. In this scene, Odysseus has successfully killed the suitors and has been reunited with Penelope; he must now decide how to be reunited with his father, Laertes:

24.235-240 μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα κὰτα φρένα καὶ κὰτα θυμὸν
κύσσαι καὶ περιφῦναι ἑὸν πατέρ', ἠδὲ ἕκαστα
εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἔλθοι καὶ ἵκοιτ' ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
ἦ πρῶτ' ἐξερέοιτο ἕκαστά τε πειρήσαιτο.
ὣδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι,
πρῶτον κερτομίοις ἐπέεσσιν πειρῆθηναι (he deliberated then in his heart and his spirit whether to embrace his father and kiss him and tell him everything, how he came again to his own dear fatherland or question him first about everything, and make trial of him. In the division of his heart this way seemed best to him, first to make trial of him and speak in words of mockery.)

Why would Odysseus decide to deliberately deceive his own father? Once again, the reason is not explicit in Odysseus' deliberation but lies implicitly in his character. Odysseus is a trickster. He tricks people, even those closest to him, by concealing his identity. He tricks Eumaios, his loyal

swineherd, by questioning him in the disguise of a beggar and making up a story of how he knew of the whereabouts of the famed Odysseus. He tricks his son Telemachus by not immediately revealing his identity and lets Telemachus think he is a beggar. And he tricks his faithful wife, as if she hasn't already proven her loyalty to her husband and their household by holding off the suitors for nearly five years! Considering the way in which Odysseus tricks Eumaios, Telemachos, and Penelope, it makes sense that he would trick Laertes as well. To do anything else would be out of character for Odysseus and would call for more explicit reasoning.[14]

Perhaps this question could be raised: if Odysseus' knowledge of himself is so certain, why must he deliberate in the first place? Quite simply, certainty of self does not remove the inevitability of temptation. Odysseus must deliberate because he is not immune to temptation. He must deliberate to persuade himself to stay intact, to act consistently with his own character, despite the temptations of any given situation. And since the particulars of his situations change, he must deliberate in order to decide how the imperatives of his character apply to his specific situation.

Other scenes of Odysseus' deliberation are incomplete in different ways. The tripartite deliberation over the Polyphemos predicament demonstrates a range of incompleteness in Odysseus' deliberation. Odysseus' ultimate defeat of Polyphemos is the end result of three incomplete but related moments of deliberation. Facing the problem of how to escape Polyphemos, the one-eyed monster, Odysseus must at three separate

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[14]For the way in which Odysseus deceit of his own father is an act consistent with his character and an act which is less cruel when understood within the context of Odysseus' character and the expectations of Greek culture, see Walcot.

moments think of a plan and make a decision whether to adopt it or not. First, he deliberates whether to rush at Polyphemos and slay him outright, but he decides against killing him at that moment. He reasons that if he kills Polyphemos inside the cave, then no one would be strong enough to remove the boulder from the cave's entrance. The end result would be the death of his comrades and himself as well, along with that of Polyphemos.

9.299-306 τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ βούλευσα κὰτα μεγλήτορα θυμὸν
ἄσσον ἰών, ξίφος ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ,
οὐτάμεναι πρὸς στῆθος . . . ἕτερος δέ με θυμὸς ἔρυκεν.
αὐτοῦ ηάρ κε καὶ ἄμμες ἀπωλόμεθ' αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον·οὐ γάρ
κεν δυνάμεσθα θυράων ὑψηλάων
χερσὶν ἀπώσασθαι λίθον ὄβριμον, ὃν προσέθηκεν.
ὣς τότε μὲν στενάχοντες ἐμείναμεν Ἠῶ δῖαν.
(And I took counsel with myself in my great heart
to go near him, drawing my sharp sword from beside my
thigh and strike him in the breast . . . but a second thought
restrained my heart, for there we too would have perished
in utter ruin for we would not be able to thrust back with
our hands from the high door the mighty stone which he
had set there. So then groaning we waited for the bright
dawn).

This is the only deliberation scene in the Odyssey where Odysseus thinks of a plan, and persuades himself to reject it without replacing it with another plan. Therein lies the incompleteness of this scene. In all the other scenes at least two alternatives were present for Odysseus, and his

deliberation allowed him to choose among these alternatives. The end result in all the previous deliberation scenes is a positive affirmation of a particular course of action best suited for the situation. However, in his first deliberation over Polyphemos, Odysseus thinks only of one possible course of action that he rejects with sound reasons. The end result of Odysseus' deliberation is his decision that a particular course of action would *not* be well suited for the situation. Odysseus persuades himself not to act at that moment, and he tells us this much when he says ὣς τότε μὲν στενάχοντες ἐμείναμεν Ἠῶ δῖαν (So then, with wailing, we waited for the bright Dawn 9.306).

Despite the incompleteness of this scene, we can still see an implicit positive course of action being devised by Odysseus. Implicitly, we know that Odysseus will choose to find a way to allow Polyphemos to open the cave door. But clearly a plan does not come to him immediately, since he and his men wait through the night, and in the morning they endure watching Polyphemos fix his breakfast of two more men. As we are told at 20.20-21, Odysseus had to endure waiting until his μῆτις got them out of the cave, though he expected to perish (σὺ δ' ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μῆτις ἐξάγαγ' ἐξ ἄντροιο ὀϊόμενον θανέεσθαι.). So despite his expectations about his fate, that he would perish in the cave with his comrades, Odysseus uses his μῆτις to try to change the course of his fate. In doing so he deliberates a second time, and this time a plan does come to his mind. This plan is so elaborate it takes 93 lines for Odysseus to explain it. He prefaces these 93 lines with the following words that show his plan to be the result of deliberation:

9.316-318 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ λιπόμην κακὰ βυσσοδομεύων,

εἴ πως τισαίμην, δοίη δέ μοι εὖχος Ἀθήνη.
Ἥδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή.
(but I was left pondering evil secretly, how I might take vengeance and how Athene might give me glory. And in my mind this plan appeared to be the best.)

In this scene then we are again presented with Odysseus' problem: how can he and his comrades escape from Polyphemos. We know that he cannot kill Polyphemos outright because then he and his men would die trapped inside the cave. We know that Odysseus thinks of a plan that seems likely to work.[15] We do not know what the plan is or the reasons that Odysseus thinks it will work. But it is not necessary for us to know either. Because Odysseus presents good reasons to himself against his first plan for escaping Polyphemos, we know that reasoning is not beyond him. We know that Odysseus is not going to act on mere impulse. We can safely assume that Odysseus has good reasons for the plan he is about to carry out, and we can even assume that this plan will at some point lead Polyphemos to open the cave door so that Odysseus and his men can escape. The other details of the plan do not need to be explained prior to the description of the action, because if they were, the audience's focus would be on Odysseus' slow and deliberate thinking rather than his swift and decisive action. The audience has enough knowledge with the first deliberation over Polyphemos and the preface to the 93 line unfolding of the action of the plan to know that the plan was generated from Odysseus' deliberation. By silencing the reasons and the plan,

[15]Odysseus is working in probabilities. The only thing he is fairly certain of is that if he doesn't act or if he waits too much longer to act, he will die at the hands of Polyphemos. In the face of this certainty, Odysseus thinks of a plan that is probable to work and announces this self-directed thought to the Phaecians as he retells his story.

Homer keeps the audience's attention on action rather than thought, which after all is demanded by the genre of epic poetry. Simultaneously, Homer provides the audience with enough evidence for us to determine that the act is a result of thought, not mere impulse or divine will.

As Odysseus continues to tell his story of escaping Polyphemos to the Phaecians, he tells his plan through his actions. He tells of how, after the Cyclops left the cave to tend his sheep, he finds a great club as large as the mast of a ship of twenty oars. Odysseus cuts a fathom length from this club and gives it to his comrades to prepare. They smooth it down while Odysseus sharpens the point. After hardening it in the fire, Odysseus hides it beneath the dung that lies in great heaps throughout the cave. He orders the men to cast lots to see who would help him drive the stake into the eye of the Cyclops, and they wait for Polyphemos to return from his day's work.

When the Cyclops has finished performing his evening tasks inside the cave (which include snatching two more men and preparing them for dinner), Odysseus speaks to him, offering him a bowl of dark wine. This wine had been given to Odysseus earlier in the poem, and Odysseus brought it with him to explore the cave of the Cyclops because αὐτίκα γάρ μοι οἴσατο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ ἄνδρ' ἐπελεύσεσθαι μεγάλην ἐπιείμενον ἀλκήν, ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (at once I thought in my bold heart that a man would approach me clothed in mighty strength, a savage man with no knowledge of justice or law 9.213-215). So even from the beginning of the expedition, Odysseus was planning, using his forethought and cunning to prepare for all potential situations.

Odysseus persuades the Cyclops to drink the wine, and the monster likes it so much that he demands more. Odysseus fills the bowl for him three more times. When Polyphemos is very drunk, Odysseus speaks to him again, saying that his name is Οὖτις (Nobody). The Cyclops, being too literal minded to detect a trick, believes Odysseus' name is Οὖτις, and he tells Οὖτις that his gift to him will be to eat him last.

Then the Cyclops reels over backward and passes out. The men then heat the stake until it is glowing red and drive it into his lone eye. Polyphemos cries terribly as his eye burns and bleeds. He then calls to the other Cyclopes who come running, probably not out of any great concern for their neighbor's well-being but more out of being bothered by the noise he is making. When they ask him why he is making such a racket, Polyphemos answers, "Οὖτίς με κτείνει δόλῳ οὐδ βίηφιν (Nobody is killing me by guile and not by force 9.408). The other Cycolpes are convinced that Polyphemos has been afflicted by Zeus with some form of craziness, and they tell him to pray to Poseidon for help. Then they go away.

Polyphemos, abandoned by his neighbors, gropes with his hands to open the cave door, and he sits in the doorway with his hands open trying to catch anyone who might try to escape. So again Odysseus deliberates about how to escape the cave without being caught by Polyphemos.

9.420-424 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον, ὅχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο,
εἴ τιν' ἑταίροισιν θανάτου λύσιν ἠδ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ
εὑροίμην· πάντας δὲ δόλους καὶ μῆτιν ὕφαινον
ὡς τε περὶ ψυχῆς· μέγα γὰρ κακὸν ἐγγύθεν ἦεν.
ἥδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή. (But I

> deliberated how it might be best, if I might find
> some means of escape from death for my comrades
> and me. And all cunning and skill I contrived as
> one would about matters of life and death. For great evil
> was near. And this appeared to my mind the best plan.)

This third and final deliberation over escaping Polyphemos is similar to the second scene in that both scenes have a clearly posed problem, both scenes indicate that Odysseus deliberates, but neither scene announces Odysseus' alternatives, his final choice of action nor his reasons for choosing such a course of action. The plan is revealed only through the description of the action of Odysseus' escape. We are told that Odysseus and his men cling to the bellies of the sheep and as the sheep leave the cave so do the men, with little to no risk of being detected by the blind Polyphemos. Once again, the same reason that prevents Homer from announcing the plan prior to the action in the second deliberation scene, prevents him in this third deliberation scene as well. If the plan were to be announced in either scene, then the audience's attention would be directed to Odysseus' thought and not his action.

In addition to these two deliberation scenes with the Cyclops, one other scene in the Odyssey is incomplete in exactly this same way. This scene, like the two Cyclops scenes, is incomplete in its lack of alternatives, its unannounced choice and its unstated reasons for the plan of action that Odysseus follows. When Odysseus must guard the blood in Hades and question the souls individually, he must find a way to keep these souls from drinking the blood before he can question them. So he deliberates once again:

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον ὅπως ἐρέοιμι ἑκάστην. ἤδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμόν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή (But I deliberated how I might question each; and this seemed to my mind the best plan 11.229-230). In this scene, like the latter two deliberation scenes with the Cyclops, Odysseus must act quickly. To keep the emphasis on this swift action, Homer cannot afford to be detailed about Odysseus' deliberation, but he does give us enough information to know that Odysseus' actions are a result of his own motivation, a result of his own deliberation, not impulse or divine will.

All of these incomplete scenes so far help us to see that Homer's silence about calculi and reasons ultimately implies something other than the absence of a deliberate mind. Most likely, it implies that Homeric audiences were not captivated by justifications, calculi, and reasons. Instead they preferred to witness swift and decisive action. Audience expectations are driven by the genre of epic poetry. The poet of this genre is not in the business of portraying thought but action, and in turn the audience expects to experience action not justifications. The tale of a hero cannot be burdened by a detailed exposition of the reasons for his actions or the calculi that precede his decisions. Justifications and reasons are not what a hero is all about. The drama of Odysseus' action would be compromised if Homer had elaborated Odysseus' deliberative process.

The truncated form of these deliberation scenes can be attributed to Economy of Phrase.[16] This stylistic tool is described by Stanford in his commentary on the Odyssey as demanding much vigilance and imaginative cooperation from the reader. According to Stanford, this technique is typical

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[16]See Stanford, The Odyssey of Homer, 4.738; 6.132; 10.113; 11.563; 12.350.

of the Homeric poems and the best of classical literature. Economy of Phrase is characterized by brevity and pregnancy. For instance, when Homer is silent about reasons for a given action, assumptions about those reasons are being called forth from the audience. The audience knows that Odysseus' heroic nature would not allow him to jump into the sea, abandoning his goal of returning home. Homer does not need to elaborate Odysseus' reasons for not ending it all. Rather, he depends on the cooperation of his audience to fill in the missing reasons so that the heroic nature of the action is not compromised.

By truncating premises in deliberation scenes, Homer invites the audience to participate in the creation of meaning in the poem. This economized phrasing has an enthymematic quality. By suppressing certain premises or the conclusion of a particular deliberation scene, Homer calls upon his audience to supply the missing information out of its own stock of knowledge. This knowledge might be of the plot or of the particular character involved, but it serves to allow the audience to bring meaning to the poem and to free the poet from the burdens of detailing the thought of his characters at the expense of the action of the story.

This economic style of composition, this enthymematic technique, allows Homer to express profound emotion or swift action with a single touch. In this light, Homer's silence can often be loftier than any speech. So despite Homer's relative silence about deliberative calculi and reasoning, we can make the case for deliberation nonetheless since there are complete episodes in the poem that fully display deliberation, and since economized phrasing is most likely preventing the explicit display of deliberation in the

incomplete episodes. It is the genre within which Homer creates and not the mentality of the Homeric person that prevents reasons and calculi from being articulated.

Considering that these eight incomplete scenes are likely the result, at least in part, of Economy of Phrase, an enthymematic pattern in the narrative, they are really not incomplete at all. In the first four incomplete scenes we saw that the reasons could be easily supplied either from the details of the plot itself or from Odysseus' character. In the second group of four scenes we saw that reasons and calculi were not necessary to the action of the scene. Thus, these incomplete scenes become more complete. And, comparatively speaking, their completeness is greater when we contrast them with one remaining deliberation scene yet to be examined. This scene is truly incomplete.

In Book 5, after Odysseus deliberates about whether to obey Leukothea's advice, Poseidon smashes his raft to bits. Odysseus abandons his raft and for two days and two nights he is driven by the waves of the sea. Finally, on the third, the shore is close at hand. But his eagerness to arrive is dampened when he sees a great wave thunder toward shore and crash against the rocks. Odysseus recognizes his dilemma. He "speaks to his own great hearted spirit (εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν)" and opens his speech with "Oh my soul (Ὤ μοι ἐγώ)!" What follows (5.411-423) is an explicit statement of the dilemma he presently faces: if he allows the waves to carry him to shore, he risks being smashed against the rocks ahead of him. However, if he swims on further in the hope of finding shelving beaches or harbors, he risks being carried back out to sea by a storm-wind or some god sending forth a

great sea creature to seal his fate. Before he can decide on a plan, a great wave catches him and drives him to land. He is thrown against the rocks.

In this scene, we can see that Odysseus' statement of his dilemma indicates that his self-persuasion is underway when the wave hits him and drives him into the rocks. However, before Odysseus can be explicit about his decision, his chance is removed by Homer. The decision is left hanging with no implicit course of action. Quite clearly, to assume that being smashed against the rocks by the waves is what Odysseus would have chosen to do after deliberating is to read too much into the text. While Odysseus deliberates about how to get onto the land ahead of him, he is obviously at the whim of Poseidon. Odysseus is swept away in an instant by Poseidon's wrath, which removes his opportunity to make a judgment about how best to reach land. Odysseus clearly does not act from his own motivation. This scene, where Odysseus is carried willy-nilly, is clearly in contrast with all the other scenes of incomplete deliberation where Odysseus does what he decides to do.

No inference can be made about what Odysseus might have done if Poseidon hadn't interfered. The only inference we can make is that if given the chance, Odysseus is likely to have reached a decision. We can infer this from the Leukothea scene immediately prior to this scene where Odysseus reaches a judgment after a process of weighing alternatives. Because Odysseus reached κρίσις in this earlier scene, we are not being unreasonable to think that he could have reached this moment of κρίσις again.

Furthermore, that Odysseus is not decisive at 5.408-423 is of little importance compared with the fact that he deliberated in the first place. That

he deliberates in the face of what he knows is a god's wrath[17] is much more significant than the fact that Poseidon eventually ends Odysseus' deliberation. It is this very point that cannot be overstated: Odysseus deliberates during a moment when he knows that Poseidon could turn his world upside down. Odysseus, in full awareness that he is subject to divine will, deliberates. While some critics might try to use this scene to establish the unpredictable nature of the Homeric person--always at the whim of the gods and definitely less free because of divine meddling, I believe this scene helps us to see that Odysseus' recognition of his own freedom is not diminished by the fact that Posiedon has put him in a compromising position. And in this way, this scene helps us to understand that Odysseus is aware of an art of self-persuasion. One who is familiar with this art knows his/her freedom, even in the face of dire constraints. One who is not so fully aware of an art of self-persuasion, does not know his/her own freedom. If Odysseus were such a person, unaware of an art of self-persuasion and the freedom this art presupposes, he would have just given himself over to the will of Poseidon. But by initiating deliberation he is resisting Poseidon's will and affirming his own freedom. This is more interesting than the fact that Poseidon's will erased the κρίσις of this particular deliberation. Even the incompleteness of this scene does not undermine the position that Odysseus is aware of an art of self-persuasion and his freedom to practice it.

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[17]At 5.423, after explicitly stating his dilemma, Odysseus states, "οἶδα γάρ, ὥς μοι ὀδώδυσται κλυτὸς ἐννοσίγαιος." (For I know that the glorious Earth-shaker is filled with wrath against me.")

Interrupted Deliberation

The above examination of Odysseus' many ponderings excludes one scene where Odysseus is said to μερμήριζειν. At 10.438-441, Odysseus deliberates whether to kill Eurylochus:

10.438-441 αὐτὰρ ἐγώ γε μετὰ φρεσὶ μερμήριξα,
σπασσάμενος τανύηκες ἄορ παχέος παρὰ μηροῦ,
τῷ οἱ ἀποπλήξας κεφαλὴν οὔδάσδε πελάσσαι,
καὶ πηῷ περ ἐόντι μάλα σχεδόν; (But I deliberated in mind, whether to draw my long sword from beside my stout thigh, and strike off his head, and bring it to the ground, though he is my own kinsman by marriage.)

While this scene begins as a scene of deliberation, it does not end that way. Instead of persuading himself against the impulse to kill Eurylochus, Odysseus is persuaded by his comrades: ἀλλά μ' ἑταῖροι μειλιχίοις ἐπεέσσιν ἐρήτυον ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος· (but my comrades one after another checked me with gentle words 10.441-442). The comrades speak in place of Odysseus' own voice. Because Odysseus is persuaded by external speakers (i.e. the comrades) this is not a scene of self-persuasion. But, that the speakers are externalized from the audience is the only difference between this scene of public persuasion and a typical scene of Odyssean self-persuasion. Both types of persuasion share purposive and formal qualities. In deliberative speech, whether public or private, a speaker addresses a future course of action, and an audience judges the appropriateness of that action. The only difference between these two types of persuasion is the position of the audience. In

scenes of self-persuasion, Odysseus becomes his own audience. In this scene with Eurylochus, Odysseus becomes audience to the persuasion of his comrades.

While the scene with Eurylochus does not tell us anything explicit about Odysseus' deliberation, it does help us to see the way in which deliberation and public persuasion are identified behaviors. In understanding the likeness between deliberation and public persuasion, we come closer to understanding the way in which deliberation, like persuasion, is a rhetorical art, a way of self-consciously using language to bring about a desired effect. For Odysseus, the desired effect in the majority of deliberation scenes is the resistance of temptation. This resistance must be brought about by persuasion since in most cases it does not come naturally nor is it brought about by force.[18] Odysseus must be persuaded to resist the temptation to act impulsively. He must either persuade himself or be persuaded by another. But regardless of who does the persuading, Odysseus must be persuaded to resist. The interchange-ability of the comrades voices' for Odysseus' own shows us the analogic relationship between public persuasion and self-persuasion, and how either one type of persuasion or another must be used to bring about Odysseus' resistance to temptation.

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[18]The obvious exception to this statement is the way Odysseus resists the song of the Sirens. He commands his comrades to use physical force to keep him from yielding to the temptation of the Sirens' song. His comrades bind and gag him, and when he fights the constraints, they bind him tighter. Odysseus resists the Sirens through force (βία) not μῆτις. His restraint is physical, not intellectual. But in all the other deliberation scenes, where Odysseus must resist various temptations that would compromise his return home, Odysseus resists through μῆτις. For an interesting commentary on Odysseus' character in the Sirens' scene, see Pietro Pucci, "The Song of the Sirens," Arethusa 12 (1979): 121-132.

Odysseus' Deliberate Deceits: Implicit Deliberation

So far, we have seen how Homer reveals various amounts of detail about Odysseus' deliberation. We have yet to consider those scenes where Homer reveals nothing about the deliberation that brings about a certain resistance. Odysseus' deliberate deceits are examples of Homer's complete silence about the inner workings of Odysseus' deliberation. But these deliberate deceits are as inextricably linked to Odysseus' μῆτις as the explicit scenes of deliberation. M.I. Finley states Odysseus' skill as the man of many devices often takes the form of deception and artful lies.[19] Odysseus tells lies about his identity to deceive Athene, Eumaios, Antinous and the other suitors, Penelope, and his own father Laertes.

In four of these five celebrated lies, Homer reveals nothing about the inner workings of Odysseus mind that allow the deliberate deceits to emerge. Only in Odysseus' deception of Laertes does Homer reveal Odysseus' deliberation. We know that Odysseus chooses to deceive Laertes after deliberating over how to approach his father. That Homer reveals some level of detail of the deliberation that precedes Odysseus' deception of his father is a sign that Odysseus' other deceptions are likewise the result of deliberate thought.

Odysseus employs each of his deceits in order to disguise his identity and insure his safe return to his kingdom. With each deceit, he resists the temptation to reveal his identity. Alvis explains that "His lying tales to

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[19]Finley, The World of Odysseus, 115.

Eumaius, the suitors, and Penelope are so constructed that they simultaneously conceal his identity and probe the loyalties, pieties, and intents of those whom Odysseus deceives."[20] Alvis attributes Odysseus' successful deceptions to his understanding of "the natures and capacities of those whom he deceives and because he considers not just immediate need but remote contingencies."[21] He lies so well on one occasion, when it is the goddess Athene herself whom he is attempting to deceive, that Athene rejoices and reveals herself to him. As Walcot describes, Athene "lavishes praise on her protégé, calling him the mortal equivalent of herself in deceit and subtleties."[22] Alvis argues that "Athena praises Odysseus' skill in deception because she appreciates practical adeptness whether it is exhibited in feats of war or in effective speech."

Despite Homer's silence about Odysseus' deliberation in four of the lies, a deliberate deceit can only be the result of deliberate thought. Odysseus' deliberate deceptions are quite clearly the result of self-persuasion. In order to secure his safe return and reestablishment of order in his kingdom, Odysseus must first persuade himself to resist the temptation of revealing his identity to the herdsman, Eumaios, the suitors, and Penelope. He must steel himself against the emotion of the moment and respond in a way that utterly contradicts his inner thoughts and feelings. He must say one thing while holding in his mind something else, a skill that Achilles loathes (Il.9.312-313). Then Odysseus must discern the particulars of his situation, the character and susceptibilities of those he wishes to deceive, and the potentially persuasive

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[20]Alvis 89.
[21]Alvis 89.
[22]Walcot 10.

deceptions that will safeguard his true identity and assist him in his attempts to reestablish his place in his kingdom. This resistance of temptation to act on impulse and this discernment of potentially persuasive deceptions, strikes me as a fundamentally rhetorical process.

Conclusion

Odysseus' μῆτις, as evident in his deliberation and his deliberate deceptions, reveals a rhetorical way of being. This way of being is informed by a process of self-persuasion. Odysseus displays his skill in this process and thus his mastery of an art when he consistently resists the temptations that arise as obstacles to his return home, when he successfully invents and judges alternative courses of action, and when he safeguards his return with deliberate deceptions. In using his μῆτις to deliberate, Odysseus avoids the determined life of one who is a victim to fate and change. Odysseus is never victim, but always agent. His agency is a result of his self-persuasion, his ability to use arguments upon himself to achieve the desired effect of resistance of temptation and judgment of appropriate courses of action. "Odysseus Polumetis" means "Master of Deliberation." And such a master has a superior knowledge of the arts of persuasion since deliberation is self-persuasion.

Chapter 5

PENELOPE'S DISGUISED DELIBERATION

Penelope makes her first appearance in the Odyssey when she hears, from her upper chamber, the bard singing of the difficult return of the Achaeans. Hearing this recitation, she comes down from her room and stands before the gathering of her suitors, her son, and the bard. She bursts into tears and speaks to the bard telling him to sing of something else since his current song is too woeful (1.328-344)

In response to her request, her son Telemachus speaks to her abruptly, telling her that the bard has a right to sing of whatever he pleases and that she should just endure and listen. Better yet, he says, she should return to her own room and her own work and should leave matters of speech to the men, especially him since his is the authority in the house. Penelope, shocked by her son's response, retreats to her room and cries herself to sleep.

Judging by this first scene, Penelope does not seem to have much freedom in her world. Her home is overrun by insolent suitors. Her own son shows little, if any, respect for her wishes. And in response to it all, she cries herself to sleep. Some critics have formed judgments about Penelope based on her behavior in this first scene and others like it, such as her scenes with Medon and Eurycleia over Telemachus' voyage (4.675-714, 721-741).[1]

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[1]See for example, William Woodhouse, The Composition of Homer's Odyssey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). Woodhouse names his tenth chapter, "Penelopeia's

Scenes such as these give license to critics to describe Penelope as passive and reactionary, helpless, victimized, and emotional. Eisenberger describes the normal condition of Penelope's mind as that of longing (Sehnsucht) and despair (Hoffnungslösigkeit)[2]. Gildersleeve's analysis of several of Penelope's speeches argues that her "feminine syntax" is characterized by irregularity and abruptness, which he implies is a reflection of her typically emotional responses.[3]

If Penelope is a passive victim, under the oppressive control of the suitors, her own son, and/or her feminine emotions, endowed with a mind characterized only by longing and despair, how does she manage to accomplish exactly what she wants, namely to stay married to Odysseus, await his return, and reign over his kingdom in his absence, all the while protecting the well-being of her son? Furthermore, if Penelope is helpless and victimized, how do we then account for her epithets, "περίφρων (thinking all-around, wise, prudent)," and "ἐχέφρων (having good sense,

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Collapse," and argues that Penelope acts without motive, without justification, and acts in ways that contradict her epithet, "περίφων." Also see Agathe Thornton, People and Themes in Homer's Odyssey, (Dunedin, University of Otago Press, 1970). Thornton argues for an obedient Penelope who follows her husband's parting words and submits to remarrying. For a commentary on the idea that Penelope's inability to make an end to the trouble in her household is the result of some feminine weakness, see Chris Emlyn-Jones, "The Reunion of Penelope and Odysseus," Greece & Rome 31 (1984): 1-18. See also Uvo Hölscher, "Penelope and the Suitors," (translation by Simon Richter) in Reading the Odyssey, ed. Seth L. Schein, trans. Simon Richter. Hölscher argues that while Penelope may have succeeded in deliberately thwarting the suitors with the trick of the shroud, her announcement of the contest of the bow is a sign of her helplessness. After being caught in her deceit, Penelope submits to the suitors with this contest. Hölscher describes Penelope as submissive, helplessly longing for that which cannot be and utterly constrained by the social expectation for her to remarry. As a final example of a disparaging portrayal of Penelope, see Samuel Butler, The Authoress of the Odyssey, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[2]H. Eisenberger, Studien zur Odyssee (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973) 271.

[3]B. L. Gildersleeve, review, "Pour mieux connaitre Homère," by M. Breal, American Journal of Philology 28 (1907): 209.

discreet)." Characterizations of Penelope as emotional victim fall into disrepute because they fail to answer these quite basic questions.

I will argue in this chapter that although Penelope faces oppression at the hands of her son, her suitors, and her social obligation to remarry[4], she remains free. Her freedom is manifest in her cunning and deliberate ways. When she tricks her suitors by unraveling Laertes' shroud after each day at her loom, when she tests Odysseus with questions about their bed, when she announces the contest of the bow, when she refuses to recognize Telemachus' impending adulthood, she shows her deliberate nature. Each of these acts is a deliberate act designed by Penelope to advance her own plan. These deliberate acts are rhetorical in that each presupposes a self-directed persuasion. We must persuade ourselves to act deliberately. One unacquainted with the art of self-persuasion acts only on impulse, or fails to act at all. This chapter proceeds under the assumption that self-persuasion is necessary for all deliberate, motivated, and intentional acts. To the extent that deliberate acts result from a self-directed rhetoric, and Penelope's acts are deliberate, Penelope's deliberate acts spring from a rhetorical source.

This chapter will attempt to explore the rhetoric of Penelope's deliberate acts. In the same way that Odysseus must deliberate and employ cunning means to secure his return home, Penelope must deliberate and employ cunning means to maintain order and stability in what has now

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[4]For the role and obligations of women in Homeric society, see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (New York: Schocken Books, 1975); James Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago: University of Cicago Press, 1975) 119-23. Both works suggest that the expectation in Homeric society for a woman in Penelope's position would be to remarry. However, both works suggest that while Penelope faced this constraint, she was not determined by it. She acted in the face of it to her own advantage.

become her kingdom.[5] The difference between the deliberation of Odysseus and Penelope is only that Homer reveals Odysseus' deliberation explicitly, but he hides Penelope's. Rather than tell us explicitly that Penelope deliberates and makes choices, Homer reveals Penelope's deliberation implicitly through her actions and her speeches. Her ways are subtle and ambiguous. She often appears as something other than what she is, or what we might expect her to be. She is a master of disguise as well as deliberation. For she must be a master of disguise, since she is a woman living in a man's world. This chapter will examine Penelope's deliberation as adumbrated by Homer and will explore the likely reasons for Homer's disguise of Penelope's deliberation.

This chapter will be organized around the various deliberation skills that Penelope demonstrates with the leading figures in her life: Telemachus, the suitors, and Odysseus. In her relationships with these people, she faces certain problems that demand resolution through the employment of deliberate acts, acts that she must persuade herself to make in order to foster her own well-being and the well-being of all she cares about. An examination of Penelope as she acts in response to Telemachus, the Suitors, and Odysseus, will help us to see her mastery of the deliberative art.

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[5]Sheila Murnaghan notes the reverse simile that marks Penelope's reunion with Odysseus in which her experiences at home are treated as comparable to his trials at sea (23.233-47). "Penelope's Agnoia: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in the Odyssey, Spec. issue of Helios, Rescuing Creusa: New Methodological Approaches to Women in Antiquity, ed. M. Skinner, 13.2 (1986): 103-115. Also see Helene P. Foley, "'Reverse Similes' and Sex Roles in the Odyssey," Arethusa v. 11 (1978): 7-26.

With Telemachus: Mother

Penelope's responses to her son can be organized into two categories: blind love and deliberate passivity. The contrast of these categories helps us to see a range of Penelope as mother, from impulsive to self-restrained.

Blind Love

Penelope's love for her son at times blinds her to the possibility of deliberation. As a result, she fails to see effective ways out of her problems with Telemachus. In blind love she yields to the emotion of the moment. She loses her self control. Her behavior is quite different from when she acts in a deliberately passive way with her son. Penelope's blind love is most evident in her response to the news that her son has sailed to Sparta and Pylos for news of his father, and that the suitors are plotting his death upon his return.

When Telemachus is making his plans to leave, he gives special instructions to Eurykleia to keep his trip a secret, especially from his mother. While he tells Eurykleia that his intention is to prevent his mother from weeping excessively and marring her beauty, he seems to do so under false pretense. That Telemachus cares so deeply about preventing his mother's tears seems unlikely given what we know about his current feelings for his mother. We know that Telemachus resents his mother's inability to bring an end to the chaos of their household (1.249-251). In his speech to Athene, Telemachus rambles on about all the grief and pain he must currently

endure. Included in this list is the inability of his mother to bring an end to the chaos in the household:

1.249-251 ἡ δ' οὔτ' ἀρνεῖται στυγερὸν γάμον οὔτε τελευτὴν
ποιῆσαι δύναται· τοὶ δὲ φθινύθουσιν ἔδοντες
οἶκον ἐμόν· τάχα δή με διαρραίσουσι καὶ αὐτόν.
(and she neither refuses the hateful marriage nor is she able to make an end. But they with feasting consume my house, and quickly indeed they will bring ruin to me.)

Furthermore, we know that Telemachus does not really care about his mother's feelings or her tears. In her first appearance in the Odyssey, when she speaks her mind before her son, the suitors, and the bard and instructs the bard to change his tune, her extreme sorrow is evident in her tears. Rather than jumping to his mother's aid to show his concern over her tears (and the damage they might do to her skin), Telemachus yells at her. He tells his mother to endure her suffering and go back to her room, for the bard can sing of anything he wishes. He shows little concern for her tears let alone her dignity.

Given what we know, Telemachus' instructions to Eurykleia seem suspicious. Rather than trying to spare his mother's tears, Telemachus is probably trying to prevent his mother from undermining his trip. Penelope herself says latter that if she had heard that he was considering this journey, he would only have been able to leave over her dead body (4.732-734). That Telemachus knew what his mother's reaction would be seems likely, and to avoid her interference he lies to Eurykleia about his intentions in keeping his

trip from his mother. It seems likely that he tells this lie because he knows Eurykleia will be persuaded by it. She does care for Penelope's feelings, and she does attempt to keep Penelope from crying. For example, at 4.750 Eurykleia, with comforting words, helps Penelope to stop her tears. Because she cares about Penelope and doesn't want to see her cry, Eurykleia is persuaded by Telemachus' reasoning. She vows to keep his trip a secret from Penelope.

Despite his attempts at secrecy, Telemachus is able only to delay the inevitable. Alas, Penelope hears the news of his trip, but not in time to prevent his departure. When the herald Medon overhears that Telemachus has left and that the suitors are planning to kill him upon his return, he goes to Penelope with the news. When she sees him, she expects to hear news of Odysseus' return, but instead hears that her son is now gone, and is in danger of being killed upon his return. Penelope's response to this news is severe:

4.703-5 Ὣς φάτο, τῆς δ' αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ,
δὴν δέ μιν ἀμφασίη ἐπέων λάβε; τὼ δέ οἱ ὄσσε
δακρυόφι πρλῆσθεν, θαλερὴ δέ οἱ ἔσχετο φωνή.
(So he said, and her knees were loosened and her
dear heart, and for a long time speechlessness held
her from words. And both her eyes were full of
tears, and the sound of her rich voice stopped.)

When she regains some strength she lashes out at Medon with questions that he cannot possibly answer:

4.707-710 ὀψὲ δὲ δή μιν ἔπεσσιν ἀμειβομένη προσέειπε·
"Κῆρυξ, τίπτε δέ μοι πάις οἴχεται; οὐδέ τί μιν χρεὼ

νηῶν ὠκυπόρων ἐπι βαινέμεν, αἵ θ' ἁλὸς ἵπποι
ἀνδράσι γίγνονται, περόωσι δὲ πουλὺν ἐφ' ὑγρήν.
ἦ ἵνα μηδ' ὄνομ' οὐτοῦ ἐν ἀνθρώποισι λίπηται;"
(But indeed at last, making an answer, she spoke these words to him. 'Herald, why is my son gone? He had no need to go on board swift ships, which serve men as horses of the deep, and cross over the wide waters of the sea. Is not even his name to be left among people?')

Penelope has responded by demanding to know from Medon why her son was making this trip, as if Medon could know Telemachus' motives. Furthermore, the tone of her response is scolding, as if Medon is somehow to blame for Telemachus wanting to take the trip: she tells Medon that Telemachus "had no need to embark on swift-traveling ships." Henry Johnstone has pointed out that Penelope's tactic here is a version of an "argument with the messenger." He describes this as the feminine version of the male brute killing the messenger. But whether these are gendered responses is beside the current point I am trying to make, namely that one who argues with the messenger does so from a lack of self-control. Penelope has lost her head. In arguing with Medon, Penelope accomplishes nothing by way of solving the problem she now faces, namely the deadly plot facing her son. Her love of her son and her fear over his death has rendered her helpless in the face of this problem. Rather than acting from a position of self-control, in a deliberate and calculated way, Penelope has yielded to the emotion of the moment and argued with the messenger.

Her emotional behavior continues when Medon leaves and the handmaidens flock around her to share her pain. The whole group is

weeping and wailing when Penelope finally speaks. She lashes out at the gods for taking both her husband and now her son (4.722-728). Then she lashes out at her handmaidens for not telling her of her son's trip (4.29-731). Worse yet, she instructs one of them to summon her servant Dolios to go to Laertes with the news about Telemachus. She hopes Laertes will plan a solution to the problem:

4.739-741 εἰ δή πού τινα κεῖνος ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ὑφήνας
ἐξελθὼν λαοῖσιν ὀδύρεται, οἳμεμάασιν
ὃν καὶ Ὀδυσσῆος φθῖσαι γόνον ἀντιθέοιο.
(if indeed haply that man, weaving cunning in his mind, may go forth and with weeping make his plea t the people, the ones who are minded to destroy the child of godlike Odysseus.)

Penelope's request overlooks the fact that Laertes can be of no help. He has dropped out of society in his grief over his own son Odysseus and has no power among the people or the suitors. At 4.754, Eurykleia points out the inappropriateness of troubling a troubled man (μηδὲ γέροντα κάκου κεκακωμένον). If Penelope were able to think through her request for Laertes to save the day, perhaps she too would realize the ineffectiveness of this plan, as Eurykleia does. But Penelope is unable to see the uselessness of her own request; she is after all blinded by her love for her son.

Perhaps the plainest evidence that Penelope is being overcome by her love of her son comes toward the end of Book 4. Penelope, in her upper chamber tasting neither food nor drink, ponders whether her stately son will escape from dying or have to die at the hands of the insolent suitors (4.787-

790). Homer compares her pondering to that of a trapped and threatened lion who turns about in fear.

4.787-793 Ἡ δ' ὑπερῳίῳ αὖθι περίφρων Πηνελόπεια
κεῖτ' ἄρ' ἄσιτος, ἄπαστος ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος,
ὁρμαίνουσ' ἤ οἱ θάνατον φύγοι υἱὸς ἀμύμων,
ἦ ὅ γ ὑπὸ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι δαμείη.
ὅσσα δὲ μερμήριξε λέων ἀνδρῶν ἐν ὁμίλῳ
δείσας, ὁππότε μιν δόλιον περὶ κύκλον ἄηωσι,
τόσσα μιν ὁρμαίνουσαν ἐπήλυθε νήδυμος ὕπνος·
(But in her upper chamber there wise Penelope
lay without partaking of food or drink,
pondering whether her strong son would escape
death or whether he would be overcome by the
overbearing suitors. As a lion is afraid in an
assembly of men, pondering, as they draw the
stealthy circle around him, so she was pondering
when sweet sleep came upon her.)

This comparison of human pondering to that of an animal is a rare occurrence in the Homeric epics. Verbs of pondering such as "ὁρμαίνω" and "μερημρίζω" have a broad semantic range, meaning anything from "to be anxious", to "to deliberate alternatives." While this range can be documented, more often than not when a Homeric character is said to "ponder", verbs such as "ὁρμαίνω" and "μερμηρίζω" signify a purposive, human moment of deliberation. These moments of deliberation usually begin with a character's recognition of a problem along with potential

alternative courses of action. These moments of deliberation usually end in action.[6]

When Homer compares Penelope's pondering to that of a cornered lion, turning in fear, we know that Penelope's pondering is not on the "deliberate" end of the "ὁρμαίνω/μερμηρίζω" semantic continuum. In this scene, to say that Penelope "ὁρμαίνει" her son's death is to say that she turns the outcome over in her mind, that she is anxious or worried about this outcome. In this scene, Penelope's deliberation is not purposive in the same way as other more typical scenes of Homeric deliberation are. She does not deliberate particular courses of action that she might take. Rather, she worries about a particular outcome, and her mind turns in fear. As a besieged lion turns in fear of his death, Penelope's mind turns in fear of her son's death. This quality of the mind--"turning"--is included in the semantic range of deliberation verbs in Homeric Greek; it is the other end of the continuum.

Before leaving this lion simile, I must make a qualification. Although the lion simile tells us that Penelope's deliberation in this scene is best characterized as an anxiety or fear over a particular outcome, the use of the lion in the simile has additional significance. As Helene Foley interprets the lion simile, "Lion images are typically reserved for heroic men. In the disrupted Ithaca of the early books of the Odyssey Penelope, far from being the passive figure of most Homeric criticism, has come remarkably close to

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[6]Take for example the following four scenes of Odysseus's deliberation (μερμηρίζω) in the Odyssey. In his deliberations over Leukothea's advice (5.354-364), over how to approach Nausicaa (6.141-148), over whether to kill Iros (18.90-94), over whether to kill his handmaidens (20.9.21), each step of Odysseus' deliberation s are displayed. In each, he recognizes his problem, and his mind is divided into two alternative courses of action. He chooses one course of action and presents a reason for this choice. His deliberation is purposive, directed toward determining the proper course of action to take in response to a problematic situation.

enacting the role of a besieged warrior."[7] Another scholar, A.J. Podlecki, notes that this lion simile identifies Penelope with Odysseus. Elsewhere in the poem, lion similes are used only of Odysseus, with one exception of the Cyclops (9.292-3).[8] To liken Penelope to a lion/warrior/Odysseus is to affirm Penelope's general character as a woman of cunning intelligence. It just so happens though that the particulars of her situation, namely the news of her son's impending death, ensnare the lion/warrior/Odysseus within her. Being under siege in this way allows Penelope only to turn over anxiously in her mind the potential outcome of her son's death. But, because Penelope is a lion/warrior/Odysseus, we can count on her eventually to make a move. And Homer tells us that she does indeed make her move only a short time later. Homer tells us:

16.409-412 Ἡ δ' αὖτ' ἄλλ' ἐνόησε περίφρων Πηνελόπεια,
μνήστηρεσσι φανῆναι ὑπέρβιον ὕβριν ἔχουσι·
πεύθετο γὰρ οὗ παιδὸς ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ὄλεθρον·
κῆρυξ γάρ οἱ ἔειπε Μέδων, ὃς ἐπεύθετο βουλάς.
(But now circumspect Penelope thought of
something else, to show herself to her suitors
who have overbearing hubris; for she had
heard that her son faces destruction in the house;
From the herald Medon, she heard of their
planning.)

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[7]Foley 10.
[8]A.J. Podlecki, "Some Odyssean Similes," Greece and Rome 18 (1971), 84.

With this move, Penelope enacts a plan (ἄλλ' ἐνόησες περίφρων Πηνελόπεια). Her incapacitation was only momentary, and only brought about by her love of her only child.

All this evidence points to one conclusion: when Penelope is blinded by her love of her son, she loses her head. She fails to maintain her self-control, and she yields to the emotion of the moment. But who can blame her? To discredit her for this behavior would be to condemn perhaps one of the most expected reactions of any parent to the news of the possible death of a son or daughter. Homer presents her as overwhelmed and no other presentation would be as psychologically plausible. Penelope is not deliberate during this time, nor should we expect her to be.

Deliberate Passivity

When her situation with Telemachus is not life or death, Penelope's behavior is less erratic. In fact, during these times, her responses to her situation with her son seem quite deliberate. This is particularly evident in the nightingale simile used by Penelope in a speech to the stranger Odysseus (19.515-524). Penelope compares her feelings to the mourning of the mother nightingale who thoughtlessly killed her son. While Penelope has not killed her son, she uses the comparison to express her angst over the idea that she jeopardizes her son's life by remaining deliberately passive about her suitors' urgency for her to choose a new husband from among them. She must make a move, or risk the fate of the nightingale, and thoughtlessly kill her own son. This simile makes clear that Penelope's primary concern is to keep

Telemachus from meeting the same fate as the nightingale's son. She wants to protect Telemachus, not inadvertently kill him. To avoid this consequence of being deliberately passive, she chooses to become deliberately active.

The simile alone does not necessarily show that Penelope was being deliberate about her situation with Telemachus. But what follows afterward does. Penelope tells of her dilemma: should she stay in her house by her son and keep all in order or go away at last with the best of all the suitors (19.525: ' ὣς καὶ ἐμοὶ δίχα θυμὸς ὀρώρεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, ἠε μένω παρὰ παιδὶ καὶ ἔμπεδα πάντα φυλάσσω: 19.528: ἢ ἤδη ἅμ' ἕπωμαι Ἀχαιῶν ὅς τις ἄριστος.)

Her choice is to hold a bride-contest among the suitors. She will choose to marry whoever can string Odysseus' bow, a seemingly impossible task in itself, and shoot an arrow through 12 axes. Discussions of Penelope's famed bride-contest usually fall into one of two categories. The first sees Penelope's contest as an earnest announcement of her decision to remarry.[9] The second sees Penelope's contest as a trick, similar to her trick of Laertes' shroud.[10] As a trick, the contest becomes another delaying tactic for Penelope to hold off the moment of crisis where she might be forced to remarry.

While both sides present compelling arguments, my argument holds regardless which perspective we adopt. If it is an honest decision, Penelope has yielded to the pressure of the suitors. Her yielding requires a self-directed rhetoric, which Homer reveals, at least in part, to us (19.525-529). She must deliberate which path to choose as a means to securing the well-being of her

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[9]See for example, Hölscher, and Sheila Murnaghan, Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987): 118-147.

[10]See for example Patricia Marquardt, "Penelope Πολύτροπος," American Journal of Philology (106): 32-48;

son. If Penelope's announcement is in earnest, then she is choosing to marry one of the suitors and in making this choice she is being quite deliberate.

If Penelope's contest is a trick then we see Penelope's deliberate deceit. She means to stay in the palace with her son and keep all in order, but must convince the suitors that she chooses otherwise, namely to marry one of them. To convince them she holds a contest that the suitors are nearly guaranteed to lose. The delaying tactic of the contest will work to appease the suitors, distract their attention from Telemachus, and buy Penelope more time. Such deceit can only come from deliberation about how to treat others as objects.

Whether it is a true decision or a deliberate deceit, Penelope's bride-contest is a deliberate means of securing her son's well-being. But in addition to her son, she protects her own well-being. If the contest is a trick, Penelope has acted to protect herself from having to enter into hated marriage. If the contest is a true decision, then Penelope has acted to protect herself from the fate of the mother nightingale, forever singing of her mournful murder of her only son. In yielding to the marriage and securing her son's safety, Penelope protects her own emotional and psychological well-being. She will not have to live as the sorrowful mother nightingale does. As Felson-Rubin describes it, "This scene shows Penelope deliberating, considering her options, previewing events so as to take the safest pathway and avoid the irreversible outcome of the mother nightingale."[11] In regard to her son Telemachus and the threat of his well-being, Penelope is being quite deliberate about her options.

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[11]Nancy Felson-Rubin, Regarding Penelope: From Character to Poetics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 31.

In addition to the nightingale scene, two other scenes in particular demonstrate qualities of Penelope's deliberative art. These scenes show Penelope's self-controlled and deliberate character, or better yet her "deliberately passive" character.[12]

On two occasions, Telemachus, in amateurish displays of his manhood, tells Penelope to quit interfering in matters that belong to men. On the first occasion, which has already been mentioned, Penelope enters the gathering of the suitors and her son and tells the bard to sing of something else than the woes of the Achaeans. For Penelope, and probably for the suitors as well, Telemachus' response is shocking:

1.353-359 σοὶ δ' ἐπιτολμάτω κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀκούειν·
οὐ γὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς οἶος ἀπώλεσε νόστιμον ἦμαρ
ἐν Τροίῃ, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι φῶτες ὄλοντο.
ἀλλ' εἰς οἶκον ἰοῦσα τὰ σ' αὑτῆς ἔργα κόμιζε,
ἱστόν τ' ἠλακάτην τε, καὶ ἀμφιπόλοισι κέλευε
ἔργον ἐποίχεσθαι· μῦθος δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει
πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ' ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ. (You let your heart and soul endure to listen for not Odysseus alone lost the day of his return in Troy, but also many other men perished. No, go into the house and tend to your own work, the loom and the distaff, and order your handmaidens to busy themselves with work, and let

[12]This interpretation of Penelope is quite evident in Anne Amory, "The Reunion of Odysseus and Penelope," Essays on the Odyssey, ed. Charles H. Taylor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963). Foley coins the phrase "deliberate passivity."

speech be of concern to all the men, and most of all to me. For my authority is in the house.)

On the second occasion, during the contest of the bow, Penelope tries to persuade the suitors to give the beggar a chance. Again, Telemachus' response is abrupt. In a nearly identical speech, but with a bit more detail, Telemachus tells Penelope that no Achaian has more authority over the bow that he does, and that he will be the one to decide whether to give or withhold the bow from the beggar. And he will do this at his own pleasure. Telemachus then tells his mother, in the same way he told her before, to go back into the house, take up her weaving, and the men shall have the bow in their keeping, all men, but most of all him, since his is the authority in the house (1.344-353).

On both occasions, Telemachus' rudeness is nothing more than a display of his newfound manhood. We know from his references to his mother throughout the poem that he is frustrated with what he sees as her inability to resolve the strife in their household (1.249-251; 16.126-128) As he enters adulthood, his disrespect for his mother takes on an explicit form. He expresses his disrespect to her face in public gatherings. This is Telemachus' way of saying, "Mother, I have come of age." Of course, more mature and respectful ways exist to display one's development into adulthood to one's parents, but these are not Telemachus' ways.

Penelope's response on both occasions is expressed with the same Homeric formula:

1.360-364 & Ἡ μὲν θαμβήσασα πάλιν οἰκόνδε βεβήκει·

21.354-358 παιδὸς γὰρ μῦθον πεπνυμένον ἔνθετο θυμῷ.

ἐς δ' ὑπερῷ' ἀναβᾶσα σὺν ἀμφιπόλοισι γυναιξὶ
κλαῖεν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆα, φίλον πόσιν, ὄφρα οἱ ὕπνον
ἡδὺν ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι βάλε γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη.
(And being amazed, she went back into the house
She put into her heart the shrewd words of her child.
And in her upper chamber with her attendant women,
she wept for Odysseus, her dear husband, until bright-eyed
Athene shed sweet sleep over her eyelids.)

In both scenes Penelope is amazed by her son's responses. In both scenes, too, Penelope, without saying a word, returns to her room. On both occasions, after leaving the scene, Penelope takes to heart her son's serious words and calls to mind her husband Odysseus. And on both occasions, she cries until Athene sheds sleep over her eyes.

From this description of Penelope's behavior, we might quickly conclude that she once again fails to act deliberately. We might conclude that she succumbs to the boorish commands of her son, returns to her bedchamber, and cries herself to sleep. But Helene Foley notes, "critics put too much emphasis on Penelope's constant weeping. Odysseus, Menelaus, and Telemachus weep frequently also, but weeping prevents none of them, or Penelope, from acting wherever possible."[13]

In agreement with Foley, I believe that a blanket critique of Penelope as passive raises several problems. And particular problems arise when we try to impose such an interpretation on these two scenes in question. If Penelope were merely a passive victim to her son's harassment, wouldn't she have

[13]Foley 23 f.9.

made some affirmative response to him? Perhaps she would have said to Telemachus something like, "Yes, dear son. I'll obey you since yours is the authority in this household." Or if Penelope were simply overcome by emotion, capable only of tears, wouldn't she have shown some immediate sign of this? Perhaps she might have burst into tears on the spot from her shock over her son's tone and her frustration over being stripped of all her power by his commands. Or perhaps she would have responded in an expression of anger, telling Telemachus how rude he actually is. We know that Penelope is indeed capable of telling her son, in an open gathering, that his behavior is intolerable. She tells him at 18.214-225 that he acts like a child despite the fact that he has come to the measure of maturity, and that he should be ashamed at his failure to protect the stranger from mistreatment by the suitors. And we know that she is indeed capable of expressing her anger in the heat of the moment because of her response to Medon when he tells her of her son's trip and because of her response to her handmaidens when she blames then for keeping Telemachus' trip a secret.

But Penelope does none of these things. Instead, she steels herself against the emotion of the moment, and without a word leaves the scene. In this way, Penelope acts deliberately. She resists the emotion of the moment, and she waits until she reaches the privacy of her bedchamber. When she silently leaves the gathering, she resists any impulse to lash out at the disrespect of her son's words, which would not be altogether out of place considering Telemachus' rudeness. Furthermore she resists what would have been a truly passive response, where in a speech to this effect, she would have affirmed the right of her son to put such restrictions on her freedom. In

short, she resists any response in the heat of the moment, and waits until she reaches her bedchamber to express her pain.

Penelope's resistance is a sign of her deliberative nature. Resisting temptation and fighting impulse involve self-persuasion. When we resist, we must persuade ourselves to act in ways that deny our most base instincts. Resisting temptation requires a self-directed persuasion. When we walk away from a fight or keep our composure in the face of an insult or a threat, we do so because we persuade ourselves to do so. Penelope adopts a deliberately passive response to her son's insults.

Penelope's deliberate passivity is a result of self-persuasion in much the same way as Odysseus'. This similarity between Penelope and Odysseus is not at all surprising since we know from earlier in the poem that their relationship is characterized by ὁμοφροσύνε or like-mindedness, the foundation of all good relationships (6.181, 15.198). Homer explicitly shows Odysseus' deliberate passivity on at least two different occasions: first when he initially chooses not to slay the Cyclops (9.299-306) and second when he chooses not to slay the sluttish handmaidens (20.9-21). Both times, in the face of a highly emotional moment, Odysseus responds in a deliberately passive way. In other words, on purpose, he does nothing. He chooses to suffer through the emotion of the moment, expressing no public sign of his suffering.

Penelope's response to Telemachus seems very similar to Odysseus' responses to the Cyclops and his handmaidens. When Telemachus barks at her, Penelope, despite her shock and her emotional upset, walks away from his insult. Just as Odysseus walks away from the insult of the handmaidens,

Penelope walks away from the insult of her own son. Penelope and Odysseus share this quality of self-restraint. She, like Odysseus, acts out of self-restraint and prudence, both of which are deliberate stances. These deliberate acts presuppose a self-directed persuasion.

Yet one important difference exists between the rhetoric of Penelope's deliberation in these scenes with Telemachus and that of her husband's in the scenes with the Cyclops and the handmaidens: Penelope's rhetoric is not spelled out in the text. Whereas Homer provides an explicit account of the self-directed rhetoric that persuaded Odysseus to restrain himself in the face of the threat of the Cyclops and the insult of the handmaidens, he does not do the same for Penelope. In the first instance (9.299-306), when Odysseus tells the Phaecians of his adventure with the Cyclops Polyphemos, he details his inner thoughts, his self-persuasion. He says that he formed a plan in his heart and drew his sharp sword to strike Polyphemos. But in the heat of the moment, Odysseus reports, a second thought checked him, for right there they too would have died since no one would have been able to remove the boulder from the cave's entrance. Then he and his comrades waited through the night. In the second instance (20.9-21), Odysseus spies on his sluttish handmaidens and ponders much (20.10, πολλὰ δ' μερμήριζε κατὰ φρὲνα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν), whether to spring on them and kill each one, or rather to let them lie this one last time with the suitors. As I explained in Chapter 4, this deliberation scene is explicit and complete.

Homer does not tell us of the inner workings of Penelope's mind in these scenes with Telemachus, or elsewhere in the poem[14]. He gives no insight into how Penelope resists responding to her son's insults. We only know that she does resist. While this silence is curious, we should not always expect Homer to be so explicit about the inner workings of human decision-making. Homer is, as I have said before, a poet of action not of thought. Anne Amory makes this very point in her analysis of Penelope.[15] She points out that sometimes, the poet cannot pause for a detailed explanation of Penelope's state of mind. Amory implies that in leaving out these details, the poet can't possibly want his audience to understand Penelope as unthoughtful, empty-headed, or as Amory puts it, living in a "perpetual daze of bewilderment about everything."[16]

That these details about Penelope's thought are missing need only imply that some kind of poetic constraint, either the swiftness of the action or the demands of the plot, prevented Homer from elaborating them, For example, the first time Telemachus tells Penelope to quit interfering, the plot demands all attention to be directed toward Telemachus, and his call for an assembly, the first in 20 years. This scene is his, and the poet doesn't have time for Penelope. The second time Telemachus tells Penelope to quit interfering, the plot demands all attention to the contest of the bow. The swiftness of that action will not allow Homer to expatiate on how Penelope restrains herself. Neither occasion affords Homer the luxury of detailing the

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[14]I say this knowing of one exception (19.524-534) where Penelope displays her deliberation for the stranger Odysseus to see. But even in this instance, she does not display all of her steps, just enough for Odysseus to understand the sketch of her dilemma.

[15]Amory 113.

[16]Amory 104.

inner workings of Penelope's self-restraint. It is enough for him to tell us simply that she did indeed restrain herself, at least until she had reached the privacy of her bed-chamber.

Perhaps a more pressing demand of the plot might be Penelope's own constraints as a woman acting within a man's world. A woman's way in the Odyssey is quite different from a man's, though equally effective. Take for example Circe's going-away gift to Odysseus (10.570-574). While Odysseus and his men are not looking, Circe stores one black ram and one ewe on their ship, as well as sweet wine and food. This is typical of womanly behavior in the Homeric poems; a man would have announced the gifts and made a public presentation of them to his departing guest, as Menelaus does with Telemachus (4.587-592) and as Alcinous does with Odysseus (13.4-25). Like Circe, a woman even though a goddess, Penelope works in secret. Her ways are not public ways. Odysseus on the other hand is a public actor, so much so that even the inner workings of his mind are made public. Homer displays Odysseus in a way that he cannot display Penelope. To display the workings of Penelope's mind would be to violate the modesty expected of her; she is after all regarded as the antithesis to brazen queens like Helen and Clytemnestra.[17] When Homer veils Penelope (1.334, 16.416, 21.65), he hides not only her physical attributes, but the workings of her intellect as well.

This need not be seen as detracting from Penelope's character. After all, the dancer is best when she doesn't demonstrate her steps. Because Penelope hides her steps, her technique is more imperceptible than Odysseus'.

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[17]For the opposition between Penelope and Clytemnestra, see Agamemnon's speech from the underworld, 24.192-202. For comment on Penelope and Helen see 11.435-461. For an extended commentary on Penelope as opposed to these two other queens, see Marilyn Katz, Penelope's Renown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.) 48-54, 80, 119-120, 185.

Compared to Penelope, Odysseus might even seem awkward when he reveals his technique. Odysseus tries to Macarena to Penelope's gliding waltz. If Telemachus had spoken rudely to Odysseus, rather than to Penelope, the scene would have been very different. Probably, Homer would tell us that Odysseus' mind was torn asunder (μερμήριζε κατὰ φρὲνα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν) and that he deliberated two ways: whether to lash out as his son's disrespect or wait for a more appropriate time and response. Homer might then tell us that Odysseus chooses to wait since waiting might allow for a more deliberate response to his son. But Odysseus is not Telemachus' audience. Penelope is. And she simply walks away. Homer shows none of the mental steps that Penelope had to take to allow her to act in such a deliberate way. Her deliberateness takes on a much more dramatic, if not ambiguous, aspect than what we might expect from Odysseus.

Whatever the reason for Homer's silence about Penelope's deliberation as manifest in her self-restraint in reaction to Telemachus' insult, the silence does not undermine the argument that a self-directed rhetoric was necessary for Penelope to walk deliberately away from a highly emotional moment and a potentially damaging scene. We do not need an explicit account of this self-persuasion in order for us to know it exists. Self-persuasion proceeds hand in hand with deliberate action. The two presuppose one another. This seems to be what some might call, "a commonplace of human experience."

With The Suitors: Bride-Prize

With Telemachus, Penelope shows a range of reactions, from impulsive to deliberately passive. With her suitors, Penelope shows her mastery of deliberation. This section will examine Penelope's deliberative art in her relations with the suitors, who treat her only as an object: their Bride-Prize. While the suitors might hope to get a loyal and lovely wife, and her royal possessions, they get more than they bargained for in Penelope. Two plots guide Penelope's scene with the suitors: the trick of Laertes' shroud and the contest of the bow. In each of these plots, we see Penelope's deliberative art.

The Trick of Laertes' Shroud

The suitors themselves know all too well of Penelope's cunning. Amphimedon, in the underworld, attributes his and his fellow suitors' demise to Penelope's devising:

24.126-128 ἡ δ' οὔτ' ἠρωεῖτο στυγερὸν γάμον οὔτ' ἐτελεύτα,
ἡμῖν φραζομένη θάνατον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν,
ἀλλὰ δόλον τόνδ' ἄλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμήριξε·
(She would neither refuse the hateful marriage nor bring it about, but she was planning death and black destruction for us, with this other trick she was deliberating in her mind.)

He then provides the details of the stratagem that Penelope had devised, namely the trick of weaving Laertes' shroud. She tells the suitors that since Odysseus has perished, she will marry one of them, but only after weaving a shroud for Laertes. So weaving by day and unraveling by night, Penelope keeps her suitors convinced for over three years that she will indeed marry one of them, as soon as she finishes weaving. But Penelope is never finished weaving. Only in the fourth year, when one of Penelope's handmaiden's tells the suitors of Penelope's trick, do the suitors become aware of her deceit.

The suitors would appear to be a bunch of dolts, being so easily duped for such a long time, if it were not for our knowledge of Penelope's role in keeping them at bay. We are told by Antinous that she sends secret messages to each man, promising many things, and in this way she persuades the Achaians to wait (2.89-932). But all the while, Antinous tells us, she devises other plans in her mind (νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοινᾶ. ἡ δὲ δόλον τόνδ' ἄλλον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμήριξε, 2.92-93). Imagine what kinds of speeches Penelope would have to have devised in order to keep her suitors at bay for nearly four years. Considering the monumental nature of this rhetorical task, Antinous seems justified in proclaiming that Penelope demonstrates "cunning beyond all others" (ἥ τοι πέρι κέρδεα οἶδεν, 2.88). Penelope's cunning intelligence allows her to deceive the suitors, not once, but over and over again for several years. Such deliberate deceit can result only from deliberation.

The Contest of the Bow

Penelope's deliberate nature with the suitors is also evident in the contest of the bow. She announces her contest to the "beggar" Odysseus. She tells him that Odysseus used to set up twelve axes in a row, stand far off, and send an arrow through them. She tells the beggar she will set up such a contest before her suitors tomorrow, and whoever successfully strings Odysseus' bow and shoots through the axes will win her for a prize (19.572-579). The beggar Odysseus encourages her to do as she says, reassuring her that before the suitors can string the bow and send an arrow through the axes, Odysseus will have returned. Penelope holds the contest the next day, as she said she would (21.67-79).

Some critics argue that the contest of the bow is an honest move on Penelope's part, involving no cunning. Other critics argue that the contest is indeed a trick, like her trick of Laertes' shroud. Both sides have equally convincing arguments, though I am inclined to support the idea that the contest is another deliberate deceit on Penelope's part. But after reviewing each of the sides, we will understand that whichever side we prefer, demonstrates qualities of Penelope's deliberation.

Insofar as this contest is an earnest announcement of Penelope's decision to remarry, it is used by critics to show that Penelope eventually yields to the marriage. As Uvo Hölscher argues, Penelope ceases waiting and resisting when her deceit of Laertes' shroud is uncovered.[18] He reasons that Penelope recognizes that the time has indeed arrived when she must

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[18]Uvo Hölscher, "Penelope and the Suitors," trans., by Simon Richter, Readings in the Odyssey, ed. Seth Schein, 133-140.

remarry. She is able to discern this proper time because she remembers Odysseus' last words to her. To Eurymachos and the other suitors, Penelope tells of Odysseus' parting speech. He had told her that if he were not to return from Troy, she should be in charge of everything. But when Telemachus is grown and bearded, then she may marry whomever she pleases, forsaking her household (18.257-73).

Penelope gives this report in a speech to the suitors. Hölscher takes her seriously, despite the fact that it seems highly unlikely that Odysseus, a warrior leaving for battle, would make such a speech to his wife, the mother of his newborn child. Rather, as Wilamowitz has pointed out about Penelope's account of Odysseus' speech, "Whoever takes it seriously, steps into the same trap as the Suitors . . . would a hero, departing for war, talk about the fact that war is fatally dangerous? He would rather say, 'wipe your tears, not every bullet hits home.'"[19]

Hölscher disregards the possibility that Odysseus never made any such speech to Penelope and argues instead that, considering the whole scene, nothing indicates that Penelope is deliberately planning to deceive the Suitors. Hölscher admits that Odysseus' reaction to hearing of Penelope's contest tells us that he is pleased because she beguiled gifts out of the suitors and enchanted their spirits with blandishing words, <u>while her own mind had other intentions</u> (18.281-83). But Hölscher questions what these "other intentions" are. Some critics might argue that this phrase means Penelope is planning something different in her mind, as she did when she wove by day and unraveled by night the shroud of Laertes. Hölscher is not one of these

[19]As cited in Hölscher 134.

critics. He argues that the word "intend" (μενοινάω) does not mean "to be up to something else," but "to long passionately for something else."[20] Penelope longs for postponement and for Odysseus' return. Hölscher argues that the "other intentions" she has in mind are not a secret plan, they are the feelings in her heart. Hölscher concludes that the happiness of Odysseus cannot be connected with Penelope's not being in earnest in her decision to remarry. Odysseus could not have known that Penelope was not serious. After all, notes Hölscher, she will tell him, as the still disguised beggar, just a few hours later, about her decision to marry and her intention to hold the contest to determine her final choice (19.570-81).[21]

Hölscher also points to Telemachus' adulthood as a way to prove that Penelope is earnest in her decision to remarry the winner of the contest. Hölscher cites the various passages in which Telemachus' manhood is affirmed, including Athene's reference to his adulthood (1.296-7, 301-2), and Telemachus' own announcement of his power in the household to both Penelope and to the suitors (1.381-82; 383; 386-88; 390-91; 397-98), Eurynome's announcement of Telemachus' coming of age to Penelope (18-175-76), and the like. Hölscher concludes that from these various testimonies of Telemachus' adulthood and Telemachus' own announcement of his power in the household, Penelope must have recognized her son's maturity. In Hölscher's view, Penelope knows that Telemachus has come of age, and in loyal

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[20]On this point, Hölscher's argument seems particularly weak. The word "μενοινάω" is similar to "μερμηρίζω" in its semantic range. "Μενοινάω" can mean anything from "to wish, desire or long for," to "to design, purpose, plan, be minded to do something." Hölscher fails to acknowledge this range, and the potential for "μενοινάω" in this passage to mean "to be up to something." Without making a case for removing the intentionality from Penelope's "other intentions", Hölscher's case seems suspect.

[21]Hölscher believes here as well that Penelope's speech to the beggar was in earnest.

obedience to her husband's departing words, she must now remarry. The contest of the bow is her earnest announcement of her decision to remarry.

Other critics disagree with this characterization of Penelope's motives in announcing the contest. These critics believe that the contest is indeed another trick, in the same tradition as the trick of Laertes' shroud. Insofar as this contest is understood as a deliberate deceit, it is used by critics to affirm Penelope's cunning. Patricia Marquardt states, "Although Penelope's emotional resources are exhausted, her intelligence prevails. The proposal of the contest of the bow . . . is another example of her cunning."[22] Marquardt describes the contest as a final attempt to put off the suitors forever: "Only Odysseus, who is never coming home, can string the bow. Let the suitors try and, defeated, abandon their suit. If Odysseus really is coming home, so much the better. The contest will, at the very least, buy her more time."[23]

As evidence for this interpretation, Marquardt cites Penelope's unusual animation in this scene (e.g., 19.325-28). She implies that Penelope's unexpected laugh could only be the result of her pleasure in devising yet another deliberate deceit of the suitors. As additional evidence, Marquardt cites Penelope's recognition of the urgency to act in light of her knowledge of the plot against Telemachus. And Marquardt points out that the assurances of Odysseus' imminent arrival from Theoclymenus and the beggar have given her the courage to make a move. Marquardt's interpretation seems to affirm the point I made earlier about the poet's comparison of Penelope to a lion. Like a lion/warrior/Odysseus, Penelope will make her move, despite the fact that she is under siege. It would seem very strange indeed if a

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[22]Marquardt 41.
[23]Marquardt 41.

cornered lion simply allowed his hunters to move in for the kill without a fight, just as strange as if Penelope, faced with the urgency of the plot against her own son, had done nothing to undermine the suitors threat to the well-being of her and her son.

My purpose is not necessarily to pick sides in this debate, despite the fact that I think Penelope's contest is a trick, because whether the contest is a trick or is earnest, we can affirm Penelope's self-directed rhetoric in either case. To demonstrate this rhetoric is my primary purpose. And clearly, from whichever side we view Penelope and her contest, we can affirm that she acts deliberately. If the contest is an act of cunning, we have signs of Penelope's internal rhetoric, the same signs that we see in her trick of Laertes' shroud. And the same signs that we see in Odysseus' many deliberate deceits. But we need not see the contest of the bow as a trick or an act of cunning in order to affirm Penelope's deliberate nature. If the contest is in earnest, as Hölscher and others believe, Penelope must have presented an argument to herself to allow her to make such a decision. For Penelope to decide to hold the contest would require her to yield to the pressure of the suitors. Yielding, like resisting, requires a self-directed rhetoric. Penelope is not just overcome by an urge, or an overwhelming impulse to announce the contest. She has to be persuaded to do so, and not from the outside, but the inside. She herself has to be rhetor and audience in order to yield to the suitors after resisting for nearly four years.

If we wanted to see Penelope and her contest as Hölscher does, we would not have to look very hard to see the argument that Penelope uses on herself in order to yield to a hated marriage. Penelope, in a rare moment,

tells us herself that her mind is divided in two ways. She says to Odysseus, who is still disguised as a beggar:

19.524-529 ὣς καὶ ἐμοὶ δίχα θυμὸς ὀρώρεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,
ἠὲ μένω παρὰ παιδὶ καὶ ἔμπεδα πάντα φυλάσσω,
κτῆσιν ἐμήην, δμῳάς τε καὶ ὑψερεφὲς μέγα δῶμα,
εὐνήν τ' αἰδομένη πόσιος δῆμοιό τε φῆμιν,
ἦ ἤδη ἅμ' ἕπωμαι Ἀχαιῶν ὅς τις ἄριστος
μνᾶται ἐνὶ μεγάροισι, πορὼν ἀπερείσια ἕδνα
(So my divided mind starts out one way and then the other, should I stay here by my son and keep all in order, my property, my serving maids, and my great high-roofed house, keep faith with my husband's bed and regard the voice of the people, or go away at last with the best of all those Achaians who court me here in the palace, with endless gifts to win me?)

If Hölscher is right and Penelope has announced the contest in earnest, then she has clearly made the decision to adopt the latter alternative, to marry one of the suitors and forsake her home. Penelope even tells us a potential reason why she would adopt this alternative:

19.530-534 παῖς δ' ἐμὸς ἧος ἔην ἔτι νήπιος ἠδὲ χαλίφρων,
γήμασθ' οὔ μ' ἴεια πόσιος κατὰ δῶμα λιποῦσαν·
νῦν δ' ὅτε δὴ μέγας ἐστὶ καὶ ἥβης μέτρον ἱκάνει,
καὶ δή μ' ἀρᾶται πάλιν ἐλθέμεν ἐκ μεγάροιο,
κτήσιος ἀσχαλόων, τήν οἱ κατέδουσιν Ἀχαιοί.
(My son, while he was still a child and weak of

> mind, would not let me marry and leave the house of my husband, but now that he is big and has come to the measure of maturity, even he prays that I go home out of the palace, impatient over the possessions, which the Achaians are devouring.)[24]

If Penelope is serious, then we have a clear case of deliberation in the contest of the bow. In her speech to Odysseus the beggar, Penelope clearly recognizes her dilemma: either submit to the hated marriage, or risk alienating her son by staying in the household. And, at least in Hölscher's view, she chooses to remarry because she wants to do what is best for Telemachus, now that he has reached the full measure of his maturity. If she is in earnest, this is Penelope's self-directed rhetoric that enables her to yield to the hated marriage.

If Penelope is not serious, then we still have a clear case of deliberation in the contest of the bow. If the contest is a trick, Penelope must know the art of deliberation so well that she can devise what looks like a genuine self-directed rhetoric, deliver this rhetoric to the beggar Odysseus as a means of testing both him and her plan, all the while keeping her genuine deliberation to herself. She is so familiar with the art of deliberation that she can use it as part of her ruse. It seems wholly implausible that Penelope would be able to devise what looks like a genuine self-directed rhetoric, if she didn't know what this rhetoric was.

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[24]Hölslcher's case for Penelope's earnesty continues to dissolve when we call to mind earlier statements that directly contradict Penelope on this point. Her statement is inconsistent with the earlier one of Telemachus that he cannot send his mother from the house, not only because it is wrong but also because he wouldn't be able to afford the fine which Icarious would charge him for doing so (II, 130-133.)

From either perspective, Penelope's familiarity with the art of deliberation and her use of it in her relations with the suitors seems clear.

With Odysseus: Wife

Nancy Felson-Rubin describes Penelope in her scenes with Odysseus as a woman who "previews and deliberates, decides and acts, and, in retrospect, she evaluates her choices."[25] In her scenes with Odysseus, Penelope's deliberative arts are used for two main purposes: first, to elicit information from the stranger that will help her to act in the face of her dilemma; second, to proceed with restraint upon coming face to face with the undisguised Odysseus, at least until that time when Odysseus can pass the test of her cunning. Only when Odysseus passes this test will he be seen in her eyes as her husband, and only then will she allow herself to reenter her role as his wife.

Queen and Beggar

The story of Penelope and Odysseus in the Odyssey begins unfolding when she summons the stranger so that she can question him about her husband. She asks the swineherd Eumaios to tell the stranger to come, so that she can befriend him and ask him of himself and of Odysseus, both of whom happen in fact to be the same person. Eumaios responds with exuberant praise of the stranger. He tells Penelope that for three nights, the

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[25]Felson-Rubin 25.

stranger has charmed him with stories. He compares Odysseus to a divine bard (17.514-521). So from the very beginning, Penelope knows that the stranger is no ordinary beggar, at least not in the eyes of Eumaios, a trustworthy servant of their household. Penelope's response has a sense of urgency to it: ἔρχεο[26], δεῦρο κάλεσσον, ἵν' ἀντίον αὐτὸς ἐνίσπῃ (Get moving, call him here, so that he himself can tell me face to face 17.529). She seems not to care that the suitors would be right outside her door, playing their games (17.530). She ends her summons for the stranger with a plea for Odysseus' return so that the plague in their household will end (17.539-540).

When she finishes, Telemachus sneezes, and around him the palace echoes terribly to the sound. Penelope laughs and calls the sneeze a favorable omen, that death will come to the suitors upon Odysseus' imminent return (17.542-547). The urgency of her summons heightens: ἔρχεο μοι, τὸν ξεῖνον ἐναντίον ὧδε κάλεσσον. οὐχ ὁράᾳς ὅ μοι υἱοὸς ἐπέπταρε πᾶσι ἔπεσσι; (Go for me, summon the stranger to come before me. Do you not see how my son sneezed for all I have said? 17.544-545).

When Odysseus hears of her summons, he tells Eumaios that despite the Queen's urgency, she must wait until the sun has set, because the swarm of suitors is capable of outrageous violence (17.564-570). Eumaios tells Penelope, and she agrees that waiting is best.

Several points need to be made about this scene. First, Penelope learns that the stranger is no ordinary beggar, but more akin to a divine bard.

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[26]This is the imperative of ἔρχομαι, which means to go, to have movement, to depart. The imperative mood combined with this particular verb of movement/departure reveal the initial sense of urgency in Penelope's request. A heightened sense of urgency follows with the omen of Telemachus' sneeze and the repetition of Penelope's command to Eumaios. In essence, she tells Eumaios the second time, "Get going!"

Second, Telemachus' sneeze tells her that death is in the air for the suitors because of Odysseus' impending return. For Penelope, as for many other members of Homeric culture, an omen is a legitimate sign upon which decisions can be made. The sneeze becomes a legitimate sign for Penelope that the moment of crisis is at hand. Third, she feels an extreme urgency to talk with the stranger, as demonstrated in her commands and her disregard for the suitors who are swarming around just outside the door. This extreme urgency must be taken as a sign that Penelope senses the importance of the stranger. Finally, she learns that secrecy is the only condition under which the stranger will meet with her, because of the threat of the suitors.

Considering these points, it is difficult to believe that Penelope's senses are not heightened. The secrecy alone as requested by the stranger must have given Penelope a sense of his intrigue and importance. Under these conditions, it seems implausible that Penelope is not at least on alert for the moment of crisis to emerge. Such alertness serve Penelope well when she questions the stranger after dark. And it will enable her, at the end of her meeting with the stranger, to decide upon a bride-contest.

At the hearth, after dark, Penelope's meeting with the stranger takes place. She begins by informing him of the suitors, her loyalty to Odysseus, her cunning wiles, her trick of Laertes' shroud, and her current lack of a plan (19.124-63). She then tests him by asking what Odysseus was wearing when the stranger met him. Odysseus the stranger gives the details of his clothing and Penelope weeps, realizing that the stranger did indeed know of Odysseus. Penelope then tells the stranger of her dream of the geese and the eagle (19.535-53). In the dream, an eagle with a crooked beak comes down from a

mountain and kills all twenty of her geese, who feed around her house, and which she loves to watch. The eagle then tells her not to fear, that he is her husband and the geese are her suitors. Penelope then wakes to find her geese still alive and feeding around the house.

The stranger Odysseus responds to the dream by telling her that it is self-evident: Odysseus will return soon and inflict punishment on all the suitors. But Penelope says that she thinks the dream is false and cannot be believed. Then she announces that she will hold a bride-contest on the next day. Odysseus agrees that a bride-contest is an excellent idea and reassures her that before any of the suitors can successfully string the bow, Odysseus will return and inflict his punishment on them.

Throughout the course of this interaction, Penelope moves from a woman at her wit's end to a woman with a plan of action, namely the contest of the bow. She enters the interaction with a heightened sense of awareness of the importance of the stranger. Her mind is alert to the fact that the potential moment of crisis is on hand. She discerns through the course of their conversation that the stranger is a trustworthy person, with reliable information about Odysseus. She offers him "guest-friendship" and addresses him as "dear friend" (19.350). And at the end of their conversation, she decides to hold the contest. She had begun the conversation with no plan but ends with one.

How did she arrive at this plan? What information does she discern from the stranger that led her to think of holding the contest? She may believe or intuit that the stranger is Odysseus, or that Odysseus will return in time and her dream will prove to be true, or that no suitor will be able to

string the bow. Or perhaps she believes in the possibility of any of these outcomes. Because of the many reasons that Penelope may have called the contest, I will leave the possibilities open, as Penelope does, and take the point of her interaction with the stranger to be this: deliberation presupposes uncertainty. Sometimes, even in the face of great uncertainty, as is Penelope's case, we must decide how to act. The point is not necessarily how Penelope decides upon the contest after talking with Odysseus, but that she decides. The particulars of what she discerns from the stranger seem less important than the realization that Penelope has entered the conversation with a keen, alert mind, but no plan, and has come away from the conversation with a plan. We don't know exactly what Penelope discerned from the stranger, only that she discerned enough of what she needed to know to make the vital decision to announce the contest.

Penelope and Odysseus

When Penelope and Odysseus finally come face to face, as reunited man and wife, rather than as Queen and Beggar, more is revealed to us about Penelope's deliberate character. In a combination of self-restraint and cunning intelligence, Penelope makes manifest her deliberative art.

When Odysseus and Telemachus have finished killing all the suitors and the disloyal servants and handmaidens, Odysseus comes into his house to wait for his wife. Eurycleia wakes Penelope to tell her the news of her husband's return, but Penelope hesitates to believe what she is hearing. Only when Eurycleia tells her about Odysseus' scar and swears her life on the truth

of his return does Penelope agree to go downstairs. As she comes down from her chamber, she ponders (ὄρμαινει) in her mind whether to keep away and question her dear husband or to go up to him and kiss him, taking his hands (23.85-86—Ὣς φαμένη κατέβαιν' ὑπερῴϊα· πολλὰ δέ οἱ κῆρ ὄρμαιν', ἢ ἀπάνευθε φίλον πόσιν ἐξερεείνοι). Upon seeing him, she is silent for a long time, and Telemachus takes the opportunity to criticize his mother again. He tells her that she is hard-hearted (23.105, θυμός μοὶ ἐνι στήθεσσι τέθηπεν) because she withdraws from Odysseus. He says no other woman would be able to resist as she does.

Penelope responds by assuring Telemachus that her heart is full of wonder, so much so that she cannot find anything to say, nor questions to ask, nor is she able to look him in the face. But, she says, if this man before her is indeed Odysseus then they will find other ways, and better way, to recognize each other, for they have signs (σήματα) between the two of them that are kept hidden (κεκρυμμένα) from others (23.109-110).

Penelope's restraint in this scene can only be accounted for by her deliberative character. Perhaps we could say that she was "stunned into silence," but this interpretation would make sense only if Penelope clearly recognized and wholeheartedly believed that the man before her was indeed her long lost husband. But we are not at all sure at this point that Penelope does recognize him. After all, her hesitation to believe Eurycleia frames this scene. And after her response to Telemachus, Odysseus tells his son that Penelope cannot acknowledge him as her husband because he is dirty and wears foul clothing. One can only imagine what Odysseus must have looked like after killing over 100 men!

The scene ends when they all go and bathe, at Odysseus' request. When Odysseus comes from his bath and appears before Penelope, he looks like a god. He repeats to her much of what Telemachus had said earlier, that she is strange for holding back as she does from him. Penelope responds by telling Odysseus that he is the strange one. She, on the other hand, is neither being proud, nor indifferent nor exceedingly puzzled (23.175 λίην ἄγαμαι), but she knows well how he looked when he left for Troy. Peradotto notes that Penelope's response tests the outer limits of the translator's skill. He says, The sense requires something like 'I know that he was the way you now appear when he left for Troy.'"[27]

While Penelope may recognize Odysseus' physical body, she is not yet satisfied that the man before her is her husband. Perhaps it is a god trying to deceive her (23.215-217). Before she can embrace Odysseus she must identify the totality of his person, body and mind. As Peradotto notes, Penelope does not, as Eurycleia had done, simply settle for the scar, which for the nurse is an unequivocal sign (23.73 σῆμα ἀριπρεπδές). Though she appears to recognize Odysseus' body, she must in addition see the unapparent signs (23.110 (σήματα κεκρυμμένα). Peradotto notes, "For Penelope's ever-incredulous heart . . . the visible, 'unequivocal sign' is at best an unstable token, at worst an illusion."[28] Only when the unapparent signs, the signs of their private memories, become apparent will her heart be persuaded.

To try to make the unapparent signs apparent, Penelope uses her cunning to deliberately deceive Odysseus, making this scene similar to her

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[27]John Peradotto, Man in the Middle Voice, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p 156.

[28]Peradotto 157.

trick of Laertes' shroud, and possibly the contest of the bow, depending on how one chooses to interpret it. She tells Eurycleia to make up a firm bed for him, the very bed that he himself built. She tells the nurse to put the bed outside her chamber and cover it with blankets.

Penelope's deceit is not evident to Odysseus, and he becomes enraged at the thought of anyone else moving his wedding bed, a bed he built with his own hands around an olive tree. The bed can't be moved without being destroyed because one of its bedposts is the trunk of the olive tree. Odysseus' initial anger (23.182 ὀχθήσας) at the heart-rending (23.183 θυμαλγὲς) prospect of a faithless wife who has allowed another man to move their immovable bed dissipates when he realizes Penelope's trick, nearly thirty lines later. Only when Penelope hears Odysseus' account of their immovable bed is she convinced that Odysseus is her husband.

Penelope's trick forces Odysseus to reveal the unapparent signs that she was looking for. She uses her cunning to deliberately devise a ruse that will ensure their safe reunion. After twenty years of resisting, Penelope could in no way easily give herself up to a man who she was not certain to be her husband. She acts on her own behalf with a deliberate deceit so that from her own initiative and on her own accord, she establishes the certainty she needs to reunite with her husband.

Conclusion

At nearly every turn in the Odyssey where Penelope is involved, she demonstrates her expertise in the deliberative arts. Her self-restraint, her

deliberate deceits, and her decision-making are part of her cunning intelligence. This intelligence allows Penelope, in full self-consciousness, to act on her own behalf in the face of the various problems posed by her interactions with her son, her suitors, the stranger, and her husband. It allows Penelope to reach her goals, namely to keep her son safe from the suitors, to delay her remarriage until the time when it is no longer an issue (i.e.. the suitors' deaths), and to reunite safely with her husband. It is this intelligence that is the very center of one who has mastered the art of deliberation, persuading oneself to act in the face of one's problems and to act in ways that foster one's own ends.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation began with an invitation from the Homeric text. Homeric deliberation invites an examination of the private function of rhetoric, or the art of self-persuasion. However, two traditions of criticism reject this invitation. One tradition doesn't believe that Homeric characters deliberate. The other tradition doesn't believe that a Homeric rhetoric of any kind, let alone of the internal kind, exists. In response to the problems posed by these traditions, Chapters 1 and 2 attempted to vindicate the idea of Homeric deliberation and the idea of a Homeric rhetoric, respectively. By the end of Chapter 2, I had attempted to prove that not only does Homer on occasion portray explicitly and completely how characters deliberate, but he presents this deliberation as an internal suasory discourse, a self-persuasion. The bulk of my dissertation examined deliberation as made manifest in the words and deeds of Telemachus, Odysseus, and Penelope.

After completing this examination of Homeric deliberation, the inevitable question of "So what?" looms large. Knowing what we know about deliberation from the individual examples of Odysseus, Telemachus, and Penelope, we must now ask how this knowledge might contribute to a general understanding of Homeric deliberation as well as to our understanding of the history and theory of rhetoric. Ultimately, though, we

must ask how this knowledge of rhetoric contributes to our understanding of our human condition.

Reading Homeric deliberation as an art of self-persuasion led to an examination not only of the paradigmatic deliberation of Odysseus but also the incipient deliberation of Telemachus and the hidden deliberation of Penelope. Homer doesn't portray either Telemachus or Penelope as deliberating explicitly and completely in the way that he portrays Odysseus. But this does not mean that Telemachus and Penelope don't deliberate. I have suggested that these deviations imply narratival constraints that prevent Homer from explicitly and completely portraying the rhetoric of Telemachus' and Penelope's deliberation. Telemachus' deliberation must deviate from the norm of Odysseus' deliberation because Telemachus is largely ignorant of the art. Whereas his father has not only acquired the deliberative skills but mastered them as well, Telemachus is just learning the art. Telemachus' deliberation, as a foil to his father's, must be undeveloped. If Telemachus' deliberation already had looked like his father's, then Telemachus' initial victimization as well as his eventual maturation to adulthood would have seemed either irrelevant to the plot or inconsistent with the development of the plot. Penelope's deliberation must also appear deviant, but for reasons different than Telemachus'. Because Penelope is a woman acting in a man's world she has no sanctioned use of deliberation. She must conceal her deliberation behind her mask of indecision, and she must conceal it in such a way as to deny any insinuation of its presence while still implicitly revealing her deliberation through her deliberate deceptions.

The deliberation of Telemachus and Penelope deviates from Odysseus' norm because of its implicit content. When we see Telemachus act deliberately for the first time by calling an assembly, thus situating himself in the public sphere, we can infer that this deliberate action was brought about by a self-directed rhetoric. When we see Penelope deliberately deceive her suitors with her weaving of Laertes' shroud, we can infer that this deliberate deception comes from deliberate thought. While Homer may not explicitly display the inner workings of Telemachus' and Penelope's deliberation, we have no reason to believe that the deliberation presupposed by their actions is any less discursive or suasory than Odysseus'.

By attempting to critique implicit deliberation, or deliberation as presupposed in a deliberate act, this study has implications for rhetorical criticism. To say that critics have much to gain from interpreting the implicit meaning of a text seems to be a platitude. If a critic's only job were to interpret the explicit, overt meaning of a text, then the practice of criticism would be of the dullest, most unimaginative kind. If experiencing the spirit of the text is a goal of a critic, s/he will do much more than critique the explicit content. As Carroll Arnold has argued, content can be implicit in texts, and the critic must pay attention to this implicit meaning.[1] The imaginative rhetorical critic can go beyond the explicit content of a given speech act in an attempt to explore further the various implicit contexts of that speech act.[2] As Charles E. Morris III has recently written, "A critic

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[1]Carroll Arnold Criticism of Oral Rhetoric, (Columbus: Merrill, 1974) 67-100.

[2]James C. Scott refers to these silences as "hidden transcripts," and suggests that by studying these hidden transcripts, the critic can learn of the power relations that force some transcripts to go under ground and others to enjoy their full freedom of expression. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). Scott's definition of hidden transcripts can be found on page 4-5.

willing to imagine invisible contexts views form as a springboard from which to look for significant silences that exist in the realm of contextual twilight."[3]

Reading the silences of a text is attractive because of its potential to enhance our understanding of peoples and ideas who have been marginalized by the dominant culture of discourse. As Morris points out, we have learned from Postmodernism that boundaries are potentially artificial and cruel. If we fail to understand silence as meaningful, we will potentially fail to understand that which exists outside the boundaries of dominant culture. But if we accept the invitation to examine implicit content, and we affirm that silences can be meaningful, then we participate, at least to some degree, in the freedom of expression of marginalized peoples and ideas. When the critic regards textual silences as expressed invitations to explore that which is being kept silent, for what purpose, and to what end, the reward is the enrichment of our own humanity.

In addition to the implications for rhetorical criticism, this study has also implications for the study of rhetoric's history and theory. These implications relate to rhetoric's centrality in our human condition.

By examining Homeric deliberation as an art of self-persuasion, this study diversifies the historical and theoretical pattern of rhetoric. Few, if any, would disagree that public discourse takes center stage in rhetoric's history and theory. We have come to know rhetoric as a public thing, something that has an audience, something that can be witnessed by another, something that has public and commercial value for its ability to create change. When Susan Jarratt argues for expanding the sites of rhetorical activity, she does so

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[3]Charles E. Morris III, "Contextual Twilight/Critical Liminality: J. M. Barrie's Courage at St. Andrews, 1922," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 82.3 (August 1996): 221.

because traditional histories of rhetoric have been based on a narrow definition of rhetoric as "the teaching and performance of an opinion-based discourse for use in the social sphere as distinct from the poetic and the philosophical or scientific."[4] As a result of restricting rhetoric to the discursive, suasory activity of the public sphere, a single pattern for rhetoric has been established. Canonizing rhetoric as a public art has formed and preserved a lasting foundation for the study of rhetoric in public discourse.

In our post-modern condition, we have come to distrust such stable foundations derived from a single pattern, formed and preserved for all time. Postmodernism suggests that our distrust comes from a recognition that a great deal of selection takes place to create such a monological narrative of the human condition.[5] Selection presupposes rejection. And with rejection comes at least marginalization, if not domination. The ideas and practices that go unselected are those that differ from the dominant culture of ideas and practices. By ignoring these practices, the dominant history and theory also negates them.

Several historians of rhetoric, including Susan Jarratt, Victor Vitanza, James Berlin, and John Schilb, have recognized the need for such revisionist histories.[6] These histories try to dislodge stabilized narratives about rhetoric

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[4]Susan C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991) 12-13.

[5]See for example Michel Foucault's general critique of traditional histories as "histories of dominations" in, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, trans. D. R. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139-164.; and The Archeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

[6]Jarratt, Rereading; John Schilb, "Differences, Displacements, and Disruptions: Toward Revisionary Histories of Rhetoric," PRE/TEXT 8.1-2 (Spring-Summer 1987): 20-44; Schilb, "The History of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of History," PRE/TEXT 7.1-2 (1986): 11-35; James Berlin, "Revisionary History: The Dialectical Method," PRE/TEXT 8.1-2 (Spring-

by exploring equally plausible manifestations of rhetoric. These manifestations diversify rhetoric, usually in the hope that something previously ignored and negated can be attended to and affirmed. While the writers of these histories of rhetoric establish the need for revision, and fulfill that need, at least in part, in their own writings, none ventures very far away from the public sites of rhetoric.

By recording and theorizing only public rhetoric and ignoring private rhetoric, the dominant history and theory of rhetoric has wedged apart thinking and speaking. This separation is suspiciously Platonic, with its bias for differentiating that which we know by seeing with the mind's eye and that which we know by listening to human speech. In this dichotomy, only one form of knowledge is reliable, and it is not the knowledge that speech produces.

This study of Homer has attempted to show, at least in the origins of the western rhetorical tradition, that thought and speech are united, not wedged apart. Thought and speech presuppose one another. Homer's portrayal of Odysseus' deliberation shows that deliberation proceeds as an internal suasory discourse about future action. When Odysseus deliberates, he persuades himself to act in ways that will most effectively foster his desired ends. And when Homer portrays Odysseus as resisting temptations and deliberately deceiving, without accompanying this portrayal with an explicit account of the rhetoric of his deliberation, we can infer that a self-directed rhetoric took place nonetheless. Deliberate actions presuppose deliberate thought. And this deliberate thought presupposes self-persuasion.

Summer, 1987): 47-61; and Victor Vitanza, "Critical Sub/Versions of the History of Philosophical Rhetoric," Rhetoric Review 6.1 (Fall 1987): 41-66.

Thought and speech are not wholly separate practices, nor do they necessarily create two different kinds of knowledge. Instead, as Homer may have been the first but has certainly not been the last to suggest that the two, thought and speech, are inextricably linked, and proceed hand in hand.

By uniting thinking and speaking in deliberation, Homer invites us to view rhetoric in a private site. In the union of thinking and speaking, the private sphere opens up to rhetorical analysis. In turn, the extension of rhetoric to a private sphere offers an opportunity to study the rhetoric of people who are traditionally excluded from the public sphere.

My inclusion of Telemachus and Penelope is an example of including non-traditional practitioners of rhetoric in an examination of the practice of rhetoric. Initially at least, Telemachus is young and inexperienced enough to be excluded from the public realm. And Penelope is a woman. Neither fit the traditional criteria for one who participates in the public realm of the Homeric poems, the dominant space of adult male power. If our scope were focused only on the rhetoric of this public sphere, we would miss the participation of characters such as Telemachus and Penelope in the ways of rhetoric. We would have missed the contrast that Telemachus provides with the adult world of deliberate thought and action. And we would have missed the story of how one young man went about entering this world by acquiring deliberative skills and experience. Perhaps most significant, we would have missed the portrayal of deliberation as an acquirable art. Furthermore, if our scope had encompassed only the public sphere, examining only public rhetoric, or as Nienkamp did, examining only the internal rhetoric of those who participate in the public sphere, we would have also missed the lessons

that Penelope teaches about deliberation, namely one's freedom is directly related to one's ability to deliberate in the face of oppression.

With an expanded scope for rhetoric, we can see that rhetoric has both a private and a public function. Such an expanded scope for rhetoric allows us to see the centrality of rhetoric to our human condition. Not only is rhetoric the art that guides our public choices, it is the art that guides our private choices as well. The possibility for enriching our understanding of our private and public selves calls historians and theorists of rhetoric to account for the rhetoric of deliberation. Studying the rhetoric of Homeric deliberation has been my attempt to answer this call.

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